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SUMMARY 
As a consequence of the recent deregulation in the electrical power production 
industry, there has been a shift in the traditional ownership of power plants and the way 
they are operated. Many new private entrepreneurs with no prior experience in power 
plants operation have entered into the power plant business. Thus, to hedge their business 
risks, they enter into long-term service agreement (LTSA), which can last as long as 
twenty years, with third parties for their operation and maintenance (O&M) activities. 
They share not only the rewards of plant performance surplus, but also the risks of any 
performance shortfall. As the major LTSA providers, original equipment manufacturers 
(OEM) have invested huge amounts of money to develop preventive maintenance 
strategies to minimize the occurrence of costly unplanned outages resulting from failures 
of the equipments covered under LTSA contracts. As a matter of fact, a recent study by 
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) estimates the cost benefit of preventing a 
failure of a General Electric 7FA or 9FA technology compressor at $10 to $20 million.  
Therefore, in this dissertation, a two phase data analytics approach is proposed 
that first uses the existing monitoring gas path and vibration sensors data to develop a 
proactive strategy that systematically detects and validates catastrophic failure precursors 
so as to avoid the failure; then secondly estimate the residual time to failure of the 
unhealthy items. To achieve the goal of this research, a step by step methodology is 
developed for each of the two phases. For the first part of this work, the time-frequency 
technique of the wavelet packet transforms is used to de-noise the noisy sensor data. 
Next, the time-series signal of each sensor is decomposed to perform a multi-resolution 
analysis to extract its features. After that, the probabilistic principal component analysis 
is applied as a data fusion technique to reduce the number of the potentially correlated 
multi-sensors measurement into a few uncorrelated principal components. The last step of 
the failure precursor detection methodology, the anomaly detection decision, is in itself a 
multi-stage process. The obtained principal components from the data fusion step are first 
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combined into a one-dimensional reconstructed signal representing the overall health 
assessment of the monitored systems. Then, two damage indicators of the reconstructed 
signal are defined and monitored for defect using a statistical process control approach. 
Finally, the Bayesian evaluation method for hypothesis testing is applied to a computed 
threshold to test for deviations from the healthy band. 
To model the residual time to failure, the anomaly severity index and the anomaly 
duration index are defined as the defects characteristics. Two modeling techniques are 
investigated for the prognostication of the survival time after an anomaly is detected: the 
deterministic regression approach, and parametric approximation of the non-parametric 
Kaplan-Meier plot estimator. It is established that the deterministic regression provides 
poor prediction estimation. The non parametric survival data analysis technique of the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator provides the empirical survivor function of the data set 
comprised of both non-censored and right censored data. Though powerful because no a-
priori predefined lifetime distribution is made, the Kaplan-Meier result lacks the 
flexibility to be transplanted to other units of a given fleet that were not included in the 
failure data. The parametric analysis of survival data is performed with two popular 
failure analysis distributions: the exponential distribution and the Weibull distribution. 
The conclusion from the parametric analysis of the Kaplan-Meier plot is that the larger 






In recent years, a paradigm shift has been occurring in the role played by complex 
system designers and manufacturers in many different fields. For the most part, major gas 
turbine designers and manufacturers do not just produce and sell new gas turbines to 
customers, they are becoming involved in the total life cycle of the products from 
designing and manufacturing to providing the after sale operation and maintenance of the 
systems for several years. The trend is valid for civil aviation applications as well as for 
electrical power production applications. Particularly in the heavy-duty gas turbine for 
electricity production, the need to outsource plants operation and maintenance (O&M) 
arose as plant owners sought to hedge some of the normally high financial risk of power 
plant operation by paying for some type of insurance premium in return to have insurance 
providers to share the potential risks.  
In general, the electricity production industry is a much-deregulated one in many 
ways with an extensive competition between producers. The reason for that is local and 
federal governments are very much involved at different stages from the production of 
electricity with its efficiency requirements and environment restrictions to the reliability 
and availability of the distribution. The rationale behind the government’s involvement is 
understandable because our modern society depends heavily on reliable and continuous 
power guarantee for businesses, hospitals, airports, school, public transportation systems, 
etc. Therefore, municipalities and electrical power regulatory authorities put strict 
requirements on the minimum acceptable efficiency, reliability and availability, making 
them ones the highest requirement metrics for power plant ability to be dispatched.  
To diverge some of the continuous business risk, plant owners enter into complex 
and specific long-term contractual agreements that can last for several years with third 
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partied O&M providers. The contractual agreements work like insurance policies where 
the manufacturers guarantee a given level of power output and/or efficiency over several 
years. They also provide repair, replacement, and upgrade parts to the degrading power 
plant. Overall, it is supposed to be a win-win partnership for both parties by sharing the 
operation risks and the rewards. On one hand, plant owners don’t have to carry all alone 
the burden of potential investment failures, and also the long-term contractual agreement 
raises the re-sale value of the plant.  
On the other hand, gas turbine manufacturers became the natural fits for new and 
lucrative insurance business ventures because they are the ones who know and 
understand their designed products and will be willing to guarantee its operations. In 
addition to that, by entering into the operational partnership with the plant owners, the 
manufacturers have unprecedented access to “a live laboratory” that should allow them to 
learn from eventual design shortcomings made in previous gas turbine designs in order to 
improve upon future ones, ultimately giving them a competitive advantage.  Also, it is 
important to note that being the plants owners’ partners provide the gas turbine 
manufacturers with a reliable customer base when new parts are needed for upgrade over 
the life of the contract. 
Although there have always been third party players in the gas turbine for 
electricity power plants long-term contractual agreements, the most important players are 
the major gas turbine original equipment manufacturers (OEM) such as General Electric 
Energy (GE Energy), Siemens Power Generation, Alstom Power, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, and Ansaldo Energia. Together, these major OEMs represented about 94% of 
the global market for the period of 2000 through 2004 [1]. Each of these main gas turbine 
original equipment manufacturers has its own definition and the foreseeable benefits to 
the plant owners of their long-term service agreement (LTSA).  
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1.1 Power plant operation and maintenance trend  
With the deregulation of the electrical power production market, private 
ownership of power plants occurred, that introduced new attitudes towards the operation 
and maintenance of those plants, mainly outsourcing. Outsourcing the O&M came as a 
way to face the unprecedented level of competition in the power plant business. Because 
third party O&M deem lucrative for the service providers, a consequence was a 
generation of an environment of competition among independent third party O&M 
provider and OEM, with the competitive hedge to OEM which can assume bigger risk. 
Then the role played by OEMs moved from transactional risk management mindset of 
building and selling gas turbines to end owners, to a long-term contractual risk 
management or partnership with the equipments buyers, see illustrative figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of OEM risk mitigation adapted from [2] 
 
In the past, the transactional approach to risk management was the way power plant 
operation business was done, which is fundamentally different from the now common 
contractual service. In the context of gas turbine usage in power plants, the transactional 
approach can be defined as the plant owner with an outage who can shop around and buy 
the parts, repairs and services as the plant requires. Therefore, the main goal of the plant 
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owner is to find the lowest price bids for services that makes the transactional approach a 
very price focus strategy with little to no ownership interest to the vendors [2]. In the 
contractual approach by contrast, the vendor is a partner who has the same end goal for 
the plant operation and maintenance as the plant owners do. Though the basics of the 
long-term service agreement (LTSA) [3] is similar in nature for all majors OEMs, each of 
them has its own tailored version of definition based on its offerings and the level of 
commitment it is willing to assume as the provider of operation and maintenance. Thus, 
the contractual agreement definition for each of the major gas turbine OEM for power 
plant applications is different and is provided below. 
General Electric Energy promotes its Contractual Service Agreement (CSA) as 
“changing the focus from minimum price to maximum value by aligning the risk/reward 
goals.”[2] GE offers customized CSA in the forms of LTSA and operation and 
maintenance agreement (O&MA) to plant owners. GE defines LTSA as fixed-price 
maintenance contract, based on performance recovery at the key gas turbine inspections, 
over 3 years or longer for planned and/or unplanned maintenance, including all parts, 
repairs and servicing of the equipment. While, GE describes O&MA as a fixed-price total 
O&M and performance guarantee that guarantees the daily performance. The O&M is 
aimed at reducing the risks to the plant owner for future total plant price uncertainty, 
plant technology changes and equipment life. In general, GE Energy offerings are 
flexible and its CSA can be customized to cover what the plan owner deems necessary. 
At the end, GE and the owner share the common goal profit maximization for each other.  
Siemens Power Generation calls its version of the long-term service agreement 
the Long Term Maintenance Agreement (LTMA). Siemens defines its LTMA as: “offers 
of power plant owners with turnkey outage services and equipment, long-term surety of 
pricing, priority emergency support, remote monitoring, and OEM technical support for 
base load gas plants”. Siemens offers LTMA contracts typically over a period of six to 
 5 
twelve years and the contract could be extended to cover generators, steam turbine, and 
balance of plant (BOP) in combined cycle operation [4]. 
Alstom Power sells its long-term service agreement under the umbrella of its 
“Full Turnkey capabilities” with the marketing slogan of “You deserve the best” [5]. 
Alstom offers a customized partnership of total customer solutions, from components to 
full turnkey power plant [6]. The service available to customers is a complete portfolio of 
maintenance services, ranging from spare parts, repair and field services to full-range of 
operation and maintenance packages. The service can also include the refurbishment and 
modernization of existing plants; all of this flexibility is intended to meet specific 
customers’ needs. Furthermore, Alstom differentiates itself from other major OEMs with 
its concept of “Plant Integrator” which covers all aspects of power plant phases from 
design of plan component beyond providing the gas turbine through the commissioning 
process to the plant operation. The end goal of the Alstom strategy is to keep the plant 
owner competitive through the long term O&M by optimizing the capital investment and 
lowering operating and maintenance costs while guaranteeing plant operation and 
performance for the length of the long-term contract. 
Like other major OEMs, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) customizes its 
available options to meet customer needs from a simple long-term part supply contract 
(LTPS) which is a 4years to 6 years contract of guarantee parts supply and engineering 
support to a more complex long-term service agreement (LTSA). MHI provides its LTSA 
for its gas turbine and other power plant equipments for normally six years to twelve 
years term. Typically the LTSA of MHI consists of supplying necessary manpower, 
replacement parts, and maintenance engineering support. Specifically under its LTSA, 
MHI provides: maintenance management that is planning of scheduled inspection and hot 
gas parts management; maintenance engineering service that consists of having a site 
service director for daily support stationed at the customer power plant; a continuous 
remote monitoring service [7]. 
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Ansaldo Energia acquired its full technological independence in 2004 with the 
termination of the Siemens license, becoming one of the major OEMs [8]. In its new 
position, Ansaldo Energia created the concept of OSP (Original Service Provider) to 
support its non-OEM service portfolio. Thus, it can provide service from on-call daily 
technical representative field dispatch to long-term turnkey maintenance contract. Under 
its LTSA, Ansaldo Energia engages in business partnerships with plant owners to share 
the revenues and the operational risks, to optimize costs of operation, to tailor 
maintenance policies and to meet the most demanding environmental regulations. Also, 
Ansaldo will guarantee throughout the duration of the contract the plant output, 
efficiency, technology upgrades and availability.  
Because the competition among OEMs has become fierce with the LTSA offerings 
becoming comparable in scope, there are qualified third party consultants like Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI) which can help customers choose the right O&M 
strategy that meet their needs by providing unbiased comparative study of the offerings. 
EPRI typically assesses competitive offerings using they own tools for neutral decision in 
the best interest of its customers [3]. Thus, LTSA contracts are becoming more complex, 
creative, and flexible in their terms and can be individually customized. Therefore, OEMs 
are much more willing to take higher financial risks by guaranteeing the LTSA 




As a result of the growing competition, non-OEMs and OEMs alike are exposing 
themselves to increasingly high financial risks by guaranteeing plant performance output, 
efficiency, environmental requirements in some cases, and taking on the risk associated 
with O&M for several decades. In fact, the maintenance costs and availability are two of 
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the most significant apprehension a heavy-duty gas turbine that plant owners faces [9] 
because of the financial consequence of unplanned outages. Thus for plant owners the 
LTSA is an insurance policy to mitigate their financial risk associated with wear and tear 
and/or equipment and component failure. Currently, O&M expenditures is a very 
important part of total life cycle cost consisting of 15% to 20% of total life cost cycle 
cost, while the equipment maintenance costs account for approximately 10% to 15% of 
total life cycle cost [2] as illustrated on figure 2 below along with the fuel cost and the 
cost of running the plant.  
 
 
Figure 2: Cost of electricity trend with the O&M expenses [2] 
 
Also a further decomposition of O&M expenses shows that there is always a cost 
associated with an outage whether it is a planned or unplanned one. 
In return, the plant owner enters in a partnership with the LTSA provider in the form of 
revenue and risk sharing. Typically, the partnership works as a stick and carrot policy 
where any extra revenue due to savings on O&M or the excess of performance over the 
guaranteed level after an upgrade is considered a bonus and is shared between both 
parties. However, any loss of revenue due to an unplanned outage or a performance 
shortfall from the expected guaranteed level corresponds to a penalty. Furthermore, if the 
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plant owner is required under contract to provide a set level of electrical power to a 
district when the forced outage occurs, he or she will be obligated to buy the 
corresponding electrical power from other power plans at higher rates. Consequently, the 
LTSA provider has to compensate for the loss revenue to the plant owner and/or the cost 
to buy from other power plants for the necessary electrical power that the plant was 
dispatched for as a liquidated damage. It is clear that the liquidated damage can grow 
quickly and become very expensive for the provider in the case of extended forced 
outage. In general, a forced outage cost includes: loss production, repair cost, and 
eventual penalty. 
1.2.1 The reasons for OEMs to enter in LTSA 
Despite the risks involved with LTSA contracts, they are an enormous revenue 
stream for OEMs. Over the years, the profit margin on sale of new gas turbines has been 
shrinking for OEMs, while LTSA for the most part assured OEMs of the sale of upgraded 
components to sustained degrading gas turbine performance throughout the duration of 
the LTSA. The market of LTSA can be a very lucrative one as illustrated through the 
following example: 
• On November 25th 2008, Business Wire reported that GE Energy and the 
Algerian state-owned power company Sonelgaz entered in a contractual 
service agreement (CSA) worth more than US $1 billon for a period as 
long as 18-years [10]. 
Once a CSA or a LTSA contract is set, the goal of the provider (third party non-OEM or 
OEM) is to design ways to help reduce and manage to lower the level of maintenance 
costs which as shown on figure 2 is typically 15 to 20% of power plant life cycle cost. 
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1.2.2 OEMs develop strategy to make LTSA profitable 
Like in any business endeavor, the main goal of OEM in providing LTSA is to 
make it profitable for both parties. With the steep liquidated damage amounting to multi-
millions of dollars associated with not meeting the reliability and durability requirement, 
LTSA providers need to develop strategies so that the revenues generated from the 
contracts exceed the costs of the involved risks. Thus, OEMs have been investing huge 
amounts of money to develop strategies to avoid unplanned plant outages in the first 
place, or to be as well prepared as possible to mitigate the effects for those unavoidable 
ones. Thus, OEMs like GE Energy created a Power Answer in Atlanta, GA, where all 
power plants under the CSA contracts are continuously monitored using installed sensors; 
the data is recorded and stored for post processing to detect any abnormal trend.  
 
Figure 3: GE Monitoring & Diagnostics concept adapted from [2] 
 
On the illustrative Figure 3 shown, the on-site monitor compares the actual unit 
performance with baseline predictions and provides the first level of anomaly detection 
and notification. The field service engineer is on hand to assess the equipment health, 
 10 
while the engineer at the power answer center reviews the overall performance data on a 
daily basis and considers all abnormal events. There is an ongoing communication among 
the three parties for an adequate health parameters assessment of the covered equipments 
of the plant to identify signs of any equipment malfunction.  
However, with the length of the LTSA contracts becoming longer with some them lasting 
more than twenty (20) years, the task of detecting all potential anomalies of gas turbine 
health is becoming daunting. There are many explanations for the difficulties in 
recognizing some of the rare or short lasting fault events that might lead to engine trips 
such as the machine-to-machine variation, uncertainties of machine degradation and 
power plant operating conditions (i.e. load condition).  In addition, OEMs like GE 
Energy services provides long-term contractual service agreement to hundreds of utility 
companies throughout the world based on different power plants design and operating 
condition, making each CSA contract to be individually written to suite the plant owner 
interests and needs (e.g. plant Power, plant efficiency, plant emission, etc). On top of that 
gas turbine designs are becoming more complex in order to meet higher requirements for 
efficiency, output, and environmental regulations. All these constraints will add to the gas 
turbine vulnerability to uncommon faults. The strategy of continuously monitoring the 
plant equipment to detect early indication of faulty behaviors has become widely popular 
in the industry. However, although many companies have invested huge amounts of 
money in sensor technology, sensor accuracy, and other monitoring devices, and have 
significantly improved the storage capacity and access of the collected data in the past 
several years, advanced analysis of the accumulated monitored data is still in its infancy 
stage and very limited to simple data post-processing techniques like data trending.  
As a consequence of the limited extraction of useful information out of the collected data 
and due to not taking full advantage of the capability acquired from the monitoring in real 
time, many failures such as first row (R-0) of both 7FA and 9FA of GE gas turbine 
compressors are still happening as reported in the EPRI report titled “GE FA Compressor 
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Dependability (Phase 2)” [11]. Those undetected failures defeat the goal of the power 
answer which goal is to detect anomalies that may have led to them, so to avoid them in 
the first place. Thus, in recent years, there have been new and improved techniques such 
as condition based monitoring (CBM) and prognostics health management (PHM), to 
detect anomalies in their early stages of development. Currently, the new techniques have 
not allowed to totally solving the issue of missed early detection of all the anomalies; 
although the merit of their concept is well accepted, their practical implementation is still 
not done in real time for the most part. Therefore, as a solution to avoid failure, in this 
work a twofold systematic approach to take full advantage of the real-time monitoring 
process is proposed. First, the equipment health in real-time using advance data 
processing techniques is continuously assessed. Then, once a fatal anomaly is detected, 
an estimation of the remaining useful life (RUL) is provided. 
 
1.2.3 Relevance of Potential impact of research 
The aim of this thesis is to propose a process to systematically detect anomalies at 
their earliest possible stage and to evaluate their severity. In the case where a detected 
anomaly is deemed fatal, then the potential survival time of the faulty equipment is 
estimated as to allow the power plant operators to make the appropriate decision whether 
to conduct an emergency shut down or to call for another power plan to come online to 
assume their power production.  
The most significant accomplishment of this work will be the ability to capture the thus 
far undetected precursory events to catastrophic failures and shut down power plant so to 
avoid them. The ability to avoid or even decrease the number of catastrophic gas turbine 
failures has an immense economically consequence considering the steep cost of 
unplanned power plant outages to LTSA providers. It is understandable that detected and 
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replacing a faulty compressor blade would have cheaper cost in consequence to replace 
than to letting the blade detached and destroy the entire compressor. Because, the total 
cost of replacing a whole gas turbine compressor instead of a single compressor blade can 
add up quickly with a loss of revenue due to an extended outage, the cost of a 
maintenance crew for a longer period of time, and the cost of entire compressor 
equipment. As a matter of fact, EPRI estimates the cost benefit from preventing a General 
Electric gas turbine 7FA and 9FA technology compressor failure at around US $10-20 
millions [11].   
Therefore moving the maintenance strategies from a concept of preservation and 
protection to that of asset management and optimization [8] will be the key for earlier 
detection of maintenance need.  Overall, given that the LTSA contracts are as long as 
over twenty years, it is important for the O&M providers to become proactive to avoid as 
much as possible catastrophic failures that would consume their potential profits or even 
produce a negative return on investment on the long run as repeated costly failures would 
defeat the capitalist purpose of their prospect as insurance providers. 
          
1.3 Research Organization 
As stated previously, this research offers a methodic process for early failure 
precursor detection and model the residual time to failure once an anomaly is detected as 
a tool to decrease the cost of power plant outages.  The remainder of this thesis is 
organized in six more chapters.  
In chapter 2, the research is put in context with its background and the research goals are 
defined. The chapter 3 is an overview of the mathematical aspect of the time-frequency 
techniques, with the emphasis on the Wavelet Transform. Then, the chapter 4 is devoted 
to the first part of the proposed methodology, where each step of the failure precursor 
detection is presented.  
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Next, the chapter 5 is dedicated to the second part of the methodology, which is to model 
as accurately as possible the prognostication of the residual time to failure of gas turbine 
compressor after the detection of a failure anomaly. Thus, the deterministic regression, 
the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier, and the parametric survival analysis techniques are 
investigated. The chapter 6 is about implementing the proposed methodologies to a fleet 
of 7FA type technology of the General Electric gas turbines compressor as a proof of 
concept. Finally, in the chapter 7, a brief recapitulation of the proposed approach is 
provided will the successes and the challenges, followed by a few recommendation for 
future work to complement this research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
2BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
2.1 Context 
As explained in the introductory chapter, as a consequence of the deregulation of 
the electricity power generation, many new private investors coming into the electricity 
generation industry had no previous power plant operation management experiences. As 
a way to circumvent some of the financial risks associated with the power plants O&M, 
private investors outsource the operation and maintenance activities of their power plants 
to third parties and focused on the management side of the plants that led to the 
conception of third party insurance providers.   
2.2 Background  
Original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are the third parties natural fit to 
becoming insurance providers to cover power plant equipments like gas turbines. 
Therefore, the major gas turbine OEMs are also the main long-term service agreement 
(LTSA) provider. The LTSA contracts can usually last as long as over twenty years. 
There are expensive financial and reputational consequences for the OEMs in the cases 
where failures of equipments under coverage are the cause of unplanned outages.   
Accordingly, OEMs are investing substantial amount of money to develop maintenance 
strategies to avoid unplanned power outages or in case they were to occur to keep the 
disruptions as short as possible and the consequences to a minimum. So far the strategies 
have mainly been to establish rigorous maintenance plans and more proactive ways such 
as the installation of sensors and other monitoring devices to remotely assess the 
condition of the covered equipments. Thus, the next few paragraphs will devoted to an 
overview of the different traditional maintenance plans, then an OEM in-house 
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maintenance strategy will be presented, and some other proactive ways to improve the 
overall plants availability. 
2.2.1 Traditional maintenance policies 
2.2.1.1 Run-to-failure  
Run to failure is the oldest and simplest type of maintenance strategies. It requires 
a repair, a replacement, or a restorative action be performed on a machine or a facility 
after the occurrence of a failure in order to bring this machine or facility to at least its 
minimum acceptable condition. Run-to-failure is a corrective maintenance policy also 
called "crisis maintenance" or "hysterical maintenance" because of its nature of being 
unplanned. When the run to failure strategy is in place, the equipment is used until failure 
occurs then the failed component is either repaired or replaced [12] (e.g. light bulb). 
The run to failure method has some advantages [13]:  
• It maximizes the useful life of the equipments 
• It is a low cost strategy  
•  It requires a minimal management 
• It can be useful on small non-integrated plant 
On the other hand, the run to failure strategy has many disadvantages: 
• It is not applicable in cases of irreversible damage 
• It usually has a high downtime because maintenance crew are often not on hand 
• It is done on an ad-hoc basis with a high cost of repairs 
• It requires an unnecessary crisis management when failure occur 
• It requires a large volume of spare inventory, which can be very expensive  
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2.2.1.2 Standard preventive maintenance 
Preventive maintenance can be defined as a schedule of planned maintenance 
actions aimed at the prevention of breakdowns and failures. The main goal of preventive 
maintenance is to catch a potential failure of equipment before it actually occurs. There 
are two main preventive maintenance plans: periodic preventive maintenance and 
sequential preventive maintenance [14]. Unfortunately, because both types of preventive 
maintenance rely on schedule planned inspection to observe an imminent fault, there is 
still a possibility for a catastrophic failure happening between two inspections [12]. 
Preventive maintenance is an improvement over the run to failure strategy. Thus some of 
the advantages of the preventive maintenance are: 
• Outages can be planned ahead of time with the possibility of logistic planning 
• The downtime of maintenance can be reduced  
• The maintenance occurs under the management control 
But there are still some disadvantages to the preventive maintenance strategy: 
• It leaves some unused useful life of the equipment 
• It can be difficult to implement for varying failure patterns 
• It can be expensive in terms of over maintenance 
• It does not  eliminate all catastrophic failures because they can still happen 
between scheduled maintenance 
2.2.1.3 Condition-based maintenance 
This is planned 
Condition-based maintenance can be defined as a planned maintenance based 
upon measuring the condition of all machine elements during the normal operation of the 
machine [13]. The goal of these measurements is to permit the prediction of the time to 
failure for all elements and thus to allow the maintenance activities to be planned before 
any elements fail. However, the concept of condition-based maintenance relies on the 
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recognition of a change in condition and/or performance of an equipment to trigger the 
implementation of the maintenance [15].  
The condition-based maintenance is a more active strategy than the previous two. A 
number of the condition-based maintenance advantages [13] are: 
• It decreases overall maintenance costs because maintenance is performed as 
needed when equipment deterioration is detected 
• It can extend system life  
• It has the ability to be machine specific 
• It  allows management  and logistic control by planning maintenance operation 
ahead of time 
There are disadvantages as well to condition-based maintenance: 
• It still requires inspection of the equipment to assess potential faulty conditions, 
so catastrophic failures can still happen between inspections  
• It relies on equipment deterioration, thus there is a chance to miss hard failure 
because of the short deterioration time see figure (4). 
• It requires a continuous management effort  
For the CBM to be successfully implemented, it is important to know the items failure 
modes in order to understand whether or not a given maintenance strategy would 
appropriately prevent the failure from happening.  
 
In essence, the field of maintenance has been an evolving one as illustrated on Figure 4 
[16]. Overtime, as systems became more complex, the maintenance strategies followed 
suit and became more proactive. 
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Figure 4: Paradigm shift in industrial maintenance [16] 
 
Hence, advanced maintenance strategies such as CBM+ (developed by the DOD) and 
PHM are becoming widely accepted and implemented on complex systems because their 
maintenance policy decision is based on systems a health centric approach.  Thus, a brief 
overview of the failure categories is presented followed by a manufacturer developed 
specific maintenance plan for its systems.  
2.2.1.4 Types of failure [13]  
There are two types of failure as illustrated on Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of Hard and Soft failures [13] 
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2.2.1.4.1 Soft failure:  
It develops gradually over time. It is usually a characteristic of mechanical 
elements as the wear of the elements is the basis of a gradual degradation of its operation. 
Its signature is much easier to observe because of the trend in the performance 
degradation. Thereby, soft failure allows that a fault prediction could be remedy through 
an adequate implementation of preventive maintenance and the condition-based 
maintenance. 
2.2.1.4.2 Hard failure:  
Contrary to soft failure, hard failure tends to happen instantaneously. It is more a 
characteristic of electrical circuit. But it can occur in mechanical elements when the 
change in equipment performance is a short lasting one and/or a precursory  catastrophic 
failure goes undetected [13]. Evidently, neither the preventive maintenance nor the 
condition-based maintenance would be suitable to avoid elements failure in the case of 
hard failure. 
 
2.2.2 A OEM customized maintenance 
Besides the well-known maintenance strategies introduced above, maintenance 
plans can be customized toward given interests of the users. Thus, in their 2006 paper 
titled “A Profit-Based Approach for Gas Turbine Power Plant Outage Planning”, Zhao et 
al. presented a method to plan maintenance actions so to maximize the profit of power 
plant operation [17]. Also in [14], Zhao et al proposed a way to plan preventive 
maintenance schedule with economic factors as the decision driver. General Electric, one 
the major OEMs has developed more tailored preventive maintenance techniques to meet 
its LTSA contracts commitment as an O&M provider. Therefore, based on its extensive 
experience acquired through the wide range of gas turbines it has sold and it is currently 
maintaining worldwide, GE bases its gas turbine maintenance need on the criteria of 
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independent counts of starts and hours. Whichever criteria limit is first reached 
determines the maintenance interval as shown on figure (5) [9], instead of the normal 
performance degradation trending as a tool to make a preventive maintenance decision. 
 
  
Figure 6:GE gas turbine maintenance need based on counts of starts and hours adapted from [9] 
 
2.2.3 Remote Monitoring center 
Thanks to the complex maintenance strategies developed by OEMs like GE, they 
are able to improve their preventive maintenance for soft equipments failure where there 
is usually a noticeable fault signature over time. However, those strategies can hardly 
prevent equipments hard failures. Therefore, there is a need to find more proactive ways 
to handle that type of failures. Hence as reported in the chapter 1, GE has invested 
resources in the creation of a monitoring center called “Power answer”  to improve its 
ability to expand the existing maintenance plans to be more proactive by detecting 





Through an analysis of the context and background a few observations can be 
made: 
2.3.1 Observation 1  
Even though a lot of the efforts and resources have been deployed through the 
development of complex and customized maintenance policies, and the creation of a 
monitoring center, there are still failure precursors going undetected. Indeed as reported 
by the EPRI in its report 1016159 in 2007, the GE gas turbines 7FA and 9FA technology 
compressor tilted:  “blade cracks and several failure incidents prompted an independent 
root cause investigation” [18]. Furthermore, the fact that there was a second phase 
documented in report 1016269 [19] in 2008 to further  study the same problem of 
compressor failure implies that the issue has become increasingly troublesome. 
2.3.2 Observation 2 
Usually all the machines covered under the LTSA contracts are continuously 
monitored in real time using installed sensors on the gas turbines and the readings have 
been stored for years in most of the cases. The stored sensors measurements data can be 
accessed at any time for post-processing of signals. Therefore, full advantage should be 
taken of the stored data, especially since there is no extra cost to be inquired for the 
monitoring process (i.e. use of existing sensors).  
2.3.3 Observation 3 
  The sensors are set to make measurements at a regular interval of time. Among 
the sensors, there are sensors that measure the machine health condition, some sensors 
measure the vibration level of different subsystem (compressor, combustor, and turbine) 
of the gas turbine, other sensors measure the overall condition of the gas turbine 
performance (e.g. power output, efficiency), and some other sensors measure the 
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operating condition (e.g. load) and the environment condition (e.g. ambient condition 
measurement).  Based on a definition of a time series as a sequence of data points, 
measured typically at successive times, spaced at (often uniform) time intervals, it can be 
concluded that sensors measurements overtime represent a time series signal [20].  
 
 
2.4 Research Objectives and questions 
 
Based on the observations, even with the existence of well-established preventive 
maintenance techniques in its arsenals, including its capability to monitor the gas turbine 
online monitoring, the GE 7FA and 9FA gas turbine compressor catastrophic hard failure 
has remained a problem. It is true that it could be difficult to avoid unplanned failure all 
together given the hundreds of gas turbines worldwide under GE’s LTSA contracts. 
However if there can be a way to make sense of the events that preceded the known 
compressor failure, an approach could be developed to recognize similar signs in the 
future in other gas turbines so to avoid the same failure from happening. Thus, the main 
research objectives can be defined:  
2.4.1  Objective 1: 
Develop a process to find precursory failure signatures as early as possible in order to 
avoid systems catastrophic failure. 
2.4.2 Objective 2: 
After an anomaly is detected, develop a strategy to prognosticate an estimation of the 
residual time to failure. 
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As a consequence of the defined research objectives, the following research questions can 
be formulated: 
2.4.3 Research question 1:  
How can a precursory anomaly that might lead to a gas turbine catastrophic failure be 
detected?  
2.4.4 Research question 1a: 
How can a failure precursor detection method be made robust? 
 
After a failure precursor is detected, it is important to confirm that any detected anomaly 
is indeed a true failure sign so to reduce or eliminate the number of false alarms. Because, 
a high number of false alarms can be detrimental to the practical implementation of any 
diagnostics techniques as the system operators in charge of taking required actions when 
warning signs are identified, may start to disregard those warning alerts after a given 
number of false alarms, which may defeat the purpose of the earlier detection of failure 
precursors. Thus, a second research question can be formulated: 
2.4.5 Research question 2: 
 How can a detected precursory event be statistically validated? 
2.4.6 Research Question 2a: 
How does the sampling interval impact on the quality of detection? 
 
Once a failure precursor is validated, the much more valuable information to plant 
owners is the time left before the unhealthy items actually fail. That yields to the third 
research question  
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2.4.7 Research question 3:  
If a failure precursor event is validated, how can the residual time to failure of the item 
be estimated? 
Since for power plants emergency shut downs can be costly, it is imperative to assess the 
probability of a health-compromised item ability to survive through the estimated 
remaining life. That concern lead to the fourth research question:  
2.4.8 Research question 4:  
How can the confidence level of the estimated residual time to failure be determined? 
 
An attempt to answer these posed research questions leads to organizing the research 
approach into two main parts: 
 
1) Failure precursor detection, followed by the validation of the detection  
 
2) Estimation of the residual time to failure of a precursory anomaly, followed by the 
confidence level of the estimation. 
 
In the contest of industrial and technology, and based on the following formal definitions: 
• Prognostics is defined to be the detection of failure precursor followed by the 
prediction of remaining useful life (RUL) [21], 
• Prognosis is defined to be detecting the precursors of a failure, and predicting how 
much time remains before a likely failure [22], 
• Prognosis as the answer of the question: what is the remaining useful life of a 
machine or a component once an impending failure condition is detected and 
identified? [23], 
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The scope of the undertaken work to respond the research questions can be formally 
defined as a prognostics problem.  
 
2.5 Previous work on fault diagnostics of time-frequency processing techniques 
 
To answer the posed research questions, there is a need to review how time series 
data have been dealt with in the past to extract useful information about the content of the 
signals. Signal analysis is one of the most important methods used for condition 
monitoring and fault diagnostics [24] . In the literature, there exist many signal 
processing techniques that have been efficiently used to extract information from time 
series signal. As a way to process the  time series data, Carden and Fanning recommend 
to convert the data from the time domain into the frequency domain using the Fourier 
transform [25]. Fourier transform is one of the oldest and the most used of the time-
frequency domain analysis techniques. However, the Fourier transform is limited as it 
erases all time dependence once the data is converted in the frequential representation  
[26]. Accordingly, Peng and Chu provide an extensive review of other signal processing 
methods in  [24].  In the past Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) which is an efficient 
algorithm to compute the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and its inverse has been one 
of the signal analysis methods used for fault diagnostics [24]. But FFT is limited in 
dealing with non-stationary signals [24]. Because the sensor data are non-stationary, 
other methods have been contemplated like the Wigner-Ville distribution (WVD) [27, 28] 
and the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) [29, 30] that are able to transform one-
dimensional temporal signal into a two-dimensional function of time and frequency [24, 
31]. Though, the WVD and STFT are true-time frequency representations for the sensor 
data, they have some drawbacks. For instance, the STFT can only provide a constant 
resolution for all frequencies because it uses the same window for the entire signal 
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analysis. To address those flaws,  other methods were brought about like the Choi-
Williams distribution (CWD) [32] and the cone-shape distribution (CSD), but they all 
had some sort of disadvantages.  
Therefore, to deal with the shortcomings enumerated with previous techniques, the 
wavelet theory has become the signal processing method of choice for time series 
analysis. Mallat and Hwang successfully used the wavelet to detect signal singularities 
[33]. Also, Jiang et al used wavelet methodology to detect damage in the thermal 
protection system panels [34]. Wang and McFaden had a series of publications on the use 
of wavelet to successfully detect mechanical failure [35, 36]. Boulahbal et al. found that 
the wavelet transform was appropriate for the detection of vibration transients generated 
by developing localized faults in gear trains [37]. Also, different modifications of the 
wavelet method and particular wavelet have been rightfully applied for fault detection. 
That is, Butler and Dey used the discrete wavelet to detect equipment failures for the 
purpose of preventive maintenance [38]. Then, Lin and Qu used the Morlet wavelet for 
mechanical fault diagnosis [39]. Saxena et al also used the complex Morlet wavelet to 
extract useful features to distinguish between faulty and healthy gear plates [40]. Mufti 
and Vachtsevanos applied a fuzzy-wavelet for fault detection [41, 42], while Wu and Du 
used the wavelet packets to extract signal features [43], which were necessary 
information for fault detection. Sun and Chang [44] also used the wavelet packet for 
damage assessment. Others like Pittner and Kamarthi used the wavelet coefficients 
instead of the wavelet transform components to extract signal feature [45]. One of the 
combinations much used for fault diagnostics and prognostics is the wavelet transform 
augmented with the neural networks, like in [46, 47]. 
The literature on the successful use of wavelet and its variants for the purpose of fault 
detection and prognostics is enormous. 
Since the goal in signal processing for fault diagnostics is to extract dominant features so 
to make the accurate decision, it is important to choose an appropriate technique that 
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would not arbitrarily truncate some useful information. Because, there are many factors, 
like changing environment and faults from the machines themselves that make the output 
signals of the running machines contain non-stationary components, time-frequency 
analysis is a better choice for non-stationary signal analysis.  
As a summary of the literature review for fault detection, it can be safe to say that 
though in the past dynamic systems based on vibration signatures and other health 
monitoring sensors data have generally relied on Fourier transforms type of analysis as a 
means of transforming time series signals from the time domain into the frequency 
domain, Fourier analysis proved to be limited as it provided poor representation of 
signals well localized in time. Therefore, it is difficult to detect and identify the signal 
pattern from their expansion coefficients. As a remedy, the wavelet methods in general 
and the wavelet packet transforms in particular appear to be a successful alternative 














           Excellent         Good        Fair           Poor       
 
The Table 1 above compares the different time-frequency methods for the adaptive time–
frequency analysis skill. The wavelet performs better than other methods, such as the 
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STFT, WVD, CWD and CSD. That explains the fast expansion of the wavelet techniques 
for fault diagnostics [24].  
2.6 Literature review on residual life estimation 
There are a fair amount of techniques in the literature used to estimate the 
remaining life of component after a failure precursor is detected. Many entities have in-
house proprietary tools to assess the remaining life of their systems like the life extension 
analysis and prognostics (LEAP) developed by the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory [49]. Otherwise in general the prognostics techniques can be organized into 
three major groups [22]:  
1. data-driven 
2. Model-driven  
3. Hybrid of data-driven with model-driven 
2.6.1 Data-driven:  
In a 2005 paper entitle “A survey on data-driven prognostics”, Schwabacher 
reports a list of fairly recent data-driven studies [22]. Vachtsevanos et al [50] report that 
artificial neural networks (ANNs) is a good candidate for prediction because the ANNs 
are self-adaptive and make few assumptions about the models. However, a major 
drawback is that standard statistical method for confidence estimation is not applicable to 
ANN. Thus, Vachtsevanos et al [50]  and also Zhang [23] present the  dynamic wavelet 
neural network (DWNN) as a tool that successfully accomplishes the prediction of the 
remaining useful life.  Fuzzy logic has been selected as a way to make a component 
failure prediction [23, 51, 52]. Byington et al [53] put the neural networks and fuzzy logic 
as viable methods. And in [54] Byington et al maintain the neural network as a data-drive 




In his PhD thesis, G. Zhang  [23] defines the model-based approach as a physical 
model based that requires detailed and thorough understanding of the system as opposed 
to the data-driven approach. Also, Vachtsevanos et al define model-based as physics 
based [50]. Therefore in this research a model-based prognostics techniques is considered 
to be necessary a physics-based model. A list of recent works on artificial intelligence 
that is a model-based method can be found in [55]. 
 
2.6.3 Hybrid of data-driven with Model-driven: 
The mixture of the data-driven and the model-driven approach can be very 
powerful as it makes use of the best of both worlds. Thus, Gebraeel [56] and Gebraeel et 
al  [57] use a statistical approach with a preset threshold to compute residual life 
distribution. Peng and Vachtsevanos chose DWNN as the tool to address the problem of 
assessing the remaining useful life of critical components [46]. Suarez et al use the notion 




In this research, the following assumptions are considered: 
• The required sensors (vibration, health, and operating condition) to continuously 
monitor the system are installed and working as intended.  
• The required sensors are installed at appropriate position 
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• The proposed process to be hypothesized is based on the gas turbine current 
operating profile (e.g. gas turbine load)    
• For a relatively short period of time, the number of starts and stops has no impacts 
on the remaining life of the machine.  
• For the remaining life estimation, the gas turbine operating conditions remain 
unchanged after the estimated remaining life (e.g. the gas turbine continuous to 
operate after the remaining useful life is estimated as it did before the failure 
precursor was detected during its healthy period)  
This work is not intended to deciding on the number or the position of monitoring sensors 
as other works that have focused on the optimal number of sensors needed and their 
location like in [23], or in the paper [59] that was devoted to the sensor location for the 




Based on the literature review for time series signal analysis, the Wavelet 
transform methods are clearly the best choice for time-frequency analysis. As Percival 
and Walden stated in [60] wavelet is a powerful technique for signal processing, which  
was reiterated by Jiang and Adeli in  [61]. Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated: 
2.8.1 Research Hypothesis 1:  
A multi-step process that relies on the Wavelet transforms theory can be used to detect a 




As the result of the literature review on the estimation of residual time to failure 
and remaining useful life, a method that relies on the artificial neural networks will be 
used. Therefore a second hypothesis can be formulated: 
2.8.2 Hypothesis 1a:  
Combining the information from the two types of sensors could decrease the number of 
missed precursory anomalies 
 
2.8.3 Research hypothesis 2: 
The X-bar control chart type of  statistical process control can be utilized to establish the 
anomaly threshold, and thus distinguish  the faulty events from the non-defective ones. 
 
2.8.4 Research Hypothesis 2a: 
The smaller the time step (the higher the frequency) is, the more accurate the detection 
quality will be. 
 
2.8.5 Research hypothesis 3: 
Survival analysis techniques such as deterministic regression, non-parametric and 
parametric analysis of failure data can be used to build models that estimate the residual 
time to failure. 
2.8.6 Research hypothesis 4: 
Existing mathematical techniques can be used to compute the confidence interval of the 
survival time estimation. 
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CHAPTER 3  
3MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND OF WAVELETS  
 
 
The goal of this research going forward is to answer the research questions and to 
validate the proposed hypothesis. Thus, the first hypothesis, which states that the wavelet 
transform theory could be used for the detection of a precursory anomaly that might lead 
to a gas turbine compressor catastrophic failure, has to be confirmed. First an overview of 
the time-frequency techniques for signal analysis is given, followed by a step by step 
explanation of the proposed approach to the detection failure precursor. 
 
3.1 Analysis of Time-frequency of high frequency signals 
The monitoring sensors types dictate the signal frequencies to being dealt with in 
this work. In general, the sensor measurements can be classified in two different groups: 
• The static or process-related measurements which are typically used for 
temperature measurements, pressure measurements, flow rate measurements 
• The sensors characterized by their high bandwidth used for vibration 
measurements, ultrasonic measurement [50].  
The measurements illustrated by their high bandwidth are particularly high-frequency 
devices. That is, the vibration sensors measurements are necessary high-frequency 
measurements. Therefore to encompass all the different types of sensor measurements, 
the high-frequency signal processing techniques are retained. Among them, the Fourier 
transforms is one of the well known, though in recent years the wavelet transforms has 
been taking over as the premier choice, which coincidentally is based on the underlining 
idea of Fourier transforms. 
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3.1.1 Fourier transforms overview  
Fourier transforms (FT) is the most popular frequency domain analysis technique 
because of its ability to decompose an energy limited signal ( )tf  by its Fourier transforms  
( )ωF  so to analyze the signal in the time domain ( )tf  for its frequency contents  ( )ωF  as 
defined by the following equation below:  








      (1) 
Where, ( ) ( ) dtetfF tiωω −
∞
∞−∫=       (2)                                       
However, the Fourier transforms gives global information on the frequencies of the 
investigated signal, it can not give local information if the spectra composition of a signal 
changes rapidly with time [62]. To address some of the limitations of the Fourier 
transforms, some particular cases have been developed like the Fast Fourier Transform 
[63] which is an efficient algorithm to compute the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and 
its inverse.  Whereas the short time Fourier transform (STFT) or windowed Fourier 
transform (WFT) is a true time-frequency analysis method [31]. The STFT concept 
consists of multiplying the signal to be analyzed ( )tf  by an analysis window ( )bt −*γ , 
then calculate the Fourier transform of the windowed signal as followed:  




      (3)  
 The main weakness of the STFT is that it can only provide a constant resolution for all 
frequencies because it uses the same window for the entire signal analysis [24, 64]. 
Although, any time-frequency analysis techniques like the FT and STFT could 
theoretically be used for the signal content investigation, the need to know the frequency 
content along with the location in time of where there exists an anomaly at different 
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resolutions make both the FT and the STFT unappealing. Consequently, those limitations 
of the Fourier transform and its special cases make the wavelet transform particularly an 
attractive time-frequency analysis technique.  
3.1.2 Mathematical overview of wavelet transforms  
There is a panoply of literature that explain the theory of wavelet transforms and 
its applications, going from the most basic presentations [65] to the more mathematically 
rigorous ones discussed in [66-68]. In a similar manner as for the Fourier transforms, the 
wavelet transform can be defined [43] for any function square-integrable function ( )ℜ2L . 
But instead of using the harmonics
tie ω , the wavelet transforms use wavelet 
basisψ defined in equation (4) and called a mother wavelet function is used for the 
decomposition:   
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.      
 (4) 
        
Where: a is the dilation or scaling parameter and b is the time location or translation 
























             (5) 
The wavelet transform ),( baW f of a signal ( )tf  is computed as shown in equation  
          (6) 
Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes.           
(6) 
Contrary to the Fourier transforms, the wavelet transforms is suited for approximating 
data with sharp discontinuities [69]. One of the main disadvantages of the Fourier 
 35 
transforms compared to the wavelet transforms is that once a signal is Fourier 
transformed from the time domain to its frequency domain, all the information related to 
the time are lost, while the wavelet transforms preserve both the frequency-domain as 
well as the time-domain information. In other words, the wavelet transforms conserve the 
location and time of anomalies. Though the wavelet transforms were established on the 
model of Fourier transform, they decompose a signal into a wide range of basis as 
opposed to Fourier which decomposes signal into basis generated by the sine and cosines 
functions only; making the wavelet transforms such an improvement over the Fourier 
transforms for time series analysis. Wavelet transforms decomposes time series signal 
into two parts: a low frequency part that trends and smoothes the original signal 
(approximations) and a high frequency part that shows local properties such as anomalies 
(details). The wavelet transform decomposes signals by taking the original signal through 
two complementary filters introduced by Mallat [70]: a low pass filter that gives the 
approximation component (or scale) and a high-pass filter that yields the detail 
components as illustrated on figure (7) below: 
 
Figure 7: Notion of filtering for wavelet decomposition 
 
One of the strengths of the wavelet transform is that the decomposition process 
can be iterated to obtained multi-resolution, with the approximations being successively 
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decomposed in turn, so that one signal can be broken down into many lower resolution 




Figure 8: Illustration of the multiple-level decomposition 
 
The multi-resolution decomposition is also referred to multi-resolution analysis (MRA) 
and can be formulated mathematically as well. Thus, first let j be a given decomposition 
level such that all details of the data series on scales smaller than j−2 are suppressed at 
resolution j. The MRA decomposes the function space into a sequence of scaling function 
subspace jV  (subspace of functions that contains the information all the way down 
to j−2 ). By definition of the MRA, jV is contained in the higher subspace 1+jV  
(e.g. 1+⊂ jj VV ) so that the information at resolution j is included within the information at 
any higher resolution [71]. Let jW  be   the wavelet subspace at level j and orthogonal to 
jV . Then the following relation is established: 
 jjj WVV ⊕=+1               (7) 
That is  1+jV is the sum of jV and jW at the immediate lower level 
For j=1: the preceding equation becomes:   
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100112 WWVWVV ⊕⊕=⊕=                       (8) 
This equation can be generalized as:  
jjJjJjjjjjjj WWWVWWVWVV ⊕⊕⊕⊕==⊕⊕=⊕= −−−−−+ 1111 .......          (9) 
Thus a nested relationship [72] can be written: 
( )RLVVVV jjjJj 211.... ⊂⊂⊂⊂⊂ +−−            (10) 
Also, a charm of the wavelets is its ability to act as a “mathematical microscope”, where   
through the multi-resolution “the big picture” or “the context” is seen at coarse resolution 
or scale (large window)  while the fine details are observed at the finest resolution (higher 
frequency or small window) [65] as illustrated in Figure 9. Graps refers to this wavelet 
features as the ability to see both the “forest” and the “trees” [69]. A result of the wavelet 
capability to gradually increase the resolution from coarse to fine enables many direct 
applications like in the pattern recognition algorithms [70]. 
 
Figure 9: Illustration of Time-Frequency domain of Wavelet Transform 
 
Like for the Fourier transforms, there are many specific wavelet transforms like the 
discrete wavelet transform (DWT), fast wavelet transform, and the wavelet packet, each 
of which is suitable for different applications. 
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3.1.2.1 Comparison between wavelet transform and Fourier transform techniques 
There are some similarities as well as differences between the wavelet transform 
and the Fourier transform. As far as similarities, both the fast Fourier transform (FFT) 
and the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) are linear operations that generate a data 
structure that contains n2log segments of various lengths. Also, the matrices used for the 
transforms have similar mathematical properties, while the transpose of the original 
matrix is the inverse transforms of the FFT and DWT.  
However, the dissimilarities are many. The most obvious one is that the individual 
wavelet functions are localized in space contrary to the Fourier sine and cosine functions. 
Another difference between the two transforms is that while the window size is constant 
for the Fourier transforms it varies for the wavelet transform [73] as illustrated on figure 
(10). This specific feature of the wavelet transform allows to have on one hand short 
basis functions to be used on short (i.e. over time) high-frequency to isolate signal 
discontinuities, and on the other hand to have long basis functions to be used on long 
low-frequency to get more detailed frequency analysis.  
 
 




3.1.2.2 Wavelet packet  
One of the limitations of the standard wavelet is that only the approximations are 
decomposed into the subsequent subspaces (see Figure 8). Thus, Coifman and 
Wickerhauser [74] introduced the notion of wavelet packet to address that limitation in 
order to allow the details as well as the approximations to be further decomposed for 
permitting finer resolutions for both of them [61]. As such, the wavelet transform 
materializes as a subset of the wavelet packet [75], because wavelet transform is just a 
part of the wavelet packet (see Figure 11). The wavelet packets are particular linear 
combinations or superpositions of wavelets [76].  
 
Figure 11: Wavelet Packet decomposition [77] 
 
A Signal S can be decomposed at the level 3 as: S=A1+ +AAD3+DAD3+ADD3+DDD3. 
Similarly to the MRA using wavelet, the MRA can be performed using the wavelet 
packet and can be written as the sum of the components it is decomposed into. That is for 
j=1: the following equation is obtained:   
111000112 WWWVWVV ⊕⊕⊕=⊕=             (11) 
Where 001 WVV ⊕=  and  11101 WWW ⊕=  
This process of simultaneously splitting both the scaling function jV  and the wavelet 
subspace jW can theoretically be repeated indefinitely. But in practice the decomposition 
is repeated until a desirable level of resolution is attained. Thereby, the ability of the 
 40 
wavelet packets to decompose both the approximations and the details parts provide more 
details about the signal than the standard wavelet transform can. Just like for its standard 
wavelet counterpart, which has the DWT, the wavelet packet also has the discrete 




4PROPOSED APPROACH FOR FAILURE PRECURSOR 
DETECTION 
 
To efficiently tackle the posed problem, the proposed approach will be organized 
along two major axes: the identification of failure precursor and the prediction of the 
remaining life as illustrated in Figure 12. In the first step the inputs are the data from the 
system monitoring sensors, while the second step is initiated once there is validated 
information about the existence of a failure precursor. The output of the proposed process 
is the remaining useful life of an unhealthy item with its corresponding probability of 
successful survival through the entire estimated remaining life. Therefore the worth of the 























Figure 12: Illustration of the proposed approach organization 
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In this thesis, a detailed methodology is proposed to detect the precursors of 
catastrophic failure. The proposed process is presented following a step-by-step 
approach, where each step has been conceived to make the approach robust and efficient 
in terms of both cost and ease of use. Most damage monitoring techniques rely either on 
vibration-based damage detection [78-80] or health performance soft failure [81], or on 
some type of limited combination of both [82-84]. This research gets its strength from the 
combination of both the vibration sensors and the performance sensors measurements.  
 
4.1 Detection of failure precursors 
 
Though in recent years there have been new and improved techniques such as 
condition-based monitoring (CBM) to help detect anomalies in their early stages of 
development, the new techniques have not totally resolved the issue of missed detections 
for all the anomalies.  Although the techniques’ merit is well accepted, their practical 
implementation is still inefficient because these techniques tend to be theoretical, 
difficult, and/or expensive to apply to real world problems. Therefore, the method 
proposed herein intends to take advantage of the monitoring sensors to capture 
catastrophic failure precursors. 
In general, the health and condition of power plants are monitored using two types of 
sensors:  
• Static or process-related sensors (used to measure temperature, pressure, and 
flow);  
• Sensors, characterized by their high-bandwidth, are used for high-frequency 
signals like the vibration measurements.  
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4.2 Steps for failure precursor detection  
The approach presented in this thesis has been well thought out and methodically 
organized. Each step is a natural progression of the previous one, which enables the 
approach to handle precursor failure detection in complex systems with enough installed 
monitoring sensors. As mentioned above, the proposed approach intends to take 
advantage of monitoring sensors to capture catastrophic failure precursors. Therefore, the 
proposed process does not require any new financial investment in monitoring sensors; 
the existing ones will be used. 
A step-by-step explanation of each block in the flowchart is presented in the 
subsections below. Also, the different steps of the proposed approach have been 
summarized in [85].  
The process of failure precursor detection can be implemented as a systematic method, as 
shown on Figure 13, which starts with the identification and collection of the raw data 
from the sensors of interest using the monitoring procedure. Then, the selected time 
series sensors go through a pre-processing step where the raw data is transformed into a 
useful form of data. Then, the time series is de-noised using a discrete wavelet packets 
transform de-noising scheme. Next, the multi-resolution analysis (MRA), which is 
decomposed at an appropriate pre-defined level for maximum useful signal features 
extraction, is applied to the de-noised signal.. After that, the multi variables sensor 
measurements are fused into fewer uncorrelated variables. The reduced number of 
variables resulting from the data fusion process goes through the anomaly detection 
procedure.     
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Figure 13: Precursor failure detection steps 
 
The next few sections provide a detailed explanation of each of the failure precursor 
detection steps. 
4.2.1 Raw sensors data collection 
 
Modern systems have become more complex and integrated than ever before. It is 
very common to see failure-critical systems that have as high as several hundred sensors 
installed to monitor all facets of their health and operation conditions. Thus, one of the 
very first things to do in any practical health monitoring implementation is to identify the 
list of relevant sensors to be observed. Typically systems or subsystems with large 
numbers of monitoring sensors may require that some type of screening process be 
performed. When there are sensors that represent some type of response, techniques 
whose outcome is the identifications of main effects can be considered (e.g. Pareto plot, 
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multivariable analysis, scatterplot matrix, etc). This thesis will be applied to heavy-duty 
gas turbines that typically have two types of installed monitoring sensors: static or 
process-related sensors and high-bandwidth sensors used to measure high-frequency 
measurements. Furthermore, this study is limited to base load operation only of heavy-
duty gas turbines. Also, the assumption is made that all the necessary sensors needed to 
perform the diagnostic and prognostic appropriately are installed at the appropriate 
location, as there are many other projects that have centered on the optimization of 
number and localization of  monitoring sensors [23].  
To illustrate how one decides on the different sensors to be included in a given study, let 
us consider a GE 7FA technology heavy gas turbine compressor as the subsystem of 
interest. Thus, the sensors that may be directly affected by anomalies in the subsystem of 
interest are selected. A quick screening of the sensor data, performed using a scatterplot 
matrix such as the one shown in Figure 14, reveals that two of the sensors did not 
correlate to any other sensors. Therefore, those two sensors may be eliminated, as they 
don’t provide any useful information about monitored condition of interest (e.g. base 
load operation), and any changes in the other sensors that may indicate an anomaly will 
not have a signature in those sensors. Typically, a scatterplot matrix can be used as a very 
fast tool to look at trends and correlations between parameters, providing valuable 
information for making decision about which sensors will be monitored. The systems 
health and operating condition parameters are continuously monitored and collected 
using installed sensors and stored for potential post-processing.  




Figure 14: Scatterplot Matrix of raw data 
 
 
4.2.2  Data Pre-Processing 
 
The pre-processing of the raw data is a necessary step for a study that relies on 
any type of data mining or data driven technique. Therefore, in the context of this work, 
which is a data driven methodology, the pre-processing stage is an essential one for a 
couple of important reasons. First, the OEMs will not want to share their proprietary data 
on equipment malfunctions because that may affect their competitive advantages due to 
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the risk of reverse engineering. More importantly the pre-processing is needed to avoid 
undesirable scaling effects [86].  The approach outlined in this paper intends to detect 
anomalies based on different types of sensor measurements, such as health monitoring 
sensors, which are static, process-related sensors (e.g. pressure, temperature, flow, etc), 
system condition sensors, which are also static (e.g. gas turbine output, gas turbine 
efficiency), and high bandwidth sensors (e.g. vibration sensors). However, these sensor 
values are recorded in different units and with different orders of magnitude. 
For instance, a typical normal base load operation of GE’s 7FA+e gas turbine technology 
can have a compressor discharge temperature measurement in the range of 600 to 800 
degrees Fahrenheit, while the vibration sensor measurements could be on the order of 
1/10 of an inch per second.  Therefore, an analysis with the raw measurement could be 
artificially skewed towards the variables with higher absolute values. Care should be 
taken when deciding the type of data normalization techniques, because data 
normalization has a very visible effect on the results of given experiments and the 
validity of the conclusions drawn [87] . While there are many data normalizing 
techniques, whose corresponding robustness and efficiency are summarized in the Table 
2 below [88], the pre-processing step used in this work consisted of normalizing each 
measured parameter value by the mean value of that variable measurement. That 
approach put all the different types of sensors readings in the same order of magnitude, 
and thus eliminated the potential outlier measurements that would misrepresent the 








Table 2: Summary of Normalization Techniques [88] 
 
Normalization Technique Robustness Efficiency
Min-Max No N/A
Decimal scaling No N/A
z-score No High
Median and MAD Yes Moderate
Double sigmoid Yes High
tanh-estimators Yes High
Biwieght estimators Yes High  








S         (12)  
Where 'kS is the normalized value of a value kS of attribute A and for k=1, 2, …n 
The min-max normalization technique performs linear transformation of the original data; 
therefore, it can only shift the minimum and maximum to 0 and 1 [88]. 
As for the decimal scaling normalization, it normalizes a value v of an attribute A by 
moving the decimal point, computing normalized v’ as: v’ = (v / 10n) [89].  
In practice, the decimal scaling normalization can be applied when the scores of different 
matchers are on a logarithmic scale. 
The z-score is the most commonly used score normalization technique, and it is 
calculated using the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of the given data. It can 
perform well if prior knowledge about the average score and the score variations of the 
matcher is available. However, to work well, it relies on prior knowledge of the nature of 
the matching algorithm.  The normalized value v’ of a z-score normalization of a value v 
of an attribute A is calculated as: v’ = (v – µ)/ σ. The z-score  method  of normalization  
is  useful when  the  actual minimum  and maximum of attribute A are unknown. 
However, the z-score normalization does not guarantee a common numerical range for 
the normalized scores of the different matchers because if the input scores are not 
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Gaussian distributed, z-score normalization does not retain the input distribution at the 
output [88]. 
The median and MAD (Median Absolute Deviation) normalization is more robust 
(has more insensitivity to outliers and to the points in the extreme tails of the 
distribution) than the previous methods. The disadvantage is that the median and the 
MAD estimators have a low efficiency compared to the mean and the standard deviation 
estimators, and when the score distribution is not Gaussian, median and MAD are poor 
estimators of the location and scale parameters [88]. This method normalizes a value v of 
a given attribute A by computing v’ as follows: v’ = (v – median)/ MAD, where MAD = 
median (|v − median|) [90]. The major drawback of this normalization technique in the 
context of the study is that it does not retain the input distribution and does not transform 
the scores into a common numerical range.   
The double sigmoid normalization is based on the use of the double sigmoid 
function [91].   It transforms the normalized scores into intervals with values between 0 
and 1. The double sigmoid normalization is not as straightforward and simple as the 
previous methods, as it requires a careful tuning of the parameters needed to calculate the 
normalized value in order to achieve a good efficiency. It works by providing a linear 
transformation of the scores in the region of overlap, while the scores outside this region 
are transformed non-linearly.  
The tanh-estimators is one of the  robust normalization techniques [92]. It was 
introduced by Hampel et al. and it relies on the influence function (ψ) [93] . It is a highly 
efficient technique; the influence of the points at the tails of the distribution during the 
estimation of the location and scale parameters makes this method insensitive to outliers. 
However, the parameters needed to estimate the normalized value must be carefully 
chosen in order to ensure the amount of robustness required, which in turn depends on 
the estimate of the amount of noise in the available training data. Consequently, because 
there are so many conditions needed to have a good normalization, this technique is not 
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appropriate for the proposed study, as there is little knowledge of the parameters. 
Furthermore, one of the goals of this thesis is to achieve a methodology that can easily be 
implemented on other systems even with little background knowledge, so the ability to 
apply the characteristics of the raw data to the normalized data is paramount. 
The Biweight estimator was introduced by Mosteller and Tukey [94] and is based 
on the biweight location and scale estimators, which are robust and efficient. The 
Biweight estimator normalization techniques are iterative in nature; that is, an initial 
estimate of the biweight location and scale parameters is chosen, and this estimate is 
updated based on the training scores. Because the major drawback is that it is only 
applicable to Gaussian data, the Biweight estimator technique is not appropriate for the 
current study. 
Although all the normalization techniques presented above have some features 
that make them attractive, a much simpler normalization scheme is used in this study. 
In this thesis a defect will depend on derivatives and the scaling of the variables so that 
having them over the same range ensures that the derivatives will not be biased by the 
magnitude of a particular variable. Therefore, each variable will be normalized using the 
following very simple equation, one that shifts the mean value of each of the sensors to 
be monitored to a value of 1: 
µS
S
S MN =            (13)  
Where : NS : is the normalized sensor value 
MS : is the actual sensor measurement 
µS : is the mean value of the actual sensor measurements 
As a result of the normalization, the following figures show that the characteristic 
distributions of the actual sensor measurements are conserved after normalization. 
 51 
That is, Figure 15 shows a health sensor that has preserved the same distribution for the 
actual measurement (Figure 15-a) and the normalized measurement (Figure 15-b) 
 

















Figure 15: Actual and Normalized Health sensor distributions 
 
Similarly, Figure 16 shows a vibration sensor that has preserved the same distribution for 
the actual measurement (Figure 16-a) and the normalized measurement (Figure 16-b) 
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After making the decision about the different sensors to be included in the study, 
and after each sensor measurement has been normalized following the scheme presented 
in the previous section, each sensor normalized value must be de-noised. 
The de-noising step is an essential one because it is not possible to know with certainty 
that the signal of a sensor measurement is not tainted by noise [50]. As a matter of fact, 
in [95] the authors argue that sensor signals are always inevitably corrupted by noise.  
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4.2.3.1 Time series de-noising techniques 
Research in signal de-noising is a very active area within the signal processing 
field. Sriram et al. present a list of de-noising techniques for signal processing in [96] that 





Table 3 below. Each of the signal denoising techniques in this table has its own 
advantages, and some limitations, depending on the type of application.   
 The first category of techniques in the table is the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)-
based technique; this category can be implemented using either a constant threshold or a 
frequency-dependent threshold. The use of the FFT expedites the denoising process 
because the FFT is a discrete Fourier transform (DFT) algorithm that reduces the number 
of computations for N points from 2N2 to 2N*log2(N). The FFT-based denoising works 
the following way for a given signal:  
- First, the FFT of the signal is taken, and the FFT coefficients that fall above a 
determined threshold are dropped;  
- Then, the signal is reconstructed using the inverse FFT. 
The difference between the two FFT-based techniques is that, in the first, the threshold 
remains constant for all frequencies, while in the second the threshold varies according to 
the principle:  threshold = (j-1)2 * 60 + 10 (j=1,…, n. with n: the n-point FFT is taken).  
This method is mainly used to remove the sinusoidal noise [96], which has pronounced 
peaks in the frequency domain. Thus, this method will not be used in our study, because 








Table 3: Categories of Signal Denoising Techniques (adapted from [96]) 
Category Signal Denoising Techniques
1 Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) -Constant Threshold
1 Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) - Frequency-dependent threshold
2 Low-pass Filtering (Butterworth filter)
2 Low-pass Filtering (Chesbyshev filter)
2 Low-pass Filtering (Inverse Chesbyshev filter)
2 Low-pass Filtering (Elliptic filter)
3 Wigner-Ville Distribution (WVD)
4 Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT)







5 Adaptive Recursive LMS
5 Cascade adaptive filtering
6 Frequency-Domain Adaptive Filtering (FDAF) using DFT
6 Frequency-Domain Adaptive Filtering (FDAF) using DCT
6 Frequency-Domain Adaptive Filtering (FDAF) using DWT
7 Recursive Least Squares (RLS)
7 Exponentially-weighted Recursive Least Squares (EWRLS)
8 Matched Filtering
9 Notch Filtering, direct implementation
9 Notch Filtering, lattice filter implementation
9 Notch Filtering, direct implementation
10 Wavelet-based (Thresholding)
10 Wavelet-based (Mallat's algorithm)  
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 The next category is low-past filtering methods. In general, low levels of noise 
are concentrated in the low frequency region, while the sinusoidal components are 
usually in the high frequency region. For this reason, when dealing with low levels of 
white noise, a low pass filter can be used to extract the noise efficiently. The “Digital 
Filter Design” by Parks et al. [97] contains details about digital low pass filters. 
Typically, increasing the filter order improves the performance of the filter. However, the 
low past-past filtering methods will not be used as the de-noising technique in this thesis. 
 The Wigner-Ville Distribution (WVD) of a given signal is a time-frequency 
representation of that signal [98]. The basis for using WVD as a de-noising technique is 
that WVD is quadratic in nature, so a signal is divided into blocks, and the WVD of each 
block is taken and processed. At every time step t the block is integrated in a small range 
around the center frequency by adding (for upper value) and subtracting (for lower value) 
the step frequency; if the value exceeds the predetermine threshold, it means the presence 
of a signal at time t. The other alternative to this WVD-de-noising technique is based on 
masking the time-frequency [99]. Like in the first method, the signal is divided into 
blocks, and the blocks are multiplied by a 2-D matrix with ones in the frequency range of 
the signal and zeroes elsewhere, which masks the noise components [96]. Finally, the 
desired de-noised signal can be reconstructed by the synthesis algorithm presented in 
[99]. 
The Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT)-based de-noising relies on the STFT 
of a signal, which is another time-frequency representation of the signal. In the STFT, a 
given preset length window is used, where the length of the window determines the time 
and frequency resolutions of the STFT. Thus, the first of the two STFT de-noising 
techniques is based on the calculation of the STFT of the input signal, multiplying it by a 
2-D array of ones and zeroes (masking) and then reconstructing the signal from the 
modified STFT as outlined in [100]. The second alternative for STFT de-noising is based 
on the estimation of the signal from the modified STFT magnitude. After the calculation 
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of the STFT magnitude of the input signal, a first estimate of the actual signal x is 
computed. Then that STFT magnitude is replaced by the available STFT magnitude. The 
signal is estimated, and that value is used as the next estimate of the signal. The process 
is then repeated.  
Though the STFT de-noising technique is a true time-frequency method, it relies on a 
fixed value of window size. Consequently, it will not be retained as the de-noising 
technique of choice in this thesis.  
The next technique is the Least Mean Squares (LMS) de-noising approach which 
has many variants. All the LMS-based de-noising techniques are based on the least mean 
square process which is an adaptive iterative gradient search method [96]. It works by 
using a filter coefficient vector, an error vector, and an input vector. The desired de-
noised signal is the input itself or the input delayed by one sample. Its first alternative in 
the above table is the leaky LMS, which modifies the main LMS approach by using a 
constant leakage factor that has a value between 0 and 1. As consequence, the leakage 
allows the impact on the filter coefficient vector of any single input sample to decay with 
time. The remaining alternatives of the LMS-based de-noising techniques have the 
advantage of reducing the computational burden however, they are not nearly as efficient 
[101]. Thus, the sign-error LMS, the Sign-data LMS, the Sign-sign LMS, the Normalized 
LMS, and the Kurtosis-driven LMS all have a similar expression but different filter 
length and mean value. The Normalized LMS, on the other hand, is used to prevent 
instability in the LMS algorithm, while the two Kurtosis-driven LMS alternatives use the 
‘kurtosis’ of the error. The Adaptive recursive LMS relies on a set of equations. In the 
case of the Cascade adaptive filtering, the convergence can be improved by cascading a 
number of adaptive filters. 
The next de-noising technique is the Frequency Domain Adaptive Filtering 
(FDAF). The FDAF is explained in [101, 102].  When the adaptive filtering is done in 
the frequency domain FDAF it is computationally more efficient than when it is done 
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using the LMS algorithm [96]. The FDAF relies on an equation based on input from the 
discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), discrete cosine transforms (DCT), or discrete wavelet 
transforms (DWT) concerning the corresponding quantities in the time-domain for a 
given filter length. A main advantage of the FDAF over the LMS algorithm is that the 
FDAF (using FFT) necessitates 3*N*log2(N/2) whereas the LMS requires 2N
2+ N 
multiplication. 
The Recursive Least Square (RLS) and the Exponentially Weighted Recursive 
Least Square (EWRLS) methods are used to alleviate the weaknesses of the LMS 
methods [96, 101] because they are faster and have better uniform convergence. 
However, these de-noising techniques rely on cumbersome recursion procedures. Also 
their computation burdens are much higher.  
The Matched Filtering technique uses a matched filter. This technique works with 
a matched filter arrangement, where the impulse response of the filter is matched to the 
signal input. The underlying decision is based on the fact that the output signal-to-noise 
ratio is maximal for a matched filter [96]. 
The notch filtering-based de-noising techniques rely upon the fact that a notch 
filter can be used to remove the sinusoidal noise present in the signal [96]. The notch 
filtering has to meet a set of constraints presented in [103]. The variation between the 
different notch filtering-based techniques is the use of two different algorithms; one uses 
the filter directly, and the other uses lattice filters. 
The wavelet-based de-noising techniques are among the newest and most elegant 
time-frequency de-noising techniques because they address many of the limitations of the 
traditional signal de-noising methods. One of the reasons wavelet-based de-noising 
techniques have gained popularity very quickly is that they perform so much better than 
other methods like the Fourier-based ones. The Fourier-based techniques do pretty well 
when the signal and the noise are located in different bands of the spectrum; however, 
they do not work well when the time series is chaotic [61]. Furthermore, in the context of 
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this work, the Fourier-based de-noising approach is not appropriate because there are 
quick changes in the frequency domain of a signal; they are spread out over the entire 
spectrum. Thus, the use of Wavelet-based techniques for de-noising is a fairly active area 
of research because of the ability of wavelet techniques to address the limitation of 
traditional de-noising techniques. Chapter 3 of this thesis has an extensive explanation of 
wavelet theory. The first of the two de-noising methods based on wavelets uses 
thresholding of wavelet coefficients, and the second one uses Mallat’s algorithm 
presented in [104]. 
The wavelet-based de-noising method that uses thresholding is based on a scheme 
called “Wavelet Shrinkage and Thresholding Methods,” proposed by Donoho [105, 106].   
Thus, Donoho further shows that wavelet can be used to optimally de-noise a 
noisy signal using a thresholding in a three-step process [107]: 
 1) Apply the wavelet decomposition of the noisy signal to obtain wavelet 
coefficients. 
 2) Apply: 
• The soft thresholding nonlinearity  











• The hard thresholding [96, 108] 











Where δ  is the threshold parameter for de-noising. 
 
 3) Reconstruct the signal using the inverse wavelet decomposition with the 
thresholded coefficients. 
The de-noising technique using Mallat’s algorithm works by decomposing the 
signal into several scales (wavelet decomposition). Then, the detail coefficients are 
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neglected and the signal is reconstructed using only the approximation coefficients. The 
reasoning behind this approach is that the major part of the noise components is 
contained in the detail coefficients; therefore , by eliminating the detail coefficients, the 
noise will be eliminated. The problem with this approach is that the detail coefficients 
can contain more than noise alone. 
Based on the advantages and disadvantages of the different de-noising techniques, 
the wavelet thresholding-based approach will be appropriate in this work because little is 
known of the form of time series signal. In fact, the wavelet shrinkage and thresholding 
methods have been successfully applied to de-noising noisy data [69, 105, 107]. Also 
because it is known that the two types of monitoring sensors are static and high 
bandwidth, wavelet-based de-noising can remove the low amplitude and high frequency 
noise effectively [61]. In the previous chapter on wavelet theories it was demonstrated 
that, for the standard discrete wavelet transform, only the scaling functions are 
decomposed into subspaces. The resulting time-frequency resolution has narrow 
bandwidths in the low frequencies and wide bandwidth in the high frequencies.  
Consequently, it is not sufficient for de-noising  time series that contain a low signal-to-
noise ratio [109]. Thus, the wavelet packet decomposition introduced in [74] allows a 
finer and more adjustable resolution that yields a better level of detail about the noisy 
signal. Therefore, instead of decomposing the noisy signal using the wavelet as proposed 
by Donoho, the discrete wavelet packet decomposition should provide extra details. Thus,  
Jiang et al. have used the discrete wavelet packet transform (DWPT) instead of the 
conventional discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [61, 109]. Also, in  [110]  the authors 
present a signal de-noising method based on wavelet packet transform. 
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4.2.3.2 Signal De-noising using DWPT and Bayesian Thresholding  
In [109] Jiang et al. took the idea of using the wavelet thresholding approach 
proposed by Donoho even further by making use of prior knowledge by replacing the 
conventional discrete wavelet transform with discrete wavelet packet transform and soft 
thresholding with Bayesian thresholding.  
The result of combining the discrete wavelet packet transform (DWPT) and 
Bayesian thresholding is the adequate removal of the noise, whether it is in the low or 
high frequency domains. Thus, Jiang et al. proposed applying Bayesian DWPT de-
noising procedure for time series signal f(t) in a five step process as shown on Figure 17. 
The interested reader can see a detailed explanation of the Bayesian wavelet theory in 
[109]. 
 
Figure 17: Bayesian DWPT de-noising procedure for times series [109] 
 
 
A brief account of the five steps of Bayesian DWPT de-noising techniques follows. 
4.2.3.2.1 Step 1: the noisy signal is decomposed into series wavelet coefficients by a 
DWPT 
Let’s assume a signal representing a time series is contaminated by an additive white 
Gaussian noise  
)()()( iii ttgtf ε+=  , with i=1, 2, …, N 
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Where: )( itf is the noisy experimental signal, )( itg is the noise-free signal.  
The noise )( itε being assumed as a Gaussian noise, it has the distribution ),0(
2σN of 
mean 0 and standard deviationσ .  
It is interesting to note that )( itf , )( itg  and )( itε are all time series data of their own. 
Jiang et al. argue that the de-noising problem becomes a univariate non-parametric 
regression problem, in which the goal of the Bayesian DWPT de-noising approach is to 
recover the underlying noise-free time series )( itg from the noisy )( itf . 
The noisy signal is decomposed using the DWPT and the wavelet coefficients are 
obtained using the decomposition scheme presented in Chapter 3.  
4.2.3.2.2  Step2:  Prior distributions on the decomposed coefficients 
Because the noise )( itε is also a time series, it can looked at as having a noise level jkε  so 
that it can be decomposed in turn into coefficients jkd̂  
 
jkjjkjk dd εσ+=ˆ , With j=j0, …., J-1; and k=0, 1, …, 2
j-1 
Now jkε  can be considered in turn. The distribution )1,0(N and jkd are the noise-free 
coefficients. Also, the decomposed coefficients conditionally on jkd and 
2
jσ can be: 
 2,|ˆ jjkjk dd σ  is a Gaussian distribution ),(
2
jjkdN τ  
Furthermore, the assumption that a non-informative prior distribution of jkd is: 
jkjkd γ| is a Gaussian distribution ),0(
2
jjkN τγ  
Where jkγ is a binary random variable with independent Bernoulli distribution jπ ; that is, 
the probability jjkjk PP πγγ ==−== )0(1)1( . Consequently, the determination of 
whether the coefficients jkd  are zero )0( =jkγ  or non-zero, )1( =jkγ  and the 
variance
2
jτ , represents the magnitude of jkd  at the j
th decomposition level. 
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4.2.3.2.3 Step 3: Posterior distributions of the coefficients using the Bayes’ theorem 
The third step is based on the use of the Bayes’ rule and the combination of these two:  
– 2,|ˆ jjkjk dd σ  is a Gaussian distribution ),(
2
jjkdN τ   
– jkjkd γ| is a Gaussian distribution ),0(
2
jjkN τγ  
To evaluate the posterior distribution: 














jk dN   
4.2.3.2.4 Step 4: Remove the noise from the coefficients using a Bayesian hypothesis 
testing 
 
The decomposed coefficients are thresholded by testing the following two hypotheses:   
 Null hypothesis  0:0 =jkdH  
 Alternative hypothesis   0:1 ≠jkdH  
The hypothesis is tested using a thresholding rule to threshold the wavelet coefficients as 
follows: )1(ˆ
~
<= jkjkjk Idd η , called the Bayes factor thresholding [111]. 
Where: )(⋅I is an indicator function, which is equal to 1 when 1<jkη  ( jkη is defined as 
the posterior odds ratio of jkγ = 0 versus jkγ =1). 
The results of the hypothesis testing are:  
1) H0 is rejected and the coefficients jkd is estimated by jkd̂  
2) Otherwise, H0 is not rejected jkd =0 and jkd̂ is thresholded 
4.2.3.2.5 Step 5: The de-noised data is reconstructed through an inverse wavelet 
transform 
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Finally, after the result of the hypothesis is established that the thresholded 
coefficients jkd
~
 are the wavelet coefficients that survived thresholding [112], the 
coefficients are used to reconstruct the noise-free signal by using the inverse discrete 
wavelet packet transform. Finally, the signal-to-noise ratio can be used to assess the 
goodness of the de-noising process. 
 
  To illustrate the step of the Bayesian DWPT de-noising procedure for times 
series, let’s assume a function )(tg is of the Mexican family defined as: 
)1()2/exp()( 22 ttctg −⋅−⋅= , with t = [-5, 5]; 







Then, let’s add some noise with variance randnt *1.0)( =ε  
Let us define the noisy data as: )()()( ttgtf ε+=  
The application of the Bayesian de-noising process has been applied to )(tf , with the 
Daubechies 10 discrete wavelet decomposition. 
Figure 18-a and Figure 18-b below represent the noise-free Mexican hat signal 


























Noisy Mexican hat signal
 
Figure 18: Original signal and Noise added signal 
 
 







Figure 19: Denoised signal using the Bayesian DWPT denoising procedure 
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As illustrative Figure 19 shows, the Bayesian DWPT denoising method has 
successfully removed the noise from the original data. Therefore, the proposed Bayesian 
DWPT denoising procedure is a sufficient noise removal. The issue with many de-
noising algorithms is that they either remove too much useful information while taking 
out the noise, or they remove too little while leaving some noise in the signal. For this 
illustrative example, the signal-to-noise ratio is about 10.99 decibel units. 
 
 
4.2.4 Multi-resolution analysis using discrete Wavelet packet decomposition 
 
The goal of this step is to extract the feature of the signal to be used in the subsequent 
step. In the literature there are many feature extraction techniques for the time series 
signals. Among the most popular are the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) [113], the 
discrete wavelet transform (DWT),  and the discrete Gabor transform (DGT) [114]. A 
short description of the popular feature extraction techniques is as follows 
4.2.4.1 Discrete Gabor Transform 
The Gabor distribution was introduced by Gabor, and works by mapping a time domain 








nmnm thCts )()( ,,  Where ( ) tjnnm emTthth Ω−=)(,  
With T and Ω  representing respectively the time and frequency sampling intervals. Also, 
the synthesis function ( )th  has the constraint energy of unity. The DGT has the powerful 
ability to represent the time history of the frequency content of a signal, using the data as 
a superposition of uniform and frequency translates of a window function. Although that 
ability allows the DGT to be an effective technique in signal detection, feature extraction, 
and identification [116], it has limitations. The major issue with the DGT is that its 
coefficients nmC ,  are uniquely defined. Due to the difficulty of computing its unique 
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coefficients [114], the DGT has been very limited in its usefulness. Therefore, the DGT 
will not be used as the feature extraction technique in this thesis.  
 
4.2.4.2 Discrete Fourier Transform  
The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) was briefly explained in the previous chapter. The 
DFT has been successful and widely used as a signal feature extraction technique. The 
DFT is the projection of a signal from the time domain into the frequency domain.  
Recall that the Fourier transform of a signal ( )tf  is defined as:  
( ) ( ) dtetfF tiωω −
∞








The FT can be generalized to the case of discrete function, ( ) ( )ktftf →  by 
allowing ( )kk tff ≡ , where ∆≡ ktk (time step), with 1,...,0 −= Nk . Therefore, the 














The energy content of a sampled signal ( )tf  can be easily evaluated:  









One of the main attractions of the DFT in general and its application as a feature 
extraction method is the fact that its coefficients can be calculated very fast using the Fast 
Fourier Transform (FFT) [118]. Thus, there is extensive literature on the different ways 
the DFT  has been used as a feature extraction tool  [113, 118]. 
However, with the introduction of the wavelet transform, which addresses some of the 
limitation of the Fourier transform, the DFT is no longer the technique of choice in many 
data mining problems. In fact, a good feature extraction technique is very important in 
any mining problem. The DFT can only project a signal into the frequency domain, while 
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the DWT can project the same signal into a tiling of the time-frequency plane [113]. 
Furthermore, there are many studies that have qualitatively compared DFT and DWT 
[119], and which emphasize the advantages of DWT over DFT. Thus, the DWT-based 
techniques are the natural choice because they enable an advanced level of feature 
extraction to be accomplished.  
 
4.2.4.3 Discrete Wavelet Transform 
The discrete wavelet transform (DWT) is a particular form of the family of the 
wavelet transform. Similar to the DFT, the DWT is a discretized version of the 
continuous wavelet transform (CWT). However, the DWT provides sufficient 
information both for analysis and synthesis of the original signal, with a significant 
reduction in the computation time, which is one reason it is so attractive for signal feature 
extraction applications. The DWT of any integrable real function ( )tf  can be represented 
as: 




,, ψ , where the basis functions are ( ) ( )ktt j
j
kj −= 22 2, ψψ ,  
with ψ  as the mother wavelet function and kjc ,  as the coefficients of the DWT. Or, the 
DWT coefficients can be calculated as the inner product ( ) ( )〉〈= tftc kjkj ,,, ψ . 
 The value of the DWT is that it is considerably easier to implement than is the CWT. As 
a consequence of its capability to measure frequency at different time resolutions and 
locations, the DWT has enabled the MRA.  
Furthermore, the advantage of using the discrete wavelet packet transform (DWPT) 
instead of the conventional discrete wavelet transform DWT has been explained in the 
chapter on the wavelet overview; therefore, the DWPT will be used for the MRA 
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4.2.4.4 The multi-resolution analysis (MRA) 
The multi-resolution analysis (MRA) was thoroughly explained in the chapter on 
the wavelet overview. This multi-resolution analysis (MRA) using the wavelet transforms 
was introduced by Mallat [70]. The MRA , when it uses signal decomposition, is a very 
powerful technique in providing unprecedented understanding of time series sensor 
signals because of its “zoom-in, zoom-out” property [120]. Since its introduction, the 
MRA, when it uses wavelet packet distribution, has been used extensively in research 
that focuses on sensor-based techniques such as diagnostic and prognostic.  
In this step, called “the multi-resolution analysis using the discrete wavelet packet 
decomposition”, each of the de-noised sensor signals obtained as the result of the 
denoising step will be decomposed at different levels in terms of the scaling function 
(approximation) and wavelet functions (details).  
Then, the content of each the components resulting from the decomposition can be 
analyzed. The first necessary step in the MRA is to determine the appropriate level of 
decomposition. Although in theory a MRA can be decomposed indefinitely, in practice 
the number of levels of decomposition is defined based on the type of signal and the goal 
of the analysis to be achieved, such that the signal representation minimizes some cost 
function [72]. That is, the appropriate level of decomposition will be set when further 
decomposition cannot yield any further details. In [74] Coifman and Wickerhauser 
developed entropy-based algorithms to determine the best basis. 
In this work the energy content of the scale function (approximations) and wavelet 
function (details) of each node of the decomposed tree will be utilized to determine a 
suitable level of decomposition. Once the decomposed tree is obtained using the wavelet 











,,, )(             (14) 
 Where knjW ,, is the wavelet packet coefficient, j is the level, k is the translation, n is the 
modulation parameter (approximation or detail). The energy content of each node will 
then be used as the signal feature.  
As applied to this thesis, the de-noised signal is decomposed at an appropriate level of 
resolution to get the approximation and the detail components. The resulting content of 
each component can be analyzed using the calculated energy content. Furthermore, there 
are readily available MATLAB® source codes such as “wenergy” that implement 
Coifman and Wickerhauser’s algorithm for given a time series. As previously stated, the 
main advantage of using the wavelet packet for the MRA instead of the standard wavelet 
transform is that the wavelet packet analysis allows “for a finer and adjustable resolution 
of frequencies at high frequency (details)” [61].  
 
As an illustrative MRA decomposition, let us decompose the de-noised signal of a 
vibration sensor X1 from the list of the monitored sensors at different levels of 
decomposition: 
1) When we apply level-2 decomposition using the Daubechies 7 (db7) wavelet 
function, we get the tree decomposition shown on Figure 20 with the signal of the 















data for node: (4) or (2,1).
 
Figure 20: Level-2 Tree DWPT decomposition of vibration sensor X1 
 
The corresponding energy calculated at each node is shown in Table 4 
 
Table 4: Level-2 decomposition Node energy content for vibration sensor X1 
Decomposed 
tree Node (2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3)
Energy 
Content (%) 99.945 0.0269 0.011 0.0168  
 
Figure 21 shows the corresponding MRA figures of the original de-noised signal (black). 
The second figure is the approximation signal (red), and the remaining three signals are 

























Figure 21: MRA level-2 DWPT decomposition of vibration sensor X1 signal 
 
2) Similarly, the level-3 decomposition is done using the Daubechies 7 (db7) wavelet 
function. The decomposed tree is shown in Figure 22 with the first detail signal of the 




(2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3)












data for node: (8) or (3,1).
 
Figure 22: Level 3 Tree DWPT decomposition of Vibration sensor X1 
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The corresponding energy calculated at each node of level-3 decomposition is shown in 
Table 5. 
Table 5: Level 3 decomposition Node energy content of vibration sensor X1 
Decomposed 
tree Node (3,0) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,7) (3,6) (3,7) 
Energy 
Content (%) 99.92384 0.021543 0.011609 0.015248 0.004727 0.006283 0.00965 0.007101  
 
Figure 23 shows the corresponding MRA figures of the original de-noised signal (black), 
The second figure is the approximation signal (red), and the remaining three signals are 








































Figure 23: MRA of level-3 DWPT decomposition of Vibration sensor X1 signal 
 
Thus, the level-2 decomposition gives three details nodes while the level-3 
decomposition yields seven details nodes. That is for the level-2 DWPT decomposition, 
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the original signal is represented by four different wavelet components, while in the 
level-3 DWPT decomposition the original signal is represented by eight wavelet 
components.  
Also, the energy contained at the approximation node of the level-3 decomposition 
(energy at node (3,0) is 99.924% ) is smaller than that contained at the approximation 
node in the case of the level-2 decomposition (energy at node (2,0) is 99.945%).  
 In this step, each of selected sensors to be included in the study will go through this 
MRA process once the appropriate level of DWPT decomposition for MRA is set. Also, 
the level of decomposition needs to be chosen carefully, as a higher level of 
decomposition may not necessarily bring in a better understanding of the signal, whereas 
decomposing on too few levels may not yield the necessary level of detail. 
 
 
4.2.5 Data Fusion using Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis 
 
The step of data fusion is an important one, because if it is not done or not done 
right, the anomaly detection may not be accurate. In general, when analyzing data mining 
problems, where there are many different types of sensors used to extract usable and 
useful information, the appropriate data fusion technique is crucial. Indeed, not only does 
the fusion of multi-sensor data provide major advantages over individual source data, the 
use of multiple sensor sources may increase the accuracy with which a phenomenon can 
be observed  [121].  
Therefore, the success of this proposed methodology is dependent on the effective 
accomplishment of this step. The field of data fusion has become a very important and 
active area in Research I, so much so that the U.S. Department of Defense created a Joint 
Directors Laboratory subpanel to assemble a uniform set of technical definitions for use 
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among researchers. In fact, J. Llinas et al. argue that the lack of unified terminology has 
been one of the historical barriers to technology transfer in data fusion [122]. For 
example, data fusion is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Directors of 
Laboratories Data Fusion Subpanel as: “a multilevel, multifaceted process dealing with 
the automatic detection, association, correlation, estimation, and combination of data and 
information from single and multiple sources to achieve refined position and identity 
estimates, and complete and timely assessments of situations and threats and their 
significance” [123]. Therefore, J. Llinas et al. attempted and defined fusion as: “the 
integration of information from multiple sources to produce the most specific and 
comprehensive unified data about an entity”, which goes along the same line as the U.S 
Department Joint Directors’ definition. The terms “data fusion” and “sensor fusion” are 
used interchangeably. The data fusion step remains a vital one if the goal is to make the 
best possible judgment. In fact, Yan and Goebel assert that most single sensors cannot be 
relied on to deliver accurate information all the time [57]. The goal of the data fusion step 
is to combine pieces of information from a multi-sensory data set system into fewer 
variables, which allows researchers to draw a more accurate conclusion than one could 
get from an individual sensor. Thus, the data fusion process produces knowledge that is 
not otherwise obtainable from a narrow wavelength-band sensor, or is more accurate than 
information gathered from single sensor systems [124]. The literature extensively 
discusses data fusion techniques; this can be seen in [122, 124].  Data fusion can be done 
at different stage of data analysis. Thus, in [125] Carvalho et al. propose a three-level 
data fusion framework based on both data and variables, where the data fusion can be 
classified as low level, high level, or mixture level. When the data fusion is performed 
before analysis, it is classified as low level. When the data fusion is performed after some 
data analysis, it is classified as high level variable fusion. In situations where the data and 
variables can be fused, it is defined as mixture level data fusion.  
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4.2.5.1 Overview data Fusion Techniques 
There are many data fusion techniques in the literature that have been used for 
different applications. Thus, some data fusion techniques are more mathematically 
intensive than others. The reader interested in some mathematical background for data 
fusion can see [126, 127], among many other papers.  
Ultimately, the key to any successful study where data fusion is needed is to find a 
technique that is suitable for one’s  problem.  
The data fusion architecture can be divided into three main groups: detection, 
classification, and identification algorithms [124]. The main algorithms can either be 
physical models, feature-based inference techniques, or cognitive-based models. Each of 
these three models can cover a different application field, as summarized on Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24: Data fusion for detection, classification, and identification algorithms [124] 
 
Besides the three groups mentioned above, there are other mathematically-based 
techniques for data fusion, such as the random set theory, conditional algebra, and 
relational event algebra [127]. 
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The following section is a brief literature review of some of the most commonly used 
data fusion techniques used to analyze multi-sensors systems, where the classical 
inference, Bayesian inference, and Dempster-Shafer inference are referred to as 
parametric techniques.   
4.2.5.1.1 The classical inference 
The classical inference is mainly used when only a small representative random sample 
of the population can be obtained to estimate the statistical characteristics of a large 
population. That is, the classical inference calcualtes the probability that an observation 
can be attributed to the presence of an object or event, given an assumed hypothesis. 
However, its applications are limited due to many disadvantages such as:  
– The difficulty of obtaining the density function that describes the observable    
– The complexity of the application of  multivariate data the classical inference 
theory becomes complex,  
– It can only assess two hypotheses at a given time 
– It cannot utilize the knowledge of a priori and likelihood probabilities 
Furthermore, another important limitation of the classical inference is that it cannot be 
used when the data are collected with bias of unknown size. Outliers have to be identified 
and removed. However, in the study of anomaly detections, the anomalies may well 
remain within the outliers. 
4.2.5.1.2 The Bayesian inference fusion 
The Bayesian inference comes from the Bayes theory, so it is a probability-based 
reasoning technique that relies on a priori knowledge about events. Ultimately, the 
Bayesian inference provides a method for calculating the conditional a posteriori 
probability of a hypothesis, given supporting evidence. Although the Bayesian inference 
has the ability to address some of the difficulties with classical inference (it updates for 
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example, the a priori given a previous likelihood estimate and additional observations, 
unlike other hypotheses), the Bayesian inference has its own set of disadvantages: 
– It is difficult to define the prior probability and likelihood function 
– The computation scheme becomes complex when multiple potential hypotheses 
and multiple conditionality-dependent events are evaluated 
– There is a requirement that competing hypotheses be mutually exclusive  
– The Bayesian inference cannot account for general uncertainty 
Thus, the Bayesian inference can be applied only outside of its limiting factors.  
4.2.5.1.3 The Dempster-Shafer evidential theory: 
This theory is a probability-based data fusion; therefore, the most advantageous 
application is when the sensors or the information sources contributing information 
cannot associate a 100 percent probability of certainty to their output decisions [124]. The 
Dempster-Shafer generalizes Bayesian inference, and both methods produce identical 
results when all singleton propositions are mutually exclusive and there is no support 
assigned to uncertainty.  The Dempster-Shafer method must define processes in each 
sensor that assigns the degree of support for a proposition. Despite this, the Dempster-
Shafer ameliorates some of the limitation of the classical inference. Its main disadvantage 
is that it is unable to make direct use of prior probability when this probability is known. 
Because of that limitation, many techniques have been introduced to improve the 
Demspter-Shafer. 
4.2.5.1.4 The Voting logic data fusion technique 
This technique combines detection and classification from multiple sources (e.g. 
sensors) by treating each sensor’s declaration as a vote, from which the majority, 
plurality, or decision-tree is used. Its approach to voting is based on Boolean algebra. 
Some of the main advantages of the voting logic are: 
– It handles false alarms better than the other techniques   
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– It may be an appropriate data fusion technique to apply when a multiple sensor 
system is used to detect, classify, and track objects 
However, voting logic has its share of disadvantages as well: 
– It has a poor rejection of cluster-induced false alarms when sensors are 
assembled in parallel and their functions are independent of each other 
– It has poor detection of suppressed targets when the sensors are in series and the 
system output is dependent on output from each sensor 
– It can increase the complexity of signal processing when the system output is 
dependent on combinations of multiple sensor outputs  
 
4.2.5.1.5 The fuzzy logic data fusion technique 
The fuzzy logic data fusion technique is based on fuzzy logic [128]. Contrary to 
the other methods, the fuzzy logic technique offers the ability to represent analog 
processes in a digital framework. Hence, the fuzzy logic technique has the capacity to 
solve the problems of imprecise knowledge or indistinct boundary definitions of 
mathematical treatment. It permits uncertainties in knowledge or identity boundaries to 
be applied to diverse applications. However, the fuzzy logic data fusion technique also 
has some drawbacks:  
– It may not be easily separated into discrete segments and may be difficult to 
model with conventional mathematics 
– It has to be applied within boundary sets of values that have not been sharply 
defined. 
The data fusion techniques presented in this overview are far from being comprehensive, 
as there are many combinations of the main techniques that can be used to meet 
researchers’ goals. As a matter of fact, there  are many other techniques being developed 
currently by different researchers throughout the world; for example, the AUG (Airborne 
 79 
Underwater Geophysical) Signals has a toolbox containing algorithms with the following 
data fusion techniques [129]: 
• Statistical methods 
• Markov Random Fields 
• Dempster-Shafer Theory 
• Neural Networks 
• Fuzzy Logic 
• Wavelets 
• Super-resolution 
• AUG Signals’ Super-resolution  
In fact, the data fusion techniques can be as specific as one’s specific field of interest. For 
example, the passive data associated with unambiguous location of targets, which is very 















Table 6: Fusion techniques for associating passively acquired data to locate and track targets [124] 
 
Fusion Level Data Fusion Technique Advantages Disadvantages
All avalabile sensor 
information used





data are processed in 
real time
One coherent processor for each 
beam in the multibeam antenna 
required













Coherent processing of data 
received from two types of 
sensors: a scanning 
surveillance radar and a 





Maximum likelihood or 
relaxation algorithm using 
direction angle measurements 
to the target
Ghosts created that have to be 






Combining of distributed 
target tracks obtained from 
each surveillance radar
Many tracks must be created 




Despite the panoply of the data fusion techniques, each technique has advantages as well 
as drawbacks. That is, some of them have very cumbersome implementation, when their 
application is not limited by restrictions. Since the main goal of this thesis is to have 
mathematical computations that can be done fairly quickly, to ensure the quick detection 
of anomalies during the monitoring of a system, the chosen data fusion technique will be 
one that is simple and transparent to implement. The number of sensors to monitored may 
be large, so it is important to be able to easily exclude or add given sensors based on their 
contribution. Thus, the Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis, which is an 
extension of the conventional Principal Component Analysis, altered by the incorporation 
of the fact that sensor measurements have uncertainties, will be used in this work.   
 
4.2.5.2 Overview of Principal Component Analysis 
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is based on a mathematical process 
whose main objective is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set that has a large number 
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of potentially correlated (or interrelated) variables by condensing these variables into a 
smaller number of uncorrelated principal components. In this process, the first principal 
component accounts for as much of the variability of the data set as possible, and each 
subsequent component accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible. The 
PCA achieves this goal by identifying patterns in the data set and expressing the data in a 
way that highlights their resemblances and differences [130]. Thus, the main 
attractiveness of the PCA lies in the fact that once the patterns in the data are found, the 
data can be compressed. The PCA is also called the discrete Karhunen-Loève expansion 
(or transform), the Hotelling transform or Proper orthogonal decomposition depending 
on the area of application. There is quite a large amount of literature on PCA and its 
application. In [131], I. Jolliffe explains the underlying concept of the PCA technique 
and its application to time series data. The popularity of the PCA as an information 
fusion technique may be explained in part by the fact it is a fairly simple technique that is 
based on simple linear algebra. Moreover, it is a non-parametric method for extracting 
relevant information from confusing data sets [132]. That is, it allows the identification 
of patterns in data, and then expresses the data in a way that highlights their similarities 
and differences. Once the patterns in the data are found, the data can be compressed (the 
number of dimensions can be reduced) while conserving much of the original 
information. It is easier to infer characteristics from the reduced data set than from the 
original. 
Some of the tutorials of PCA [130, 132] are among the simplest ones to follow, where 
the  PCA is presented as follows: 
– Step 1: Get data composed of multiple variables. 
– Step 2: Calculate the mean of each variable and subtract it from the entry 
element of the variable (Row data Adjust) 
– Step 3: Calculate the covariance matrix, which is an n-by-n matrix (for n-
dimensional data set) 
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– Step 4: Calculate the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, 
where the eigenvectors represent the axes of the principal components. Also, the 
eigenvectors are perpendicular to each other (i.e. forming a basis). 
– Step 5: Choose the components and form a feature vector, which in turn decides 
the number of eigenvectors (k, with n>= k) to be kept. Therefore, the number of 
disregarded eigenvectors represents the number of eliminated variables 
 Feature Vector = (eig1 eig2 … eigk) 
– Step 6: Derive the new data set. The new data set is generated using simple linear 
algebra:  
Final data = Row Feature Vector * Row Data Adjust 
When engineering practical problems, programming software is utilized to write 
algorithms to perform the PCA. 
Although data set dimensionality reduction is the principal application of the 
PCA, it has many other applications, including exploratory data analysis (e.g. detection of 
outliers), data compression and data reconstruction, image processing, visualization, 
pattern recognition, time series prediction, and data feature extraction. In fact, Table 7 



















Linear map; fast; eigenvector-
based
Linear Discriminant Analysis
Supervised linear map; fast, 
eigenvector-based
Projection Pursuit









PCA Network Linear map; iterative
Nonlinear PCA




Nonlinear map; non-Gaussian 
criterion, iterative
Multidimensional scaling 
(MDS), and Sammon's 
projection
Nonlinear map; iterative
Self-Organization Map (SOM) Nonlinear, iterative
Auto-associative neural network with linear transfer 
functions and just one hidden layer
Neural network approach, possibly used for ICA
Bottleneck network with several hidden layers; the 
nonlinear map is optimized by a nonlinear
Often poor generationn; sample size limited; noise 
sensitive; mainly used for 2-dimensional visualization
Based on a grid of neurons in the feature space; suitable 
for extracting spaces of low dimensionality
Comments
Traditional, eigenvector based method, also known as 
Karhunen-Loeve expansion; good for Gaussian data
Better than PCA for classification; limited to (c-1) 
components with non-zero eigenvalues
Mainly used for interactive exploratory data-analysis
Blind source separation, used for de-mixing non-
Gaussian distributed sources (features)
PCA-based method, using a kernel to replace inner 
products of pattern vectors
 
 
The choice of one technique over the others in Table 7 is primarily based on the goal and 
speed of execution of each method. 
Recall that the fundamental goal of the data fusion step is to combine pieces of 
information from a potentially correlated multi-sensory data set into fewer uncorrelated 
variables that allow for drawing a more adequate conclusion than one could get from 
each individual sensor. Therefore, based on the simplicity of the PCA on one hand, and 
its ability to reduce the dimensionality of a data set on the other, the PCA is a good 
choice for data fusion. Despite all the qualities the PCA mentioned above, it has some 
limitations that must be improved upon. In fact, the following are some of the main 
limitations of the PCA [134]: 
– It assumes approximate normality of the input space distribution, which implies 
that the PCA may still be able to produce a good low dimensional data set even 
though the data may not be normally distributed. 
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– It can fail for data that lies on a complicated manifold. 
– Its makes the assumption that the input data is real and continuous. 
– It is non-parametric (i.e. no probabilistic model for observed data). 
– It doesn’t handle uncertainty in sensor data. 
Although the PCA performs fairly well with many types of data set, because of its last 
stated limitation, a technique that can handle uncertainty must be explored. The fact that 
the PCA cannot handle data uncertainty because it doesn’t take into account the 
probabilistic model for the observed data [135, 136] cannot be overlooked in this thesis. 
It is a necessity for data uncertainty to be taken into account in the study, since power 
plants monitoring sensor measurements would most likely have uncertainties due to 
many intrinsic phenomena of power plant operations such as different operating regimes 
(a wide range of sensor readings at the different load conditions), operating environment 
(summer vs. winter), sensor built-in uncertainty, machine-to-machine variation, etc. 
Thus, the Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis (PPCA), which was introduced in 
order to deal with sensor data uncertainty, emerged as an improvement over the standard 
PCA, as it has the advantage of taking into account data uncertainty [136]. 
 
4.2.5.3 Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis overview 
The primary goal of the PPCA in the dimensional reduction application is to 
make up for the absence of a probabilistic model in the PCA methods. To achieve that 
objective, the PPCA utilizes the notion of maximum likelihood and the variance of the 
reduced data matrix, which means that it uses only the most significant weights obtained 
from the conventional PCA. The PPCA is definitely an improved version of the standard 
PCA, as it has the advantage of taking into account data uncertainty [136]. Some of the 
advantages of the PPCA can be summarized as follows: 
– It addresses limitations of the regular PCA. 
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– It can be used as a general Gaussian density model in addition to reducing 
dimensions. 
– The maximum-likelihood estimates can be computed for elements associated 
with principal components. 
– It captures dominant correlations with few parameters. 
– It permits multiple PCA models to be combined as a probabilistic mixture. 
– It can be used as a base for a Bayesian PCA. 
Because of all these capabilities, the PPCA is a good candidate for many applications in 
practice as reported by M. E. Tipping et al. in [136]. Some possible applications are:  
– The PPCA can be used to estimate the principal axes for missing data by making 
use of the standard methodology of the maximum likelihood of a Gaussian model 
as presented in the very popular book by R. J. Little and D. B. Rubin [137].  
– Through the use an example in [138], the author demonstrates a successful use of 
the standard PCA to handle missing data.  
– The PPCA can be used through the mixtures of PPCA models. Since the standard 
PCA consists of a single linear projection, more complex models that combine 
many PCA models have been used in practice in fields such as image 
compression [139] and visualization [140].  
– The PPCA can be used as a constrained Gaussian density model, with the benefit 
that the maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters associated with the 
covariance matrix can be efficiently computed from the principal data 
components. 
Nevertheless, in this work the PPCA will be used for its dimensionality reduction ability, 
especially when the speed of the execution of the analysis is the foremost important 
factor, because the early detection of an anomaly can avoid potential catastrophic failure 
down the road. Therefore, a reduced number of variables will lead to decrease of the 
computational burden.  
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The underlying mathematical background of PPCA is based on a few considerations, 
which will be briefly presented in the next section. The interested reader can also access 
a more detailed approach in [135, 136].  
 
4.2.5.4 Mathematical Background of PPCA (with all the equations) 
The very first step of the PPCA consists of performing the computation of the 
conventional PCA on a given data set. That is, the PCA involves a matrix analysis 
technique called eigenvalues decomposition. The PPCA mathematically derives from the 
notion of the Gaussian latent variable model, which in turn is related to statistical factor 
analysis [135]. 
4.2.5.4.1 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is a mathematical approach used to reduce the number of observed 
vectors t (d-dimensional) to a corresponding number of vectors (q-dimensional) of latent 
(unobserved) variable x, where q<d is defined as [136, 141]: 
εµ ++=Wxt        (15) 
Where ( ) µ+=WxWxy ,   is a function of the latent variable x with parameters W. 
W is the qd ×  matrix  
The parameter vector µ allows the model to have a non-zero mean.  
By definition ( )INx ,0~ , with the restriction that the latent variables be independent and 
Gaussian with unit variance. The noise or error ( )ψε ,0~ N  is also Gaussian distribution 
with zero mean, and a variance ofψ .  
Consequently, the corresponding observation ( )ψµ +TWWNt ,~  is Gaussian as well, 
and the model can be determined by the maximum likelihood. M.E. Tipping et al. [136] 
argue that “the distinction made between variance and covariance in the standard factor 
analysis model, the subspace defined by the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
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columns of W will generally not correspond to the principal subspace of the observed 
data.” Furthermore, they establish that the isotropic noise covariance and the variance be 
equal ( ψσ =I2 ) with the residual variance 2σ  assumed known. Then, they show that the 
observation covariance model IWW T 2σ+ can be calculated exactly, allowing W  and 
2σ to be determined analytically. 
The latent variable x  is conventionally defined as independently distributed Gaussian 
with zero mean and unit variance ( ( )INx ,0~ ). Then, the observable t can be written in 
Gaussian distribution form as follows from the equation      
 (16) 
( )ψµ,~| +WxNxt          (16) 
Where I2σψ +Λ= , which is the combination of the measurement (or prediction) error 
Λ that is unique to the response, and the variability 2σ that is unique to x  (i.e. the 
isotropic noise covariance). 
Λ is a diagonal matrix with each diagonal element representing the data uncertainty of 
the corresponding variable. Also, Λ is the variance of the additional error which has zero 
mean ( ( )Λ,0~* Nε ). 
In [135], Jiang et al. stress that the latent variable x in the PPCA is intended to explained 
the correlations between observed variable t, while the error variable ε  represents the 
variability unique to x , which is different from the standard PCA, which treats 
covariance and variance identically. 
The unadjusted conditional distribution of the latent variable x can be calculated given 
observation t using the Bayes’ rule. It is also Gaussian: 
( )121 ,~| −− MtWMNtx T σ      (17) 
Where IWWM T 2σ+=  
M.E. Tipping et al. show that the likelihood is maximized when the weight matrix is:  
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( ) RIUW qqML 2/12σ−Λ=          (18) 
qU is the matrix of the principal eigenvectors with jλ the corresponding eigenvalues, and 
R is an arbitrary q*q orthogonal rotation matrix; IR = can be assumed in practice. 




11 −− +=Σ ψ         (19) 
Where IMLML







2 1 λσ is the maximum likelihood estimate of 2σ  
 








2σ+= . Let us rename nn tx | as 
*Φ  
Thus, the parameters calculated for the PPCA will be applied in the model. 
The parameters nn tx |  or 
*Φ , called the data matrix, represent the entry of the PPCA’s 
principal components. 
The data fusion step involves fusing the signal features of each variable obtained 
from the MRA using the PPCA technique, which is an improvement over the standard 
principal component analysis (PCA). Thus, the probabilistic principal component 
analysis (PPCA) is used to merge the information from the sensors of interest.  To 
perform the PPCA, the steps of the principal components analysis are executed, and then 
the notion of maximum likelihood and the variance of the reduced data are calculated 
using matrices, where only the most significant weights obtained from the standard PCA 
are used as entries in a maximum likelihood matrix. The next section presents an 




4.2.5.5 Illustration of Data Fusion PPCA (with all figures & tables) 
The original data set of twelve sensors (x1, …, x12) has been normalized, de-noised and 
the MRA step has been completed. 
1) First, the conventional PCA steps are done: 
The conventional PCA is performed on the retained signal feature (approximation) to 
determine the principal components (PC). 
The covariance matrix of the processed 12 variables is calculated, as shown in Table 8 
 
Table 8: Covariance Matrix for eigenvalues calculation 
 
 
Then, the eigenvalues, their respective contributions, and the corresponding 
eigenvectors for the covariance matrix are obtained and ranked from the highest value to 






Table 9. Thus, the highest value of the eigenvalues 1λ represents 71.862% of the 




























































The original twelve eigenvectors and their corresponding eigenvalues are shown in Table 
10. However, to retain at least 95% of the information contents (i.e. 95% confidence 
level), only the first three eigenvalues, representing 95.32% of the information content, 
are needed. Consequently, the eigenvectors corresponding to those three eigenvalues, 
which represent the principal components, are chosen as shown in the red rectangle in 
Table 10.  




















































































































































Thus, the original twelve sensor data sets can be reduced into three principal 
components. 
2) Steps for PPCA:  
Once the PCA steps are completed, the PPCA will add the probabilistic component.  
The entries of the eigenvectors are the weights that will be applied to their corresponding 
variables in order to obtain the principal component that is the combination of the twelve 
variables. At this point, the PPCA procedure will be implemented. The major weight 
contributors are identified in order to calculate the maximum weight that will be allowed 
as an entry value of an eigenvector; let’s say less than 0.1 is set to 0, while any value 
greater than 0.1 is kept. This is to say that the maximum likelihood depends on the 
meaningful weights. Consequently, for the PPCA, the following principal components 
are obtained:   
 
 
Table 11: Maximum likelihood weight for principal components 
Variables PC1 PC2 PC3
DWATT 0.11163 0 -0.24283
TNH 0 0 0
BB1 0.53611 0.44731 0
BB2 0.41406 0.5949 0.14483
BB4 0.64797 -0.61745 0.44181
CPD 0.09165 0 -0.18695
CTD 0 0 0
CPR 0 0 -0.14856
CSGV 0 0 0
CTIM -0.29391 0.23822 0.78966
AFQ 0 0 -0.17164
AFPAP 0 0 0  
 
After obtaining the maximum likelihood weight matrix and calculating the remaining 
parameters for the PPCA using a developed MATLAB® code, the result of the three 
principal components kept using the PPCA steps are shown in Figure 25a, b, and c 





















Figure 25: PPCA result principal components 
 
 
The result of the PPCA data fusion is that the study will go from twelve potentially 
correlated sensor values (the original number of sensors of interest) to a much more 
manageable three uncorrelated variables, which are now called the principal components.  
In general, there exist rules to determine the number of components to be kept. Usually 
this is dictated by the level of confidence that needs to be achieved in the study; that is, 
the ratio of the original information to be kept. In this example, a confidence level of 95% 
was used. 
 
4.2.6 Anomaly detection decision  
 
The last step of the proposed methodology for early precursor detection is to 
make the correct assessment of the anomaly identification in the appropriate time series. 
Anomaly detection has been a fascinating and active field of research in the research 
community for many years. A. Lazarevic et al. provide the following definition: 
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“anomaly is a pattern in the data that does not conform to the expected behavior.” Also, 
anomalies can be considered outliers in some cases [142]. Thus, based on the anomaly 
definition, it is understandable why the anomaly detection is of such interest to so many 
fields of research. In fact, almost every complex systems developer or operator allocates 
resources to anomaly detection in order to avoid the possibility that a missed anomaly 
lead to a catastrophic systems failure. As a consequence of the interest in anomaly 
detection, there exists plenty of literature [143, 144] on the subject. In [143], V. Chandola 
et al. present a fairly broad survey of the current anomaly detection decision approaches. 
Among some of the most common in the engineering field are the accuracy-based 
metrics, precision-based metrics, and robustness-based metrics [145]. Some of the current 
active areas of anomaly detection research are engineering, statistical, economic, health 
care, etc. There are many fault decision metrics; some of them are summarized in [145].  
In general, anomaly detection methods are faced with a set of challenges that must be 
overcome in order to achieve any meaningful type of results. Those challenges may 
include but are not limited to [142]: 
– Defining a representative normal region can be difficult. 
– The boundary between normal and outlying behaviour can be imprecise. 
– The exact notion of an outlier is different for different application domains. 
– The availability of labelled data for training/validation can be limited. 
– One might have malicious adversaries. 
– Data might contain noise. 
– Normal behaviour keeps evolving. 
There are three major types of anomaly [142]: 
– Point anomalies, which occur when individual data points are anomalous with 
the data set. 
– Contextual anomalies, which occur when an individual data instance is 
anomalous within a context; the context needs to be understood. 
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– Collective Anomalies, which occur when a collection of related data points is 
anomalous. The relationship among data points must be known.  The 
individual points within a collective anomaly may not be anomalous by 
themselves. 
For the purpose of this study, which relies on a data-driven approach, a precision-
based metrics type [21, 145] will be utilized in the proposed process to make the decision 
of whether a found outlier is an anomaly or not. The advantages of using a precision-
based metric are that it is simple to implement within the context of a statistical approach 
based on historical knowledge of given systems, and it is suitable for time series types of 
study. Furthermore, a statistically-based technique for anomaly (i.e. outlier) detection will 
first be utilized, followed by the precision based metric for the decision. 
Typically the statistically-based technique is a very suitable anomaly detection technique 
for time series. It works by modeling data points using stochastic distribution, where the 
points are determined to be outliers depending on their relationship with an established 
threshold model. Although statistically-based techniques have many advantages, they 
have some drawbacks that one must be mindful of when using these techniques. 
Statistically-based techniques have the following characteristics:  
• Advantage: they utilize existing statistical modelling techniques to model various 
types of distributions. 
• Drawbacks: it is difficult to estimate distributions with high dimensions, and their 
underlining parametric assumptions often do not hold for real data sets. 
 
4.2.6.1 Statistically-based approach to anomaly detection 
There are other practical advantages of using a statistically-based technique in this 
thesis. For example, a statistically-based method does not require sophisticated modeling 
of the data set, such as a neurally-based network would require. The calculations and 
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recalculations of statistical parameters needed to set the threshold are fairly simple and 
fast, which is very important for implementation in systems monitoring. In fact, any time 
there is an exterior intervention to the system (such as water watch for a heavy gas 
turbine, installation of a new part, completion of scheduled maintenance, or completion 
of a recovery of degradation action); the statistical parameters will need to be 
recalculated. 
4.2.6.1.1 Reconstruction of representative signal 
The procedure for anomaly detection decision is a multi-steps approach. 
After the completion of the PPCA step, when the different principal components of the 
signal have been determined, the reduced dimensionality data set is in turn combined into 








λ                       (21) 
Where: n: is the number of retained principal components (PC) 
 kλ : is the contribution of Eigenvalues (k) 
 )(* ikΦ : is the signal corresponding to PC(k) of the data matrix 
  RS: is the reconstructed signal     
That is, the original N-dimensional data set was first reduced to a q-dimensional data set 
using the PPCA data fusion technique, and it is now reduced to a one-dimensional 
reconstructed signal RS. The eigenvalues corresponding to each principal component are 
used as weight to consolidate the q-dimensional system into a one-dimensional system. 
4.2.6.1.2 Statistical Process Control for threshold setting 
The statistical process control, which relies on quality control theories [146], is used to 





The obtained reconstructed signal RS is decomposed using the discrete Wavelet packet 
decomposition (similar to the MRA step). Then, the energy content of each node is 
calculated (similar to the multi-resolution analysis step) using the equation to calculate 
the energy content as follows at each time step t:  







Step 2:  
Once a system representative signal RS is calculated, the two damage indicators SAD and 
SSD are calculated to be monitored instead of directly monitoring the change of the 
energy content [147].  SAD and SSD are defined as follows: 
Sum of Absolute Difference (SAD) and computed as: 
refEkEkSAD −= )()(                     (22) 
Square Sum of Difference (SSD) and computed as: 
( )2)()( refEkEkSSD −=                  (23) 
Where: 
refE  is the reference signal energy content, calculated over a healthy period before the 
monitoring for potential anomaly starts. 
)(kE : is the RS energy content obtained from the subsequent measurement.  
The monitoring of SAD and SSD is a popular approach in practice because these sums 
permit the easy capture of deviations from target monitoring bands. In fact, an important 
part of accomplishing any good anomaly detection method is to figure out the best feature 
to be tracked; thus, SSD is constantly recommended as one such trackable feature [148]. 
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Since the selection of the right feature is key to successful monitoring in general, there 
are many algorithms developed to track signal or image features [148, 149].  Thus, the 
two damage indicator parameters SAD and SSD chosen to be track fit that requirement. 
It is important to note that the calculations of the damage indicators SAD and SSD have 
been modified from the ones proposed [44] by Sun, because in the case of a larger size 
data set, the required computation time becomes a limit to the monitoring. Thus, Sun 

















refEkESSD        (25) 
Step 3:  Conventional Apply SPC (Statistical Process Control) 
The X-bar control chart concept [150] is used to establish the threshold of damage 
indication. Thus Ang et al. suggest the following threshold calculation for a one-sided 
upper (1-α) upper confidence limit for the damage indicator SAD (a similar formula is 















                        (26) 
Where:  
α
SADUL  : Upper Confidence Limit 
SADµ : is the value toward which the mean value of the parameter SAD converges  
 αZ : is the value of standard normal distribution with zero mean and unit 
variance, so that the cumulative probability is 100*(1-α)  
SADσ : is the value toward which the standard deviation of the parameter SAD 
converges 
q: interval of monitoring time  
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Then, the X-bar control chart upper limit is used to monitor the damage indicators over a 
given period of time. 
4.2.6.1.3 Modified threshold calculation 
 
In general, the control charts are effective in defect prevention [150] when used in 
the context of manufacturing, for example. However, because of the constraint of the 
execution speed, the choice has been made in this work to modify the conventional SAD 
and SSD formulas. Therefore, instead of directly using the conventional statistical 
process control where the mean value of the SAD ( SADµ ) is used to calculate the upper 
specific limit, it is proposed that one uses a modified version of the SPC formula. The 
reasoning behind the proposed change is simple; because the conventional SPC is a sum 
of absolute values, it converges to a maximum value of the mean value of the SAD 
( SADµ = MAXSAD _µ ). Thus, it is proposed that one uses the same thought process applied to 
the maximum mean value to calculate the upper specific limit, which will be used as the 
threshold value, because before the mean values of SAD (and SSD) converge toward a 
given value, there is an overshoot in the value of SAD before it stabilizes. Therefore, for 
the determination of the upper specification limit, the original formula must be modified 
to address the modifications proposed in the calculation of the damage indicators, SAD 
and SSD.  By doing so, the number of false-positive alarms, which would have been 
arbitrarily high, decreases. That appears to reduce considerably the number of false 
















__                     (27) 
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In sum, the proposed approach is one step better than the current industry standard 
practice because it has a better execution (i.e. run faster) time. 
The proposed threshold calculation is also machine specific, because different machines 
in a given fleet can have many differences, such as machine-to-machine variations, 
operating condition variations, and environmental condition variations. Therefore, the 
threshold is established from the test machine during its healthy operation time and 
conditions.  This allows for the avoidance of some of the practical issues of fleet 
management. 
4.2.6.1.4 Bayesian Hypothesis for monitoring time 
Finally, the Bayesian evaluation method is applied to the modified threshold 
value αε MXSADUL _= . Thus, the Bayesian evaluation method for hypothesis testing can be 
conducted.  The anomaly function is defined as H(t), which is the vector of the Bayesian 
hypothesis testing result with null and alternative hypotheses defined as follows. 
Once the threshold is set as a positive value, the decision criterion is based on a Bayesian 
binary type of hypothesis assessment [34] at each time step: 
• The null hypothesis H0 is defined as:  
  ( ) ( ) 1, =≤ tHtSAD ε                                   (28)    
That is, at any monitoring time step, if the sum of the absolute difference SAD (or 
SSD) is less than or equal to the calculated threshold, then the measurement at that 
point is considered good (i.e. the point is within the preset acceptable band).  
• The alternative hypothesis Ha is defined as:  
( ) ( ) 0, => tHtSAD ε                                     (29)  
That is, at any monitoring time step, if the sum of the absolute difference SAD (or SSD) 
is greater than the calculated threshold (i.e. outside of the pre-set band), then the 
measurement is rejected as a defect. 
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Hence, at each time step a defect judgment is made, so that all the defective data points 
are identified.  
As a result of the hypothesis testing, a binary type of function is obtained as outcome 
over a giving period of monitoring time.  Thus, the function H(t)  has values of 1 or 0 and 
can be plotted over time for visualization. An H(t) value of 1 is a healthy state, and an 
H(t) value of 0 is an abnormal one.  Therefore, the appearance of the value of H(t) = 0 
can be considered a failure precursor. The function H(t) can be visualized and tracked 
over time because it is also a time series function.  
 
Thus, the steps of the anomaly detection decision can be summarized and organized as 






































4.2.6.2 Different error types (or confidence level) calculations 
Any decision making process needs to provide the confidence level associated 
with its conclusions. Thus, an immediate advantage of the statistically-based techniques 
is that the confidence levels are easily determined. Moreover, the proposed approach 
provides an easy, fast, and robust calculation of the different types of errors. 
4.2.6.2.1 Calculation of the Confidence Level for type I error  
Recall that the probability of type I error or false-positive is defined as:  
α = P{reject H0|H0 is true}; that is, the probability of rejecting H0 while is indeed true. 
In other word, type I error is the probability of detecting a failure precursor while there is 
no defect.  
In the proposed process, the statistical confidence level is an input from the system 
monitor, calculated as 100*(1-α)%.  In other words, the system monitor decides the level 
of type I error acceptable to him/her; then, that value is input in the threshold calculation. 
Consequently, the type I error is a controlled parameter in the proposed process.   
4.2.6.2.2 Type II errors calculation 
Conversely, the type II error or false-Negative is defined as: 
β = P{fail to reject H0|H0 is false}; that is, the probability of not rejecting H0, while H0 
is false. In other words, the type II error is the probability of missing a defect when one is 
present. In fact, determining the type II error is crucial in systems where failures have 
huge consequences.   
To estimate the type II error, let us assume the following conceptual approach to 
determine the probability type II error. 
Let null hypothesis H0 and the alternative hypothesis H1 be defined as: 
H0: 0µµ =           (30) 
H1: 0µµ ≠           (31) 
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The procedure for testing is to take a random sample of n observations on the random 








=  and reject H0 if 20 αZZ >  
Where σ : is the standard deviation and 2αZ  is the upper 2α percentage point of 
the standard normal distribution. 
By recalling the central limit theorem, ( )nNx 2,~ σµ  , we can see that for cases 
H0: 0µµ =  is true ( )1,0~0 NZ and the probability of the successful H0, 100*(1-α) of the 
values of 0Z must fall between 2αZ− and 2αZ  
Then, the probability type II error assumes H0: 0µµ = is false, then the 











NZ , where δµµ += 01 , therefore H1: 0µµ ≠ is true.  
The type II error is the probability that the test statistic will fall between 2/αZ−  and 2/αZ  
when H1 is true, as illustrated in Figure 27. A more detailed explanation of the concept of 
determination can be seen in [152]. Finally, the probability can be evaluated as  
( ) ( )2/2/ αα ZFZF −− ,  













Figure 27: Graphical representation of type II Error [152] 
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Then, by changing from the cumulative distribution function to the standard normal 


























Z 2/2/  (32) 
Where:  
Φ  is the cumulative standard normal distribution 
δ is the difference between the mean value used to calculate the threshold value 
and the mean value of the monitored interval of time of damage indicators SAD and SSD. 
σ  is the standard deviation 





Table 12: Summary of type I and type II errors in decision making (adapted from [124]) 
H0 True H1 True
Reject H0







Type II error 
Probability = β
Decision
Truth about the population 
 
 
Another interesting statistical parameter is the process power defined as:  
Power = 1–β = P{reject H0|H0 is false}; it is the probability of correctly rejecting H0 
when H0 is false. It is desirable to have a higher value of Power. In other words, the 




4.2.6.3 Illustration of anomaly detection step 
As it done with previous step, let use an illustrative example to show the anomaly 
detection steps. Thus the input to the anomaly detection decision is the PPCA data fusion 
step. By using the same data set as an example as in the data fusion step, the result of the 
PPCA was three principal components. 
  Step 1:  
The signal representing the system is reconstructed using the three principal components 
shown on Figure 25 (a), (b) and (c). Thus the reconstructed signal is shown on Figure 28 
below  












Figure 28: Reconstructed 1-dimensional signal from the 3 PPCA 
 
Step 2: 
The convergence of the statistical parameters for SAD and SSD is obtained as shown in 
Figure 29. 
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Figure 29: Converged statistical parameters 
 
Step 3: 
The upper specific limits for SAD and SSD are computed for a value of α of 2%that 
serves as the threshold as well: αSADUL  is 0.20126 and 
α
SSDUL is 0.04295. Thus, Figure 30 
shows the reference time series signal used to determine the statistical parameters (blue), 
monitor time series (green) and threshold (red dash) for SAD damage indicator. Also, 
Figure 30 shows the magnitude of the anomalies. 
 


















Similarly, Figure 31 shows the reference time series signal used to determine the 
statistical parameters (blue), monitor time series ( green) and threshold (red dash) for the 
SSD damage indicator. 









Figure 31: Monitoring of the damage indicator SSD 
 
After setting the threshold, the result of the hypothesis testing is shown in Figure 32 















Figure 32: H-Function of the hypothesis testing result 
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4.2.7 Combining both types of information 
 
After completing all the steps of the precursor detection, let us address the 
research question 1a. Recall that the research question 1a stated: “How can a failure 
precursor detection method be made robust?” 
– Why is the current industry standard missing many early precursory signs 
of catastrophic failure? 
– Can combining both vibration sensors and performance sensors decrease 
the number of missed detections? 
To address this research question, let’s use an example with eleven monitored sensors 
(three vibration sensors and eight performance sensors). 
4.2.7.1 Vibration sensors only 
After the preprocessing and de-noising of each of the three vibration sensors, the PPCA 
step is done. The eigenvalues contribution is shown in Table 13. 
 



















After the conventional PCA, the PPCA is done, using the maximum likelihood for weight 
matrix and with entry (W>=0.1), for the two retained principal components (99.31% of 

















The reconstructed signal is shown in Figure 33. 
 













Figure 33: Reconstructed signal for vibration sensors only 
 
Finally, the hypothesis testing is performed and show in Figure 34. 















Figure 34: H-function for vibration sensors only 
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4.2.7.2 Performance sensors only 
In a similar fashion, all the steps are repeated with the eight performance sensors only. 
The eigenvalues contribution is shown for performance only in Table 15 
 







































After the conventional PCA, the PPCA is done, using the maximum likelihood for weight 
matrix and with entry (W>=0.1), for the two retained principal components (99.917% of 
information content). This is shown in Table 16. 
 









AFPAP 0 0  
The reconstructed signal is shown for performance only in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35: Reconstructed signal for performance sensors only 
 
 
Finally, the hypothesis testing is done for performance sensors and shown in Figure 36. 













One set of anomaly detected
 
Figure 36: H-Function for vibration sensors only 
 
4.2.7.3 All sensors (vibration and performance) combined  
Now, let us combine all the sensors and perform all the steps of the anomaly detection 
process. The eigenvalues contribution is shown for the combination of all the sensors 
together in Table 17. 
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After the conventional PCA, the PPCA is done, using the maximum likelihood for 
weight matrix and with entry (W>=0.1), for the three retained principal components 
(98.283% of information content). This is shown in  
Table 18.  
 
Table 18: Three retained PC from the PPCA step for ALL sensors combined 
PC1 PC2 PC3
DWATT 0.1897 0.34279 0.28134
TNH 0.1664 0.28797 0.22198
BB1 0.60303 -0.30941 0
BB2 0.63522 0.36886 0
BB4 0.26122 0.5137 -0.80535
CPD 0.19144 0.33751 0.28019
CTD 0.17847 0.29981 0.21548
CPR 0.1778 0.31576 0.26381
CSGV 0 0 0
CTIM 0 0 0
AFPAP 0 0 0  
 
The reconstructed signal is shown for all the sensors combined in Figure 37 
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Figure 37: Reconstructed signal for ALL sensors combined 
 
Finally, the hypothesis testing is done for all the sensors combined and shown in Figure 
38.  














- 3 from the vibration
- 1 from the performance
 
Figure 38: H-Function for ALL sensors combined 
 
 
Figure 38 above shows that the anomaly signature that was not in the vibration-based 
analysis appears in the analysis based on the combination of all sensors. Similarly, the 
three anomalies detected during the vibration-based analysis, whose signatures were not 
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visible in the performance-based analysis, were detected in the combination of all 
sensors. 
. 
Recall hypothesis 1a: “Combining the information from the two types of sensors could 
decrease the number of missed precursory anomalies” 
 
Thus, hypothesis that stated: “the combination of the two type of sensors through the 
proposed approach can decrease the number of missed precursory anomaly” has been 
verified.   
Therefore, although there are damage diagnostic method that rely solely on vibration 
sensors [80], the combination of the vibration with the performance yields a much mmore 
robust anomaly detection methodology. 
4.2.8 Effect of sampling interval on the proposed anomaly detection methodology  
Recall research question 2a: “How does the sampling interval impact on the quality of 
detection?” 
– Does the sampling time have any impact on the quality of detection? 
To study the effect of the sensor sampling interval on the proposed anomaly detection 
technique, let us consider the following three sampling intervals: five seconds, one 
minute, and five minutes. Furthermore, let us perform the study through the use of an 
example. In this example, there are thirteen sensors that are being monitored. In each of 
the three cases, the normal steps of data preprocessing, de-noising, fusion, and anomaly 
detection are applied.   
4.2.8.1 Five minute sampling interval 
 
In this case, the data set is collected using sensors reading at five minute intervals. 
Table 19 shows the Pareto plot representing the contribution of each of the eigenvalues.  
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The Figure 39 below shows the magnitude of the anomaly in the five minute sampling 
interval of the SAD damage indicator.  
 














Figure 39: Monitoring of the damage indicator SAD for five minute sampling intervals 
 
 
The result of the hypothesis shown in Figure 40 indicates, that the detected anomaly 
started on 008/21/2008 at 12:05AM.   
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4.2.8.2 One minute sampling time 
In an approach similar to the one minute sampling interval case, the one minute interval 
is performed. Table 20 shows the Pareto plot representing the contribution of each of the 
eigenvalues  
 































































Figure 41 below shows the magnitude of the two anomalies in the one minute sampling 
interval of the SAD damage indicator.  














Figure 41: Monitoring of the damage indicator SAD for one minute sampling interval 
 
 
In the case of the one minute sampling interval, the result of the hypothesis testing shown 
in Figure 42  indicates that an anomaly was detected that started on 008/21/2008 at 
12:05AM (same as in the five minute sampling interval case), but a  short anomaly was 
also detected on 08/14/2008 from 23:05 to 23:06 (lasting only one minute). 






















4.2.8.3 Five second sampling time 
Finally, the five second sampling interval was performed in a similar fashion to the 
previous tests.  
Table 21 shows the Pareto plot representing the contribution of each of the eigenvalues. 
  




























































Figure 43 below shows the magnitudes of the anomalies in the five second sampling 
interval of the SAD damage indicator. It is seen in the figure that there are many more 
anomalies than in either the five or one minute sampling interval case. 



















Failure Precursory signs 
8/20/08 @ 23:58
 
Figure 43: Monitoring of the damage indicator SAD for five second sampling interval 
 
Recall the stated research hypothesis 2a: “The smaller the time step (the higher the 
frequency) is, the more accurate the detection quality will be.” 
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This research question investigated whether or not the sampling interval had an impact on 
the anomaly detection, and the hypothesis stipulated that: “the smaller time step (the 
higher frequency) will have better detection capability.” Through the study of the three 
different time intervals, it is clear that the smaller sampling interval leads to better 
detection capabilities, we see that the finer the interval, the more accurate the anomaly 
detection decision.   Also, we see that the smaller the sampling interval, the higher the 
sensitivity to anomaly detection. However, the smaller the sampling interval, the longer 
the analysis execution time will be. More importantly, the higher the sensitivity, the more 
the detection is prone to false alarms. 
In sum, the stated research hypothesis 2a is justified through the above experiment of 
assessing the sampling interval effect on the quality of the detection.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO 
RESIDUAL TIME TO FAILURE MODELING 
 
After developing the process of anomaly detection, the next interesting question 
that arises is whether or not the residual time to failure may have been predicted using an 
understanding of the detected anomaly signatures. Thus, this chapter is devoted to 
addressing that thought.  
 
5.1 Importance of Prognostics and Health Management  
The ability to predict the residual life of a system after the observation of a certain 
anomaly has always been of interest to the research community. Thus, whenever there 
has been the opportunity to monitor systems and collect characteristics of those systems, 
the question of what can be done with that knowledge to avoid surprise system failures 
has been raised. In other words, in the unfortunate situation where an irreversible failure 
precursor is observed, how can the acquired knowledge allow the prediction of the 
remaining life of that system?  
The medical field has been the pioneer in the prognostication of remaining 
lifespan. These estimates are made when certain potentially life-ending diseases like 
severe acute strokes or “advanced cancers,” known to the general public as “terminal 
cancers,” are diagnosed in patients. In fact, for a century the medical field has committed 
a lot of studies to the accurate prediction of the length of time remaining for certain 
patients with terminal illness, because it is important “for clinical, organizational, and 
ethical reasons, especially in helping to avoid harm, discomfort, and inappropriate 
therapies in vulnerable patients and, conversely, in planning specific care strategies” 
[153]. Moreover, knowledge of survival time can influence many important personal 
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decisions the patients and his/her love ones might make to enhance the end-of-life 
experience. In order to improve the accuracy of the prognostication, there are many 
studies that have particularly focused on determining the factors or health predictors that 
may be used to correctly predict survival time after the detection of fatal diseases [153-
155]. 
However, as a result of those studies, it was learned that the predictors that may be useful 
in predicting survival time when a fatal illness is caught at an early stages may be totally 
different from those that are useful when the discovery is made at a later stage. For 
instance, in the case of advanced cancers, the prognostication is typically based on tumor 
development at the earlier stages, whereas at advanced stages (defined as median survival 
time of no more than 90 days), prognostication is based on many more factors.  In [153], 
Maltoni et al. report that the remaining life estimation is still feasible, but it depends on 




Table 22: Factors Subdivided on the Basis of Level of Evidence Obtained by a Correlation With 
Actual Survival [153] 
Factor for which a definite 
correlation with prognosis has 
been identified
Factors for which a correlation has been indicated 
but not confirmed or for which a statistical 
significance has been identified in patient 
populations with lass advanced disease or for 
which contradictory data have emerged
Factors with controvesial 
indications










Prognostic scores Serum calcium level
Serum sodium level
Lactate dehydrogenase and other enzymes
Multidimensional 
quality-of-life 
questionaire; it is 
possible that their 
prognostic capacity is a 
result of the identifying 
components of physical 
Signs and symptoms of cancer 
anorexia-cachexia syndrome 
lanorexia, weight loss, 
dysphagia, and xerostornia
Some biologic factors 
(leukocytosis, 
Patient characteristics (age, sex, and marital 
status)  
 
In a similar fashion, as designed systems became more complex and expensive, 
the ability to detect abnormalities that may lead to their failure arises as a necessity. For 
example, in an industrial application, for systems in which an emergency shutdown may 
create disruption or may be costly (e.g. heavy duty gas turbine for electrical production), 
it is important to know the level of risk of continuous safe operation, until it becomes less 
disruptive to shut the system down. The ability to prognosticate the remaining useful life 
(RUL), or the amount of time left before system health will deteriorate below a defined 
failure threshold, is important for critical systems. RUL prediction becomes especially 
valuable in cases of expensive systems such as gas turbines where the failure threshold 
could be an irreversible catastrophic mechanical failure. Additionally, RUL estimation is 
necessarily a prediction or forecasting endeavor; that is, it is an extrapolation for the 
future process [21] from what is believed to be the system current health, as illustrated in  
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Figure 44 below. For that reason, Vachtsevanos stated that RUL prediction is the most 
challenging part of the prognostic development [50], because the future is never known 
with certainty. Therefore, any prediction would be essentially based on models that 
would have architecture similar to the one shown in Figure 44, and would be built to 











Figure 44: Schematic of the RUL architecture 
 
 
There are many ways to predict the residual time to failure or to foresee how a system or 
component may behave during its remaining useful life, as one can see from the literature 
[156-158]. Furthermore, there are regression models that can serve as templates or 
starting points for further development [159]. 
In the modern literature, the field of prognostics that is dedicated solely to studying the 
residual time to failure of systems or components, based on their intrinsic health from 
monitoring, is referred to in the general sense as Prognostics and Health Management, or 
PHM. The PHM field is so vibrant and active that organizations have been created 
exclusively for its advancement, such as the National Society of PHM. Journals and 
magazines like the the International Journal of Prognostics and Health Management 
(IJPHM), and professional meetings and conferences such as the annual conference of the 
PHM or the IEEE International Conference on Prognostics and Health Management, just 
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to cite a few, are also signs of the vibrancy of the field. PHM applications and research 
are thriving in many different fields, ranging from big, general areas such as aircraft 
systems[160], to some of the narrower and more specific fields such an avionics systems 
[161] and electronic systems [162]. Current research in the field of PHM is being done 
both at the systems level, as illustrated in Figure 45, and at the component level [163, 
164]. Generally, “PHM includes every method used to assess the health of systems 
elements beginning with the manufacturing process and continuing through all levels and 
elements of operation” [165].  
 
Figure 45: Example of PHM System Architecture for a fighter aircraft [165] 
 
In an example illustrating the broad need for and application of the PHM, shown in 
Figure 46, B. Ferrell states that PHM is a system function that touches every element of 
the weapon system in some way. 
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Figure 46: PHM operations in military application [165] 
  
Regardless of the way PHM is implemented or studied, it remains strategically based, in 
one form or another, on detecting and understanding the signature of anomalies. 
One thing is for certain: the more complex a system is, and the more critical its safety and 
reliability are, the greater the need is to implement PHM, and the more the related cost 
can be justified. 
5.1.1 Data generation process for PHM analysis 
The very first issue in any regression building model is to identify the predictors 
and their corresponding responses. In the case of deterministic prediction, only after the 
data set of paired inputs and outputs is defined and generated can a regression model be 
built. The output of interest in this work is the residual time to failure after a failure 
precursor is detected. The preliminary problem remains in defining a system’s health 
index so that it can be used as an input or predictor factor.  
The underlining assumption made here is that the signature of the residual time to failure 
can be observed in the health indexes. Therefore, the identification of the appropriate 
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health indexes should allow the building of a residual life estimation regression model, 
which would map the health indexes after a diagnosed precursory event in order to 
determine remaining time to failure.  
  
The following health indexes were identified and observed: 
• The Anomaly Severity Index (ASI), which records highest value reached during 
an anomalistic period. This index is referred to as the severity index because it 
provides an idea of how bad the damage is. It is defined as: 
( ) ( )
USL
kSAD
kASI =          (33) 
Where:  
– ( )kSAD  is defined as the sum of the absolute difference between the 
reconstructed signal (representing the system) energy content at the thk  time 
step after the threshold value is set, and the reference energy refE . 
– USL  is the calculated upper specific limit that corresponds to the anomaly 
threshold.  
• The Anomaly Duration Index (ADI) 
ADI (k) is thk the length of time the monitored signal (reconstructed signal) stays 
above the anomaly threshold after any crossing of the threshold. That is, the amount 
of time between the point of detection of an anomaly and the end of that anomaly. 
That is: 
TkADI ∆=)( , while USLkSAD >)(  
• The Residual Time to Failure, RTTF (k), is the time between the detection of the 
thk anomaly and the time of the system failure. 
 
Figure 47 illustrates all the parameters defined above for the residual life analysis. 
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Figure 47: Illustration of the prognostics parameters 
 
So the defined health indexes (ASI, ADI) are mapped into the output or response. The 
output target is defined as the interval of time between the moment the first failure 
precursor is detected, and the time of the system failure. In other word, the problem in 
hand can be represented as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )kADIkASIfkRTTF ,=      (34) 
Thus, the first attempt to resolve the problem posed in equation (34) is the deterministic 
approach, which is presented in the next section. 
5.2 Deterministic approach to modeling and simulation for estimation of residual 
life 
Ideally, it is desirable to be able to deterministically estimate the residual life of a system 
or component based on an assessment of its current level of health. In practice, this 
means the development of the capability to model responses giving a set of determined 
corresponding predictors. Although the idea of developing regression models for residual 
life estimation is not new, there have always been many challenges to overcome, like in 
any regression problem, including knowing all the predictors that affect a given response. 
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The regression modeling works by mapping a set of causes and their corresponding 
effects. Typically, models to represent causes and deduced effects are constructed by 
applying statistical regression techniques to experimental data. In general, regression 
techniques can be subdivided into two main families: parametric regressions and non-
parametric regressions. Among the most commonly used regression techniques are the 
Response Surface Equation (RSE), the Gaussian Process, and the Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN). Thus, a brief overview of each of the three regression techniques will 
be given in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Parametric Regression 
5.2.1.1 Response Surface Equations (RSE)  
Response Surface Equations are simplified polynomial equations used to model 
the behavior of complex systems. RSE are obtained through multivariate regression 
techniques known as Response Surface Methodology (RSM) [166, 167]. RSM is a 
collection of statistical or mathematical techniques useful for developing, improving, and 
optimizing processes [166]. Typically, RSM is used to relate the factors (or predictors) to 
the measured responses over some specified region of interest [168].  The underlying 
principle of the RSM is that it is an experimental strategy that consists of exploring the 
factors, empirical statistical modeling to develop an appropriate approximation between 
the yield and the process variables, and optimization methods for finding the values of 
the process variables that produce desirable response values [169]. The RSE technique 
models equations through the usage of design of experiment (DOE). The most popularly 
used RSE is the second-order Taylor series approximation because it requires a minimal 





















         (35) 
 
Where, 
R  is the dependent parameter (response) of interest. 
ob is the intercept term. 
ib are regression coefficients for the first order terms. 
iib are coefficients for the pure quadratic terms. 
ijb  are the coefficients for the cross-product terms. 
ji xx ; are the independent variables. 
k is the number of factors. 
ε  is the error associated with neglecting higher order effects 
RSE assumes that for any model the error, ε, should be distributed as N(0,1). 
The RSE approach has many advantages, such as:   
• It provides a rapid correlation between design variables or technology metrics and 
the system level impacts. 
• It uses a simplified equation to represent a complex system. 
• Its sensitivities are easily obtained. 
• Its optimization process is easily obtained. 
• It is rapid and efficient. 
• It provides instantaneous evaluations. 
However, RSE has a series of limitations as well: 
• Large variations in the factors can be misleading and generate error or bias 
• Critical factors may not be correctly defined or specified.  
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• If the range of levels of factors is too narrow or too wide, the optimum cannot be 
defined. 
• There is a lack of use of good statistical principles.  
• There is an over reliance on computers (e.g. one can only make sure the 
regression results make sense using a computer). 
In order to achieve a satisfactory result when using RSE, the following assumptions need 
to be verified: 
• The critical factors are known.  
• The region of interest is known.  
• The factors vary continuously throughout the experimental range tested. 
• There is a mathematical function that relates the factors to the response. 
• The response defined by the function is a smooth curve.  
Besides the listed drawback, one of the chief limitations of the RSE method is that it 
relies on linear requirements, so it can’t handle non-linear behaviors of the system 
parameters, which non-parametric techniques like the artificial neural networks can. In 
sum, because of the many advantage of the RSE, it should always be considered during 
regression problems. In fact, because RSM approximates the behavior of a response with 
respect to certain specific design parameters, it has the capability to quickly give a system 
analyst insightful knowledge into a problem when the proprietary models are not 
available for use.  
 
5.2.2 Non-parametric Regression 
5.2.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks   
The Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) is a non-parametric regression technique 
that can be used for highly non-linear parameters or discrete problems.  Thus, ANN has 
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the capability to address one of the major limitations of the response surface equation: the 
inability to handle non-linear problems.  
Typically, ANN works by trying to mimic the way a brain functions. Artificial neurons 
are usually simplified versions of a brain cell. The reason for trying to create a technique 
that imitates the functional processing approach of the brain is that the replication of the 
structure of the brain is the best way to achieve artificial intelligence. A human’s brain 
has several billion neurons. Each neuron can have thousands of connections, and each has 
an axon that serves to transmit a signal, and dendrites that receive signals from other 
neurons. The signals that are received through the dendrites of a neuron pass a set 
threshold value; the neuron in turn fires a signal through its axon. Although each 
connection is simple alone, when a large number of them are put together it leads to fairly 
complex behavior [170]. Though the structure of a neural network can be complex, 
Figure 48 shows a simple artificial neuron that is the nuclei of the most complex 
structures: 
 
Figure 48: Illustration of an artificial neural from [171] 
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In the illustrative Figure 48, the ix  are the network inputs, the iw are the weights, y is the 
weighted sum of inputs, and also the input to the transfer function f , while a is the 






             (36) 
Where: { }xxxxx ,....,,,1 21= is the vector of inputs and { }xwwwww ,....,,, 210= is the 
vector of weights. 
Several neurons can be grouped in layers to construct structures as complex as needed. 
Typically, functions can be represented as the weighted sum of orthogonal basis 
functions [47]. The weights used to model a neural network are obtained during the 
learning (or training) process. Ultimately, the structure and dynamics of the network and 
the learning (training) process are the major components defining a neural network. The 
power of neural networks lies in their ability to combine logical parallel computations 
with serial operations [172]. All the neuron layers can run in the same direction (i.e. feed-
forward) or they can feedback from layers to preceding layers (dynamic or recurrent). In 
general, ANN requires a training of the neural nets with examples of input-output pairs of 
data [51]. After an adequate training, neural networks can be readily used for process 
parameter (or state) assessment without requiring any knowledge of the underlying 
system. This capability makes the neural networks a very powerful tool for pattern 
recognition [45]. Usually, the accuracy of the regression can be improved by increasing 
the number of neurons, which comes with the cost of an increase in the computational 
burden. A conceptual diagram showing the different components and connections 
between neural network layers is shown in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49: Neural Network Conceptual Diagram [170] 
 
Although the conceptual neural network in Figure 49 has a simple structure, neural 
networks can be classified into two major categories: the static neural network and the 
dynamic neural network [173].  
1) Static neural networks, also called feed-forward neural networks, have no 
feedback elements and contain no time delays, as illustrated in Figure 50 
 
 
Figure 50: Feed-Forward Neural Network 
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The static network is trained through a scheme called backpropagation, which relies on 
determined training algorithms such as the Levenberg-Marquardt to obtain the weights. 
2) Contrary to the static neural network, the outputs of dynamic networks 
depend on the current or previous inputs, outputs, or states of the network. Furthermore, 
the dynamic network can in turn be divided into two subgroups: 
• Dynamic networks with feed-forward connections only. In this case, the 
output response depends not only on the inputs, but also on time. Moreover, the 
application is more common when the inputs also depend on time. A depiction of a 
dynamic feed-forward network in shown in Figure 51.  
 
Figure 51: Depiction of a dynamic feed-forward network [174]  
 
 
• Dynamic networks with feedback or recurrent connections. In 
this case, the output state depends on the previous states and the time. In [175], the author 
explains that recurrent neural networks (RNN) are neural networks with one or more 
feedback loops, where the feedback can be of a local or global kind. The RNN has the 
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ability to store memory of preceding states, which allows the RNN to record the 
characteristics of a system it represents over time [174].  Figure 52 shows an illustrative 
representation of the general structure of a recurrent network. Obviously, that makes the 
RNN the structure of choice when modeling a dynamic system in which current output 
depends on past as well as present information. This unique ability makes the RNN very 
powerful and popular. 
 
 
Figure 52: Recurrent Neural Network [176] 
 
There are many training algorithms for the dynamic neural network. A list of them and 
their implementations can be seen in [177]. 
It is worth noting that even though the simple structure of neural networks is 
shown in previous figures, the two most popular types of neural network are the multi-
layer perceptron (MLP) and the radial basis function (RBF) [51]. Therefore, it is possible 
to create structures as complex as necessary using multiple layers. 
Regardless of the type of neural network needed for a system modeling, there are two 
types of learning procedures: supervised and unsupervised learning [171].  
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1) In case of supervised learning, the input values which have known target outputs 
are used. Then, the network error is computed using the difference between the 
target values and the network-predicted output values. Backpropagation is most 
frequently used for supervised training where network error is propagated back 
through the different layers of the network. Finally, different optimization 
methods can be use to minimize the network error.  
2) In unsupervised learning, the weights are adjusted depending on the value of the 
network-predicted value because there is no use of target values. Another 
particularity of the unsupervised learning case is that the learning process never 
stops. 
 
Commonly classical orthogonal functions such as the sinusoids function and the Walsh 
function are used as the activation functions of the neural network. Though they have 
been popular, they are global approximators (i.e. use global functions), which can be 
disadvantagous. A specific field of artificial neural network research that is getting a lot 
of attention is the use of wavelet family functions as activation functions. In contrast to 
the classical activation functions, the wavelet functions aren’t limitated by global 
approximators because they have good localization properties and orthonormal bases. 
When wavelets are utilized as the activation functions of a neural network, it is called a 
Wavelet Neural Network (WNN) [46, 47]. WNN theory was developed as an alternative 
to the standard feed-forward neural networks for modeling nonlinear functions [178]. The 
wavelet neural network has been used in a fairly high number of research projects 
recently, particularly in the field of fault diagnosis [179, 180]. A general illustration of 
the WNN is shown in Figure 53, where the structure is similar to the conventional static 
neural network, only the activation function is replaced with a wavelet family function.  
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Figure 53: General structure of WNN [181]  
 
Just like in the conventional neural network case, when a wavelet family is used as an 
activator in a dynamic network, the network is called a Dynamic Wavelet Neural 
Network (DWNN). 
 
5.2.2.2 Gaussian process 
The Gaussian process is a stochastic process which has the following formal 
definition: “A Gaussian process is a collection of random variables, any finite number of 
which have (consistent) joint Gaussian distribution” [182]. Training in a Gaussian 
process involves maximizing the logarithmic likelihood that the predicted process 
matches the training data [183]. The Gaussian process has several advantages: 
• Its models can be used to formulate a Bayesian framework for regression 
• It can handle non-linearity 
• It can be easier to work with in practice than ANN  
However, it has disadvantages as well, as it assumes a “Gaussian distribution”, an 
assumption which is not valid for a typical power plant operation because periodic shut-
downs and turn-ons of a gas turbine [9] are a regular occurrence, which keeps its 
operation from being a continuous process. 
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5.3 Implementation of deterministic modeling for estimation of residual life 
Based on the literature review and an analysis of the regression techniques (RSE, 
ANN, and the Gaussian Process), the artificial neural network appears to be the most 
suitable non-parametric regression technique for the modeling and simulation necessary 
for the remaining useful life estimation. However, for the sake of completeness, both the 
RSE (parametric regression) and ANN (non-parametric regression) techniques will be 
investigated.  
 
5.3.1 Residual life modeling using RSE  
Once the RSE is selected as the parametric regression technique, the modeling 
and simulation tool is built. The inputs will be the system health characteristics (health 
indexes) and the system operating conditions at the time the first failure precursor is 
detected and validated, while the responses will be the interval of time between the 
precursor detection point and the system failure point. A diagram of the conceptual M&S 
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Figure 54: Schematic of conceptual M&S for residual life estimation using RSE 
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As indicated above, even though the RSE can be a polynomial of any order, it is 
typically of the second order. 
The equation that will be used to approximate the target output is the second-order Taylor 




















      (37) 
The estimated coefficients of the response equation will be determined via an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) approach, in which an appropriate Design of Experiments table is 
utilized to analyze the different variable settings. The statistical software package of the 
JMP by SAS® will be used in conjunction with other software in order to achieve the 
residual life modeling using the RSE regression method. 
5.3.2 Non-parametric RUL estimation 
In a similar fashion, a modeling and simulation tool is built for the residual life 
estimation using artificial neural networks as the regression technique. The ANN will be 
trained using a training data set collected while the item is healthy. The inputs will be the 
system health characteristics (health indexes) and the system operating conditions at the 
time the first failure precursor is detected and validated while the responses will be the 
interval of time between the precursor detection point and the system failure point. A 
diagram of the conceptual modeling and simulation for residual life estimation using 
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Figure 55: Schematic of conceptual M&S for residual life estimation using ANN 
 
Because the neural network approach has been so commonly used, there exists much 
customized, ready-made software developed by organizations to meet their specific 
needs. Thus, for the ANN use, a software called BRAINN [170], developed in the 
Aerospace Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 
will be used. The software BRAINN is capable of creating regression formulas for a set 
of input-output pairs under certain conditions.  It can handle the two types of neural 
networks for different response types [170], which are: function approximation (used for 
continuous response, highly non-linear) and classification (used for discrete responses).  
The sigmoid transfer function defined below in equation      
     (38) is one of the most commonly used in the neural 
network, because it can approximate any continuous function so long as the number of 
neurons in the hidden layer is sufficient and the weights of the neuron connection are 








          (38) 
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Then, the sigmoid transfer function is used to compute the characteristic of each value for 















        (39) 
 
Where: ja  is the intercept term for the 
thj  hidden node. 
 ijb  is the coefficient for the 
thi  design variable. 
 iX  is the value of the 
thi  design variable. 
N is the number of input variables. 
 jH  is the value of the
thj hidden node. 
   
If the regression problem is for a function approximation, the value of the response is 









        (40) 
Where: ke  is the intercept term for the 
thk  response. 
 jkf  is the coefficient for the 
thj  hidden node and thk  response 
 HN  is the number of hidden nodes 
Otherwise, if the regression problem is a classification problem, the value of the response 































      (41) 
 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that the function approximation requires no post-
processing, while the classification needs post-processing.  
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5.3.3 WAVELET Neural Network (WNN) 
 
Though the wavelet neural network is not applied in this thesis, it has become a 
good alternative when dealing with systems for which the conventional activation 
function does not work well. This is because the conventional back-propagation  (BP) 
training that has been the most used in practice has low learning speed and easily falls 
into local minima as reported in [181]. The Wavelet NN handles some of those 
deficiencies by using wavelet function as the activation function of the neurons. Also, 
one major advantage of the WNN is that for systems that are dynamic (time dependent) 
in nature, the dynamic wavelet network provides much better results than does the 
conventional dynamic neural network. A conceptual representation of the Dynamic 
Wavelet Neural Network (DWNN) is shown in Figure 56. 
 
 
Figure 56: Conceptual representation of Dynamic Wavelet Neural Network [46] 
 
After the models for both the parametric and non-parametric regressions are created, they 
will be assessed to see if they provide an acceptable way to estimate the residual life of 
the system.  In the case that they are deemed acceptable based on the accuracy of the 
prediction, the two type of regression will be compared in order to decide which of the 
regression techniques yields a better prediction model. 
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On the other hand, if the two regression techniques fail to provide acceptable 
prognostication estimation, either an empirical cumulative distribution function or the 
Kaplan-Meier data analysis technique will be used to establish the distribution of the 
collected residual time to failure data. In effect, all time experimental and empirical 
failure data are available, and so a priori specific parametric distribution is assumed. The 
non-parametric and Kaplan-Meier are appropriate approaches to estimating the survival 




5.4 Empirical or non-parametric approach to residual life estimation: Kaplan-
Meier  
 
The Kaplan-Meier estimator is one of the most popular statistical data analysis 
methods for many reasons. In fact, the merit of the Kaplan–Meier estimator of the 
survival function (also known as reliability) is that it is an empirical or non-parametric 
method of estimating the survival probability for either non-censored or right-censored 
data. Because of its ability to handle right-censored data, the Kaplan-Meier is used in this 
work. This is because in the field currently under study, when an anomaly is detected in a 
timely fashion, the system’s operator must automatically shut it down to avoid the 
expensive risk associated with catastrophic failure. 
5.4.1 Censored data  
Before continuing to an overview of the Kaplan-Meier estimator, let us briefly review 
the notion of censoring data. Censoring can be defined as the fact that the life data of an 
observed item or system is not complete. In other words, the residual time to the item 
failure is not known because the observation was stopped. Censoring occurs 
predominantly in the engineering and medical fields.  
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There are many types of censoring.  
• Right-censored: an observation is right-censored if it is known that the failure 
time occurred after time t, but the actual time is not known. Most survival time 
data are right-censored, because when the decision is made to stop the operation 
of an item before failure occurs, the cut off is made at the right side [184]. Right-
censoring is common in medical applications. 
• Left-censored: a survival time is left-censored when at a given time t, it is known 
that the failure has already occurred, but the actual failure time is not known. In 
other words, a data point is below a certain value, but it is unknown by how 
much. 
• Type-I censored: data is type-I censored when n items being tested are stopped at 
a predefined fixed time t0, at which point any subjects remaining are right-
censored. An application of type-I censoring is conventional preventive 
maintenance, where, after a predefined lifetime, any remaining operating 
components are taken off and replaced. 
• Type-II censored: data is Type II censored when right-censoring is performed on 
the remaining number of items (n-k) from a set of n items (original number of 
tests at start time) after a predetermined number of items (k<=n) have failed. 
• Interval-censored: data is interval-censored when a failure time T cannot be 
observed, and the only known information is that the survival time is between X 
and Y (X<Y) [185]. 
• Random (or non-informative) censored: data is random-censored when each item 
has a censoring time Ci that is statistically independent of its failure time Ti. The 
observed value Yi = min{Ci, Ti}; any item whose failure time is greater than its 
censoring time is right-censored. 
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Based on all the definitions of the different types of censoring, we can see that the 
survival time data modeled in this thesis belongs to the random censoring category, 
because each test item is either right censored or it failed. Also, it is worth noting the 
following points regarding the items or units being considered in this work: 1) they have 
different anomaly detection times (calendar times); 2) the censoring occurs because a 
failure signature was detected, the unit was shut down, and the anomaly was fixed. An 
illustrative concept of the censored survival data is shown in Figure 57 
 
Figure 57: Censored data with different beginning of experiment time [186] 
 
It is important to handle a censored data set with greater care, because deriving a survival 
function from censored data is not straightforward [186].Therefore, since the Kaplan-
Meier has been used successfully with the same data type, it is an appropriate technique. 
5.4.2 Kaplan Meier overview 
Edward Kaplan and Paul Meier developed the non-parametric estimation for 
right-censored lifetime data analysis [157]. It is crucial to have an acceptable level of 
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confidence in the estimation of the residual life or survival time of critical components 
because over-estimating the survival time could lead to catastrophic failure. For the given 
fleet of systems for which the RUL estimation was developed using a non-parametric 
model, the Kaplan-Meier estimator can be utilized to assess the likelihood of that 
estimation [112]. The goal of the Kaplan-Meier estimator is to evaluate the maximum 
likelihood of an estimated survival time. In general, the Kaplan-Meier’s plot is dynamic 
and can be updated with both the right-censored data (units whose survival time was 
truncated before failure and therefore they did not fail) as well as units that failed. Once a 
Kaplan-Meier plot is established, the probability that a unit will survive through its 
estimated RUL can be easily determined, based on the historical behavior of similar units 
in the fleet. The Kaplan-Meier plot is used for a population with similar characteristics 
(e.g. for the same type of diseases in the medical field).  
5.4.2.1 Estimation of the survivor function 
Before proceeding to some mathematical background of the Kaplan-Meier, let’s make a 
few assumptions: 
• It is assumed that the time to failure of the different units (n total) after an 
anomaly is detected can be sorted and rearranged in an ascending fashion: 
nn tttt <<⋅⋅⋅<< −121      (42) 
• The residual time to failure (RTTF) is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed.   
• It is assumed that there are no ties in the data set. 
Therefore, the probability of survival or the empirical survivor function (ESF) can be 
estimated as follows: 










=            (43) 
Where:  
in  is the number of units at risk just prior to it . 
ip̂ is the probability of exactly one item failing right after time it . 
Equation           (43) is defined by Kaplan and 
Meier as the conditional probability of surviving just past time it ; mathematically that is 
written: 
ip̂ estimate of ( )iFiF tTttTP >+> |δ     (44) 
Where tδ is an arbitrary small time interval in which no censoring occurred.  
Recall the conditional probability for two independent events A and B: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BPAPABPAPBAP ⋅=⋅=∩ |     (45) 
Now, if the definition of conditional probability is applied to the time it ,  
where ni tttt <⋅⋅⋅<<⋅⋅⋅<< 21  
then: 
( ) ( ) ( )












   (46) 
Recall that the survival function or the reliability function is the probability in equation  
 (46).  
Then, by replacing each factor in equation   (46) with its expression in equation    
       (43), we find the survivor function 
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 , for 0≥t  
Thus, equation                 (48) represents a step function 
that decreases by n1  just after each observed lifetime [187], as illustrated in Figure 58. 
 
 
Figure 58: Illustration of empirical survivor function with no censored observations [186]  
 
However, if there are d lifetimes equal to t , then the step function decreases by nd just 
past time t . 
 
2) When there are censored observations with id failed items at the time it , the 











            (49) 
Where  
( )tŜ  is the estimated function curve. 
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in is the number of units at risk just prior to it . 
id is the number of units failed at it . 
An illustrative example showing the Kaplan-Meier plot for censored survival data is 
shown in Figure 59 
 

























Kaplan-Meier plot of GT compressor failure after FIRST Anomaly
 
Figure 59: Illustrative example of Kaplan-Meier plot for censored data  
 
 
It is important to note that in the case of non-censored observations, the Kaplan-Meier 
estimator reduces to a regular Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE). The difference 
between the Kaplan-Meier and the MLE is that when there is censored observation, the 
Kaplan-Meier takes the weight which would have been normally assigned to that 
observation and distributes it evenly among all observed values to the right of that 
observation [112]. 
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5.4.2.2 Estimation of Kaplan-Meier Confidence Interval 
Any rigorous scientific approach requires that, when one is dealing with an 
approximation or estimation, one must provide the confidence level of that estimation. 
Since the Kaplan-Meier estimator is simply an estimation of the actual survivor function, 
a confidence level calculation is necessary.  
The problem is that, in the case of right-censoring, the variance does not have a simple 
form when the Kaplan-Meier estimator is used. Fortunately, a formula developed by 
Greenwood, and known as Greenwood’s formula, can be used to determine the 
( )α−1 confidence interval [112]. 
Recall that the survival function is FS −= 1  where F is the cumulative distribution 
function. Therefore, under the right-censoring, the confidence interval (upper and lower) 
becomes: 
( ) ( )ii tZtS σα ˆ2 ⋅±  






tStSt 222 ˆˆ σσ  (50) 
A 95% confidence interval can be determined as shown in equation  (51): 
( ) ( ) ( )iii ttStS σ96.1ˆ%95 ±=  (51) 
Although this is a good confidence interval calculation method, it is important to note 
that the confidence interval is a pointwise confidence interval based on fixed values of 
time  t  in the CDF ( )tF  [112]. 
 
5.5 Parametric analysis for assumed distributions  
In cases where the regression model does not yield a satisfactory residual life 
estimation model, and the Kaplan-Meier provides only a non-parametric empirical 
survivor estimator, it is interesting to investigate conventional survival data distribution. 
This is because, although the non-parametric estimator is not constrained to any 
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particular predetermined lifetime distribution, it is not flexible enough to be used for 
another purpose. A parametric analysis, on the other hand, allows for the use of a finding 
from a given data set and for its implementation on other units within a given fleet of 
units. 
However, because there are no previous studies on the type of residual time to failure 
being undertaken in this thesis, nor is there any knowledge of the underlying distribution 
form of that residual time to failure, few of the most commonly used distributions in the 
field of survival function parametric analysis will be investigated.   
 
 
5.5.1 Exponential Distribution  
5.5.1.1 Exponential distribution overview 
The first distribution to be considered when there is no previous knowledge is 
exponential distribution, because it is simple and can give a first level of understanding.  
















λ  (52), 
 
where λ is the hazard function. 
The major assumption of the exponential function is that the hazard function or hazard 
rate is constant over time and can be defined as: 
 λλ == )()( tth  (53) 
For non censoring cases with n units, the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of the 
hazard function can be determined as follows: 
One assumes that n units X with identical independent distribution (iid),   
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Sample X = {X1, X2, …,Xn). The maximum likelihood estimate is: 
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     (56) 
Since the MLE is reached when the derivative vanishes, the MLE is: 
 
x
1ˆ =λ    (57) 
Recall that x  is the average of the n units X. Therefore, x is also the mean time to failure 
(MTTF) in the context of time to failure, FT being the variable of interest. 
 
MTTF
1ˆ =λ   (58) 
However, since there are censored units among the data to be analyzed, the use of  λ̂  as 
determined in equation   (58) is not appropriate.  
Instead, the approach will assume the general form of an exponential distribution. When 
the exponential plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimated survival data is complete, the best 
linear least squares fit to the data set is found, and the estimatedλ̂  from the curve fit is 
deduced. If the exponential distribution assumption was a good one, then the estimatedλ̂ will 
be close to the λ̂  calculated from the maximum likelihood analysis. To plot the survivor 
or reliability function, one must then perform an exponentially distributed function:  
tetS λ−=)(  (59) 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of equation  (59) yields the following: 
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( ) ( )tetS λ−= ln)(ln     (60) 
Then, the equation    (60) becomes: 
 ( ) ttS λ−=)(ln         (61) 
The following variable changes are then made: 
tx =  (62) 
xy λ−=  (63) 
 
It is important to note that the intercept in equation  (63) is 0 [188].  
Equation  (63) shows the best linear least squares fit of the exponential plot of the 
Kaplan-Meier estimated survivor function. When this is determined, the goodness of fit 
can be estimated. The coefficient of determination, 2R , will be used as a metric for 
goodness of fit. 
 
 
5.5.1.2 Exponential Confidence Interval 
 
Depending on the size of the data set, the confidence level can vary. Also, it is 
obvious that the confidence level for a small data set will be lower than that for a larger 
data set. The 100(1 − α)% confidence interval can be calculated for exponential 


















Where λ̂  is the MLE estimate, λ is the true value of the parameter, and 2;xkχ  is the value 
of the chi squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, which gives x cumulative 
probability. Fortunately, the confidence interval can be ready obtained using a Matlab® 
built-in function expofit. 
 
5.5.2 Weibull Distribution 
5.5.2.1 Weibull distribution overview 
The next distribution to be considered is the Weibull distribution, because it is one 
of the two most frequently used distributions in the reliability and survival analysis field.  
Additionally, exponential distribution has a constant failure rate or hazard function, while 
Weibull has a time-dependent hazard rate.  























θ  is defined as the scale parameter (expressed in units of time).  
β  is the shape parameter (dimensionless). 















t  , with 0>θ ,  0>β , and 0≥t  (66) 
 
The survivor function or reliability is defined as:  
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( )βθtetS −=)(  (67) 
 
To get the Weibull plot, one must take a logarithm of both side of equation  (67), as 
follows:  
( ) ( )( )βθtetS −= ln)(ln  (68) 











tS )(ln  (69) 
By taking the logarithm of both sides of the equation  (69) one more time, it 
becomes: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )θββ lnln)(lnln −=− ttS  (70) 
 













Equation  (70) becomes:  
( )θββ ln−= xy  (72) 
 
In equation  (72), which is the equation of a straight line, β  represents the slope, and 







=  (73) 
 
Therefore, the Weibull distribution estimate that corresponds to the Kaplan-Meier 
estimate, or the RTTF, can be obtained.  
Similarly, equation  (72) represents the best linear least squares fit of the Weibull 
distribution plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimated survivor function. Once this is 
determined, the goodness of fit can be estimated. The coefficient of determination, 2R , 
will be used as a metric for the goodness of fit. 
 
5.5.2.2 Weibull Confidence Interval 
As in the exponential distribution case, the quality of the Weibull distribution 
estimation is dependent on the size of the data set being studied. Consequently, the 100 
(1 − α)% confidence interval needs to be calculated for the Weibull distribution 
estimation. The determination of the confidence interval for the Weibull estimate is not 
trivial. The two sides (1 − α) of the scale and shape parameters can be calculated as  
( )µθ exp=   and σβ
1=  , where µ is the extreme value location parameter and 
σ is the extreme value scale parameter. 
Then, the lower and upper bounds of the Weibull parameters can be obtained, as shown 
in equations  (74) and  (75): 
 
[ ] [ ])exp(),exp(, ULUL µµθθ =  (74) 
 




Likely, the confidence interval can be readily obtained using a MATLAB® built-in 
function, “wblfit” in MATLAB version 7.8.0 (R2009). 
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CHAPTER 6 
6IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD FOR GAS 
TURBINE COMPRESSOR CATASTROPHIC FAILURE  
 
 
This chapter concerns the application of the proposed methodology, as described 
in chapter 4 and chapter 5, to a fleet of eleven failed or right-censored 170MW rated 
heavy duty gas turbines, in order to demonstrate the viability of the proposed 
methodology to efficiently handle compressor failure problems. Each unit in the 
considered fleet has either failed or has displayed failure signatures due to a compressor 
issue. 
The failure precursor detection methodology explained in chapter 4 is first applied to 
each unit in order to identify the time of the precursory failure events. The characteristic 
signature of each of those failure precursors is computed and tabulated. Then, the 
accumulated survival data is analyzed using deterministic regression techniques, non-
parametric techniques, and parametric techniques, which produces models for the 
residual time to failure, as elucidated in the chapter 5.  In short, this chapter is divided 
into three parts: 1) implementation of catastrophic failure precursor detection on the 
eleven units of a fleet; 2) modeling of the residual time to failure, as obtained from the 
failure anomaly characteristics; and 3) discussion of the findings and the key challenges 
of the proposed methodology and its implementation. 
6.1 Implementation of failure precursor detection 
 
The proposed approach for failure precursor detection is applied to General Electric 
7FA gas turbine compressor failures. There were a fleet of eleven units that were 
monitored and analyzed.   
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6.1.1 Assumptions made for proposed approach implementation 
It is important to enumerate a list of implicit assumptions made when conducting 
this implementation: 
1) The test units are not picked in any particular order. 
2) The failure precursors independent and identically distributed (iid), which 
means there is no distinction made between the type and mode of failure. 
3) Each unit is a test subject. 
4) Units are operated in a similar manner (mostly at based-load operation). 
5) Units’ owners perform the appropriate scheduled maintenance. 
6) Monitoring sensors are performing as planned. 
 
 
6.1.2 Inspection background of General Electric gas turbine 
 
Figure 60: GE gas turbine inspection scope [9] 
 
GE has different inspection scopes for its gas turbines: combustion inspection, hot gas 
path inspection, and major inspection. Each inspection covers specific parts of the gas 
turbine, as shown in Figure 60. 
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Each category of inspection is performed at predefined intervals of time. The combustion 
inspection is the most frequently done, the hot gas inspection is done the second most 
frequently, and the major inspection is the least frequently done. Table 23 below shows 
the recommended inspection intervals for the GE 7FA gas turbine, given the following 
inferences: 
• Combustion inspection should be done every 8000 factored hours (machine 
running time) or 450 factored starts, whichever occurs first. 
• Hot gas path inspection is recommended every 24000 factored hours or 900 
factored starts, whichever occurs first. 
• Major inspection is recommended every 48000 factored hours or 2400 factored 
starts, whichever occurs first. 
 
Table 23: GE technology specific baseline recommended inspection intervals [9] 
 
 
As one can observe from Table 23, the compressor, which is normally covered under a 
major inspection, could develop anomalies that might lead to component failure during a 
major inspection interval of 48000 factored hours or 2400 factored starts. 
Therefore, the proposed approach could help detect compressor failure precursors. 
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6.1.3 Failure precursor detection process applied to a gas turbine compressor for 
data collection 
Each of the test units is monitored using several sensors. However, because the 
compressor is the subsystem of interest, only sensors that are affected by the compressor 
operation are selected. The locations of the monitored sensors are shown in Figure 61.  
Based on the answer to a previous research question, the sensors measurements are 
recorded at a one minute sampling time. Because all eleven units will go through the 
same process, the steps of the proposed failure precursor detection method are applied to 
the first test unit, as seen below. The application of the failure detection to the other ten 























Output    Speed
X1                X2
 
Figure 61: Layout of monitored sensors for gas turbine compressor anomaly detection 
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6.1.3.1 Backgrounds of the failed units 
 
Test unit 1 had a hot gas path inspection in July 2005. The unit had 34638 factored fired 
hours (much less than the recommended 48000 FFH for the next major inspection)   and 
140 factored starts (much less than the recommended 2400 FS required for the next major 
inspection). In other words, the machine was not close to it required major inspection (i.e. 
machine has not gone through any major inspection) at the time of the compressor 
failure. The machine had a compressor catastrophic failure on July 4th 2009 at 2:55 AM. 
6.1.3.2 Steps of the anomaly detection methodology 
6.1.3.2.1 Step 1: Query data 
The sensors that measure the health of the gas turbine compressor, the overall 
heath of the gas turbine, and the operation conditions are identified and summarized in 
Table 24. 
Table 24: Monitored Gas turbine compressor sensors 
Variable Variables Description
X1 Overall  system health parameter 1
X2 Overall  system health parameter 1
X3 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X4 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X5 Turbine seismic vibration 3
X6 Compressor health parameter 1
X7 Compressor health parameter 2
X8 Compressor effectiveness health parameter 1
X9 operating condition (load)
X10 operation condition 1 (environment)
X11 Compressor effectiveness health parameter 2






After the sensors are identified, a query is made to the stored database for information 
from the sensors of interest at a one minute sampling interval from the period of 
6/01/2009 at 12:00 AM to 7/04/2009 at 3:00 AM, soon after the time of failure. 
 
6.1.3.2.2 Step 2: Pre-processing 
At the pre-processing step, the raw data is normalized using the mean value of 
each variable. The normalized sensor readings are within the same value range. It is 
observed that the normalized data set has the same characteristics as the raw data, and the 
normalized data has a mean value of 1 for all the sensors. 
Then, the data set is filtered to eliminate outliers.  
By observing the distribution of the twelve pre-processed sensors, shown in Figure 62, it 
can be noticed that the distributions are almost normally distributed and centered on the 
value 1, with the exception of the operating conditions that have a uniform distribution, 






Figure 62: Distribution of the 12 sensors pre-processed 
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6.1.3.2.3 Step 3: Signal de-noising using the DWPT  
At this step, each of the twelve normalized sensor data sets is de-noised using the 
discrete wavelet packet transforms (DWPT) and the Daubechies 10 Wavelet. 
As an illustrative example, Figure 63 shows the noisy and noise-free sensor X3 signals, 
which will be used in the subsequent steps, with a signal to noise ratio of 13.445 decibels   










original sensor s ignal
denoised sensor signal
 
Figure 63: Noisy and de-noised sensor X3 
 
6.1.3.2.4 Step 4: Multi-resolution Analysis 
At the MRA step, each sensor signal is decomposed into a three-level tree using 
the DWPT with the “Daubechies 7”, which leads to eight different wavelet components 





(2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3)










data for node: (7) or (3,0).
 
Figure 64: Tree decomposition of sensor X3 signal with the wavelet component at node 7 
 
Figure 65 below shows the original de-noised signal and each of the eight wavelet 
components (original de-noised sensor signal shown in black, approximation in red, and 
the details in blue). 
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Figure 65: DWPT at 3-level MRA of sensor X3 
Then, the energy content at each node of level 3 is evaluated and grouped into two 
groups: approximation (node 7 or (3,0)) and details (sum of the details of node 9 through 
14). This is shown in Table 25 below.  
 
Table 25: Node energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition  
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
100 100 99.983 99.988 99.99 100 100 100 100 99.999 100 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)
2.33E-04 1.49E-06 0.0165 0.011548 0.010464 5.93E-05 2.72E-05 5.10E-05 4.86E-06 7.59E-04 3.33E-05 1.92E-06
 
 
For each of the twelve sensors, the energy contained within the approximation node is 
over 99.9% of the total energy of the original signal. Therefore, the approximation signal 
(or scale function) will be used as the representative of the actual signal in the subsequent 
steps. That is, the energy content in each of the wavelet components will serve as the 
signal feature characteristic.  
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6.1.3.2.5 Step 5: PPCA data fusion 
First, the standard PCA is performed on the retained signal feature (approximation) to 
determine the principal components (PC). 
The covariance matrix of the processed twelve variables is calculated, as shown in Table 
26.  
Table 26: Covariance Matrix for PCA 
 
 
Then, the eigenvalues with their respective contributions and the corresponding 
eigenvectors for the covariance matrix are obtained and ranked from highest value to 









































































 To retain at least 95% of the information content (i.e. 95% of the confidence 
level, which is shown with a red bar), only the first three eigenvalues representing 
95.908%, are needed. Consequently, the eigenvectors corresponding to those three 
eigenvalues, which represent the principal components, are chosen, as shown in the Table 
28:  
Table 28: Eigenvectors or weight matrix for three principal components 
Variables




PC3    
(6.10%)
X1 0.00441 -0.04005 0.23462
X2 -0.00016 -0.00003 -0.00048
X3 0.70473 -0.27312 -0.52123
X4 0.64907 -0.12295 0.58098
X5 0.2856 0.95059 -0.07837
X6 0.00059 -0.03636 0.14895
X7 0 -0.00058 -0.07432
X8 -0.00039 -0.02236 0.1228
X9 0.00001 0.00013 -0.00033
X10 -0.02169 -0.04877 -0.51587
X11 0.00232 -0.02716 0.14269
X12 0.00094 -0.01109 0.018  
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The entries of the eigenvectors are the weights that will be applied to their corresponding 
variables in order to obtain the principal component; that is, the combination of the 
twelve variables.  
At this point, the Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis (PPCA) procedure will be 
implemented. First, the major weight contributors are identified. This establishes the 
maximum weight likelihood; that is, any entry value of an eigenvector less than 0.1 is set 
to 0, while any value greater than 0.1 is kept. Consequently, the following principal 
components are obtained for the PPCA and shown in Table 29. 
 
Table 29: Maximum likelihood weight for PPCA principal components 
 
Variables




PC3    
(6.10%)
X1 0 0 0.23462
X2 0 0 0
X3 0.70473 -0.27312 -0.52123
X4 0.64907 -0.12295 0.58098
X5 0.2856 0.95059 0
X6 0 0 0.14895
X7 0 0 0
X8 0 0 0.1228
X9 0 0 0
X10 0 0 -0.51587
X11 0 0 0.14269
X12 0 0 0  
 
As can be noticed from Table 29, the major effects occur along the vibration sensors 
(X1,X2, and X3) for the two heavily contributing principal components, while the 
performance parameters have some impact as well along the third component. 
Next, the remaining PPCA parameters are computed (i.e. the isentropic noise covariance, 
the prediction error unique to response, the data matrix and the variance of reduced 
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dimension). An algorithm that will implement the PPCA steps is created using the 
MATLAB ® software, and the signal along the three principal components is obtained. 
The three signals obtained from the PPCA process are shown in Figure 66 


























Figure 66: Signal obtained from PPCA process 
 
6.1.3.2.6 Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
Anomaly detection decision is a multi-stage statistical process. The first stage is 
the reconstruction of a one-dimensional signal, followed by the threshold calculation and 
so on. 
• Computation of reconstructed signal 
Since the three most important principal components (shown in Figure 66) are kept, the 






11 ttttRS Φ+Φ+Φ= λλλ               (76) 
With 1λ =76.01%, 2λ =13.79% and 3λ =6.10%. These percentages are the total 
information content in each of the three major eigenvalues. Figure 67 is the 
reconstruction of the three principal components, which are, in themselves, the 
representation of the original twelve sensor signals.  
 














• Threshold calculation  
 
 
To compute the damage indicators SAD and SSD, Eref needs to be established. To that 
end, the following steps are taken:  
1) The reconstructed signal is decomposed using DWPT and the Daubechies 6 (db6) 
wavelet. 
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2) The reference energy, Eref, is calculated as the average energy content of the 
reconstructed signal for the first ten hours of healthy operation. Thus, a value of 
Eref=1.2943 is obtained.  
3) Next, to calculate the threshold a converged value of the statistical parameters 
( SADµ , SADσ  and SSDµ , SSDµ ) need to be determined. The convergence criteria are 
strictly enforced; that is, the parameter values need to remain static for three hours 
of operation for each parameter, and then converge after more than eighty hours 
of operation.  Figure 68 shows the point at which all four parameters converge.  
 


























Figure 68: Statistical parameters for SAD and SSD 
 
 
Then, the modified statistical parameters are obtained and used to calculate the threshold. 
A value of α = 0.02 for a confidence level of 100*(1- α) (i.e. corresponding to 98% 
confidence level) is assumed, and monitored until the failure occurs.  
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That corresponds to the SAD threshold values: a αSADUL of 0.22664 and a 
α
SSDUL of 
0.051105 for the SAD and SSD respectively. 
4) After the threshold value is set, the statistical process control kicks in, where the 
damage indictors are monitored over time. Figure 69  below is a graph presenting 
the monitoring of the damage indicator SAD, and Figure 70 shows the data from 
the damage indicator SSD. In both figures, the red dash is a visual representation 
of the threshold, while the signal is in red.  











Figure 69: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD 
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Figure 70: Monitoring of damage indicator SSD 
 
 
Both Figure 69 and Figure 70 show the threshold, magnitude length of the anomalies. 
5)  Bayesian Hypothesis Testing  
Finally, Bayesian hypothesis testing is performed using the following two equations: 
( ) ( ) 1, 0.22664 =≤ tHtSAD  (77) 
( ) ( ) 0, 0.22664 => tHtSAD  (78) 
The result of the Bayesian hypothesis test is the binary function H(t), with entry values of 
“1” and “0” obtained and shown in Figure 71.  As shown in the Figure 71, there were five 
abnormal events during the monitoring periods. This should have allowed the gas turbine 
operator enough time to avoid a catastrophic failure.  
In a post-processing analysis, the gas turbine manufacturer established that there was a 
failure precursory event on 06/17/2009 at 19:45. The proposed approach has successfully 
identified at least one previous defect event, as early as 06/12/2009 at 23:09. 
Furthermore, the proposed process has captured three other defects, missed by the gas 
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turbine manufacturer’s procedure, which should have alerted the manufacturer. Each 
defect was severe, with the final defect being the most severe.  













5 Anomalies detected 
before failure
 
Figure 71: Result of the Bayesian hypothesis testing 
 
Finally, the errors associated with the statistical calculation of the threshold are computed 
as well. Thus, the probability of a false-positive is an input that is decided by the analysis.  
It represents 2% in this example. As for the probability of a false-negative or type II 
error, it is less than 10e-4 for both damage indicators SAD and SSD, which is very small. 
The corresponding powers are around 1.0. It can be concluded that type II errors are 
insignificant compared to type I errors, which is desirable for any statistical process. 
 
6.1.4 Data collection procedure for RTTF modeling 
After the implementation of the precursor detection, the failure data needs to be 
collected in order to model the residual time to failure. Recall that the plan is to map the 
defect characteristics (the inputs) into the observed length of time (the response) between 
detection and time of failure. 
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Thus, using the same test unit 1 as an example, the health characteristics, as defined in 
the previous chapter, are determined. 
The Anomaly Severity Index (ASI) for the SAD damage indicator is computed as: 





kASI == , where k=1 is the first time step of the 
monitoring period (shown as a green curve in Figure 69). 
The Anomaly Duration Index (ADI) for the SAD damage indicator is the length of time a 
defect is continuous. It can be measured using either set of damage indicator figures, or 
using the results of the Bayesian hypothesis testing figure. 
Finally, the response parameter, or the time to failure FT , is determined for each detected 
anomaly. The failure time for test unit 1 is illustrated in  Figure 72.  
The use of both type of figures-Figure 69 for the monitoring of the damage 
indicator and Figure 71 for the result of Bayesian testing- provides a better visual 
representation of the anomaly magnitudes (severity and duration). Additionally, the two 
health indexes can be merged in order to look at as the intensity of the severity. 
 
 177 

















Figure 72:  Illustration of the time to failure parameter 
 
The inputs for and response to a detected anomaly are summarized in Table 30. The ASI 
is dimensionless, while ADI and RTTF are in hours. 
 
Table 30: Summary of first detected anomaly 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1 2.42 0.7 507.76
 
 
The process applied to unit 1 to make Table 30, which consists of the first detected 
anomaly, can be repeated (see Appendix A) for the other ten units in order to produce a 
table of first anomalies.  
If all the detected anomalies were to be considered, an extended data set could be 
obtained, since there are five anomalies for unit 1, as shown in Table 31.  
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Table 31: Summary of all detected anomalies  
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1 2.42 0.7 507.76
2 1.149 1.583333 342.6667
3 2.582 1.183333 233.0667
4 2.814 1.433333 209.85
5 3.0298 1.366667 161.1667
 
 
In a similar way, by considering not only the first anomaly and its real time to failure, but 
also each subsequent anomaly, the table can be extended as well. 
Finally, the table can be altered by doing some tweaking, and disregarding the 
marginal health indexes in cases where there are many anomalies detected. Practically, 
this would eliminate the anomalies with small ASI and ADI values (when there are other 
anomalies detected within the same unit), which would base the prognostic model on the 
more pronounced health indexes. 
By making the proposed changes to the test unit, Table 30, which represents the 
first anomaly, changes so that the data summarized in Table 32 now represents the first 
anomaly.   
Table 32: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
3 2.582 1.183333 233.0667
 
 
In a similar fashion, Table 31 is changed into and replaced by Table 33, which will be 




Table 33: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
3 2.582 1.183333 233.0667
4 2.814 1.433333 209.85
5 3.0298 1.366667 161.1667
 
 
6.2 Modeling of Residual Time to Failure 
 
After repeating the data generation process for all eleven units, as underlined 
above, with the health indexes and time to failure (see Appendix A) the data in Table 34 
is compiled, representing the failure data for the modified first anomaly detected. 
However, test units 10 and 11 were censored after failure signatures were identified. 
Thus, the entries in the column labeled “censored” are either “0,” representing an 
observed failure, or “1,” representing a right-censored anomaly. 
 
Table 34: First anomaly 
Data point ASI ADI (hr) RTTF (hr) Censored
1 2.548228 1.183333 233.0667 0
2 1.036524 0.216667 332.15 0
3 1.282236 3.6 232.1167 0
4 1.165099 1 339.6833 0
5 1.184042 1.033333 578.2833 0
6 1.062287 0.066667 458.6833 0
7 1.551326 0.833333 35.2 0
8 1.12047 0.183333 119.5167 0
9 1.130492 0.233333 3.183333 0
10 2.335767 2.366667 85.18333 1
11 1.006843 0.033333 124.4 1  
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6.2.1 Implementation of the deterministic approach to residual lifetime modeling 
As presented in the previous chapter, the response surface equation will be used 
as the parametric regression technique, while the artificial neural network will be used as 
the non-parametric regression technique. 
 
6.2.1.1 Parametric regression: RSE 
 


























1112211 xxbxbxbxbxbbR o +++++=  (80) 
The goal is to solve for the different regression coefficients 0b , 1b , 2b , 11b , 22b , 12b . Then, 
the JMP software is used to determine the coefficients, as shown in Table 35. 
 
Table 35: RSE fit coefficients 
b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
2526.01 -3103.46 675.8822 810.1705 -87.9684 -129.022  
 
Table 36: Contribution of each term and cross terms to the RTTF prediction 
 
Figure 73 represents the profiler, and shows how RTTF varies with each of the predictors 



































Figure 73: Prediction profiler of RTTF (ASI,ADI) using RSE 
 
The next figures, Figure 74 and Figure 75, are the “actual versus predicted” and “residual 
versus predicted” plots, respectively. They show the quality of the fit of the eleven point 
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Figure 75: RSE fit Residual vs. Predicted RTTF 
 
The coefficient of determination that corresponds to the fit quality is 2R =0.52, which is a 
poor fit, as can be seen from Figure 74 and Figure 75. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that the RSE modeling of the RTTF is not acceptable. Next the 
neural network, which is a non-parametric regression technique, is used to predict the fit 
of the RTTF for given pairs of ASI and ADI. 
 
6.2.1.2 Non-parametric regression technique: neural network 
The non-parametric regression technique to be implemented is the artificial neural 
network (ANN). For the prediction of the RTTF response, using ASI and ADI as 














Figure 76: Neural Network for modeling RTTF 
 



























Figure 77: Prediction profiler of RTTF (ASI,ADI) using ANN 
 
Again, the software JMP is used to perform the regression. Figure 78 and Figure 79  
show the quality of fit for the eleven point data set regression performed using the 
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Figure 79: Residual vs. Predicted plot of NN regression 
 
 
In the case of the ANN, the coefficient of determination that corresponds to the fit quality 
is 2R =0.59. Although slightly better than the regression fit, the fit is still a poor one, as 
can be seen from Figure 78 and Figure 79. Consequently, the ANN modeling of the 
RTTF is not acceptable. It must be noted that there was an attempt to utilize other readily 
available neural network regression tools such as the BRAINN [170] and the MATLAB 
® GUI “nftool”. Both tools failed to provide adequate fitting results due to the limited 
size of the data set. 
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6.2.1.3 Implementation of the extended data set 
After the realization that the limited data set size is a constraint when performing 
acceptable deterministic regressions, the question arises whether or not a larger data size 
would provide a better fit.  For the sole purpose of checking the impact of the limited data 
set, let us build a table where not just the actual time to failure of the first detected 
anomaly is considered, but all of the anomalies are included, as described above in Table 
33, where the extended data set for test unit 1 is summarized. By adding the extended 
data for the other ten test units,  Table 37 is obtained. 
Table 37: Extended data set of ALL the anomalies 
Data point ASI ADI (hr) RTTF (hr) Censored Data point ASI ADI (hr) RTTF (hr) Censored
1 2.548228 1.183333 233.0667 0 21 1.165099 1 339.6833 0
2 2.81397 1.433333 209.85 0 22 1.065159 0.6 318.9833 0
3 3.029187 1.366667 161.1667 0 23 1.036482 0.083333 675.4333 0
4 1.036524 0.216667 332.15 0 24 1.184042 1.033333 578.2833 0
5 1.18051 0.166667 469.4833 0 25 3.623064 0.716667 37.31667 0
6 1.132413 0.2 438.5667 0 26 1.062287 0.066667 458.6833 0
7 1.137 0.116667 353.2667 0 27 2.240944 1.016667 1 0
8 1.183305 0.133333 284.4167 0 28 1.106504 0.166667 85.98333 0
9 1.258377 0.366667 252.65 0 29 1.551326 0.833333 35.2 0
10 1.282236 3.6 232.1167 0 30 1.580428 1.066667 11.05 0
11 1.496119 2.133333 212.0167 0 31 1.12047 0.183333 119.5167 0
12 1.246279 3.766667 208.0167 0 32 1.016824 0.05 49.38333 0
13 1.369278 2.266667 201.6333 0 33 1.130492 0.233333 3.183333 0
14 1.252208 2.016667 182.45 0 34 1.18496 2.8 2.783333 0
15 1.151164 2.15 160.9333 0 35 2.335767 2.366667 85.18333 1
16 1.208265 4.65 113.6667 0 36 1.637981 16.38333 78.46667 1
17 1.279143 4.766667 64.81667 0 37 1.626708 22.18333 22.16667 1
18 1.218381 2.283333 41.98333 0 38 1.006843 0.033333 124.4 1
19 1.140144 1.6 17.11667 0 39 1.23587 0.683333 48.36667 1
20 1.359802 0.3 359.9 0  
 




6.2.1.3.1 Parametric regression of extended data set using RSE 
Again using the JMP statistical software package, this time to determine the RSE 
regression coefficients for the extended data set, Figure 80 and Figure 81 illustrate the 
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Figure 81: Residual vs. Predicted regression of extended data set using RSE 
 
The corresponding coefficient of determination of the fit is 2R =0.22, which is an 
extremely poor fit of the response using the two inputs ASI and ADI. 
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6.2.1.3.2 Non parametric regression of extended data set using ANN 
Similarly, the JMP statistical software package is used to perform the regression 
of the extended data set; Figure 82 and Figure 83 illustrate the quality of the regression 





















Figure 83: Actual vs. Predicted regression of extended data set using ANN 
 
The corresponding coefficient of determination of the fit is 2R =0.36, which is an even 
worse fit of the response RTTF by the two inputs ASI and ADI than limited data set 
produced. 
 
However, an implicit assumption was made to build the extended data set: that 
each anomaly and the subsequent anomalies of a given machine were independent. The 
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resulting regression is even worse. That means that the assumption of independence is not 
legitimate. Now, let’s assume that an anomaly and its subsequent anomalies are not 
independent. Thereby, let’s define a new predictor that is only valid in the case of the 
extended data set, called the Number of Previous Anomaly” (NPA). NPA is a metric that 
gives more weight to an anomaly than to its predecessors if they occur on the same test 
unit. Table 38 is produced with the addition of the third input (NPA). 
 
Table 38: Extended data set with 3 inputs 
Data point ASI ADI (hr) NPA RTTF (hr) Data point ASI ADI (hr) NPA RTTF (hr)
1 2.548228 1.183333 1 233.0667 21 1.165099 1 2 339.6833
2 2.81397 1.433333 2 209.85 22 1.065159 0.6 3 318.9833
3 3.029187 1.366667 3 161.1667 23 1.036482 0.083333 1 675.4333
4 1.036524 0.216667 1 332.15 24 1.184042 1.033333 2 578.2833
5 1.18051 0.166667 1 469.4833 25 3.623064 0.716667 3 37.31667
6 1.132413 0.2 2 438.5667 26 1.062287 0.066667 1 458.6833
7 1.137 0.116667 3 353.2667 27 2.240944 1.016667 2 1
8 1.183305 0.133333 4 284.4167 28 1.106504 0.166667 1 85.98333
9 1.258377 0.366667 5 252.65 29 1.551326 0.833333 2 35.2
10 1.282236 3.6 6 232.1167 30 1.580428 1.066667 3 11.05
11 1.496119 2.133333 7 212.0167 31 1.12047 0.183333 1 119.5167
12 1.246279 3.766667 8 208.0167 32 1.016824 0.05 2 49.38333
13 1.369278 2.266667 9 201.6333 33 1.130492 0.233333 2 3.183333
14 1.252208 2.016667 10 182.45 34 1.18496 2.8 3 2.783333
15 1.151164 2.15 11 160.9333 35 2.335767 2.366667 1 85.18333
16 1.208265 4.65 12 113.6667 36 1.637981 16.38333 2 78.46667
17 1.279143 4.766667 13 64.81667 37 1.626708 22.18333 3 22.16667
18 1.218381 2.283333 14 41.98333 38 1.006843 0.033333 1 124.4
19 1.140144 1.6 15 17.11667 39 1.23587 0.683333 2 48.36667
20 1.359802 0.3 1 359.9  
 
The entire study with the two main predictors (ASI, ADI) is repeated by adding a third 





6.2.1.3.3 Parametric regression of the extended data set with three inputs using RSE 
The JMP statistical software package is used to determine the RSE regression 
coefficients of the extended data set with the three inputs. Figure 84 shows the 
contribution of each of the terms of the RSE. 
 
 
Figure 84: Pareto plot of the terms contribution for 3 inputs 
 
A visual representation of the quality of the extended data set regression using three 
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Figure 86: Residual vs. Predicted regression of extended data set with 3 Inputs using RSE 
 
The corresponding coefficient of determination for the regression fit of the extended data 
set using, the three inputs (ASI, ADI, NPA) is 2R =0.27, which is a very poor fit. 
 
6.2.1.3.4 Non-parametric regression of extended data set using ANN 
A similar approach is taken for the extended data set with three inputs using the 
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The corresponding coefficient of determination for the regression fit with three 
inputs using the ANN is 2R =0.51, which, though better than the coefficient of 
determination using two inputs, is still not an acceptable quality of fit. 
 
Ultimately, the deterministic regression approach to the residual time to failure is 
not appropriate. Although the non-parametric regression (ANN) is slightly better than the 
parametric (RSE) one, the qualities of the respective fits ironically get worse for both 
regression techniques when the data size gets larger. 
Therefore, as predicted in the previous chapter, the non-parametric data analysis is 
appropriate for failure data, as it can provide the empirical cumulative distribution of any 
survival or reliability data.  
 
6.2.2 Implementation of non-parametric data analysis using the Kaplan-Meier 
estimator 
Though the deterministic regression approach not appropriate, the Kaplan-Meier 
is appropriate to provide the estimate of the survival function plot because the data set is 
composed of both non-censored and censored data. 
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Thus, let us compute the Kaplan-Meier estimator with the obtained failure data. The 
actual failure data is referred to as the table of first anomaly data. The tabular data for the 
Kaplan-Meier plot of survival time, obtained using the application of the Kaplan-Meier 
estimation calculation, is shown in Table 39. 
 
 










0 0 0 11 1
3.183 1 0 11 0.909091
35.2 1 0 10 0.818182
85.183 0 1 9 0.818182
119.517 1 0 8 0.715909
124.4 0 1 7 0.715909
232.117 1 0 6 0.596591
233.067 1 0 5 0.477273
332.15 1 0 4 0.357955
339.683 1 0 3 0.238636
458.683 1 0 2 0.119318
578.283 1 0 1 0  
Figure 89 shows the Kaplan-Meier plot of residual time to failure after the first detected 
anomaly. 
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Kaplan-Meier plot of GT compressor failure after FIRST Anomaly
 
Figure 89: Kaplan-Meier plot of the residual time to failure for first detected anomaly 
 
However, as stated in the previous chapter, Figure 89 is an estimate; therefore, the 
confidence level of that estimation needs to be established. In order to achieve a 95% 
percent confidence interval, section C.1 in the appendix is calculated. Figure 90  shows 
the Kaplan-Meier plot, shown in Figure 89, with the addition of a 95% confidence band. 
As one can see, the uncertainty is large. 
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Figure 90: Kaplan-Meier plot of the RTTF from first detected anomaly with 95% confidence band 
 
Since the anomaly detection analysis showed that most of the units had more than one 
anomaly before failure, it is interesting to see how the Kaplan-Meier plot for the second 
detected anomaly compares to that for the first detected anomaly. Table 40 shows the 
tabular data for the Kaplan-Meier plot of residual time after the second detected anomaly. 
 










0 0 0 11 1
1 1 0 11 0.909091
2.783 1 0 10 0.818182
11.05 1 0 9 0.727273
37.317 1 0 8 0.636364
48.367 0 1 7 0.636364
49.383 1 0 6 0.530303
78.467 0 1 5 0.530303
161.167 1 0 4 0.397727
201.633 1 0 3 0.265152
318.983 1 0 2 0.132576
332.15 1 0 1 0  
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Similarly, Figure 91 shows the Kaplan-Meier plot of the residual time to failure after the 
second detected anomaly. 

























Kaplan-Meier plot of GT compressor failure after SECOND Anomaly
 
Figure 91: Kaplan-Meier plot of RTTF for second detected anomaly 
 
By proceeding as we did for the first anomaly, the 95% confidence interval for the 
Kaplan-Meier plot in Figure 91 is tabulated in the section C.2 in the appendix C.  
































Figure 92: Kaplan-Meier plot of the RTTF from SECOND detected anomaly with 95% confidence  
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Figure 92 shows the Kaplan-Meier plot from Figure 91 with the addition of its 
corresponding point-wise 95% confidence interval. There is still a large uncertainty 
interval. 
Although the first and second detected anomalies have a similar shape, plotting them 
together will provide a visual comparison, as shown in Figure 93. 









































Figure 93: Comparison of the first and second anomalies 
 
As it may be intuitive to many, Figure 93 shows that fact that the sooner an anomaly is 
detected the more time is given back to the decision makers to shut down the unit so as to 
avoid catastrophic failure. 
As in the case of the deterministic regression, let’s investigate the impact of the extended 
data set on the Kaplan-Meier plot for RTTF. The tabular data for the Kaplan-Meier plot 
of the extended residual time to failure data set is compiled in section C.3 of Appendix C. 
Also, Figure 94 is the graphical representation of the Kaplan-Meier plot in section C.3. 
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Kaplan-Meier plot of GT compressor failure with Extended data set
 
Figure 94: Kaplan-Meier plot for RTTF with extended data set 
 
Again, because Figure 94 represents an estimate, the confidence level needs to be 
established. The tabular extended data set for the 95% confidence interval is shown in 
section C.4 of Appendix C. Figure 95 shows the Kaplan-Meier plot of the extended data 
set with its corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 95: Kaplan-Meier plot of the RTTF for extended data set with 95% confidence 
 
Contrary to the deterministic case, the nonparametric approach to the extended data has a 
tighter uncertainty band, clearly indicating that the larger, the data set, the more 
accurately the Kaplan-Meier plot can be estimated. 
 
6.2.3 Parametric Distribution 
Although the non-parametric approach provides an empirical plot, which is the 
best representation of any failure data, the non-parametric approach is not flexible 
enough to be applied to other units of a given fleet not included in that failure data set. 
Thus, it is inappropriate for the purpose of this thesis, which is to find a way to guide the 
gas turbine manufacturers and unit owners to avoid catastrophic failure after a failure 
precursor is detected. A parametric analysis using different distributions than the ones 
presented in the previous chapter will be implemented in this section. 
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6.2.3.1 Exponential Distribution 
When there is no knowledge of a time-based distribution, as is the case here with 
the residual time to failure, the use of exponential distribution as a first estimate is always 
appropriate. The goal is to try to fit the Kaplan-Meier estimate data using the exponential 
distribution. That is, if it is assumed that the Kaplan-Meier data is exponentially 
distributed, then the probability density distribution of the first anomaly is shown in 
Figure 96. 
























Figure 96: pdf of the first Anomaly using Exponential distribution 
 
 
By plotting the equation xy λ−=  with tx = , one can create an Kaplan-Meier 
estimated exponential plot. This is shown in Figure 97. 
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Exponential plot of the kaplan-Meier
 
 
Linear least square fit
empirical data
 
Figure 97: Exponential plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimation of the RTTF 
 
 
The linear least square fit of the Kaplan-Meier estimated exponential plot of the RTTF 
has the equation: 
xy 0033.0−=  with a corresponding 869.02 =R . 
Although the coefficient of determination is not as bad as in the deterministic regression 
case, it is not perfect. Figure 98 also provides another visualization of the Kaplan-Meier 
estimate and the exponential fit. 
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Figure 98: Kaplan-Meier estimated RTTF of first anomaly and exponential fit 
 
Let’s analyze the impact of the exponential distribution assumption using the extended 
data set. First, the pdf of the exponential assumption better matches the extended data set 
than does the limited (first anomaly only) data set, as illustrated in Figure 99. 

























Figure 99: pdf of extended data set using the exponential distribution 
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We then plot the equation xy λ−=  with tx = . The Kaplan-Meier estimated 
exponential plot of the extended data set is shown in Figure 100 
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Figure 100: Exponential plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimated of the RTTF using the extended data set 
 
The linear least square fit for the exponential plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimated of the 
RTTF has an equation xy 0046.0−=  with a corresponding 9386.02 =R . 
The coefficient of determination in the extended case is much better than in the case of 
the limited data set. This stresses the fact that for a larger data set, exponential 
distribution fits the Kaplan-Meier estimate better.  
Again, the visual representation of the Kaplan-Meier estimate and the exponential fit 



















Figure 101: Kaplan-Meier estimated RTTF for extended data set and exponential fit 
 
 
6.2.3.2 Weibull Distribution 
The Weibull is the second distribution to be implemented. Figure 102 shows the 
pdf of the first detected anomaly. 






















Figure 102: pdf of the first anomaly using the Weibull distribution 
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In the case of the Weibull plot, the linear least square fit of the Kaplan-Meier 












Therefore, the Weibull plot of the Kaplan-Meier is shown in Figure 103. 
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Figure 103: Weibull plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimated RTTF 
 
 
The equation of the linear fit is: 
9275.36512.0 −= xy with a corresponding 7492.02 =R  
A plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimated RTTF of the first anomaly and the Weibull 
fit that serves as a visual, is shown in Figure 104 
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Figure 104: Kaplan-Meier estimated RTTF of first anomaly and Weibull fit 
 
As we did in the exponential case, let’s investigate the impact of the extended and 
Weibull distribution assumptions. The pdf of the Weibull assumption, shown in Figure 
105, better matches the extended data set than it does the limited (first anomaly only) data 
set.. 

























Figure 105: pdf of extended data set using the Weibull distribution 
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The Weibull plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimation of the extended data set is shown in 
Figure 106. 
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The best linear least square fit of the Weibull plot of the Kaplan-Meier estimation of the 
RTTF has an equation: 233.47624.0 −= xy , with a corresponding 9313.02 =R . 
Again, the coefficient of determination in the extended case is much better than it was in 
the case of the limited data set for the Weibull distribution. This shows that, in the case of 
a larger data set, a Weibull distribution fits the Kaplan-Meier estimate better.  
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Again, the visual representation of the Kaplan-Meier estimate and the Weibull fit, as 
shown in Figure 107, is better. 
 














Figure 107: Kaplan-Meier estimated RTTF for extended data set and Weibull fit 
 
6.3  Results Discussion 
This section serves to recapitulate the chapter on the implementation of the 
proposed methodology. It is shown that the deterministic regression approaches, both 
parametric and non-parametric, are not adequate for accurately predicting the residual 
time to failure; even when the number of predictors is increased to three, by taking into 
account the fact that a detected anomaly is not an event independent of its predecessors, 
the regression quality worsens. One way this observation could be explained is the 
challenge of knowing with certainty all the predictors that affect a response.  
Secondly, the non-parametric analysis using the Kaplan-Meier estimate, which is 
an empirical plot of the residual time to failure, was conducted. As any estimation 
requires, a 95% confidence level was computed for both the limited data set and the 
extended data set. As expected, the larger data set had a reduced uncertainty band. Also, 
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the first and second detected anomalies were compared to each other. It was revealed that 
the impact of early anomaly detection is that the gas turbine operation decision maker 
could take less disruptive actions. In other words, the sooner an anomaly is detected, the 
more time is given to the decision maker to avoid a catastrophic failure. 
Although the non-parametric analysis using the Kaplan-Meier provides a great 
result because the computation of the residual time to failure does not make any 
predefined distribution assumption, it cannot be used as an effective prediction tool for 
other units in a given fleet. This does not fulfill all the self-imposed goals of the thesis, 
one of which is to predict the residual time to failure for other fleet units based on the 
knowledge gathered from the analysis of previous failures. Thus, it was imperative from 
that point of view to investigate some parametric distributions, such as the exponential 
distribution and the Weibull distribution. The implementation of the parametric 
distributions was promising but did not fit well enough with the limited data set for either 
the exponential or Weibull distributions, as shown in Figure 108. 
 































Figure 108: Comparison of exponential and Weibull distribution fits with the Kaplan-Meier 
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Both the exponential and the Weibull distribution have a much better fit to the non-
parametric extended data set, as illustrated in Figure 109. The goodness of fits was 
assessed using the coefficient of determination 2R , which yield larger values with the 
extended data set. Another metric that was used to check how the fit quality gets better 
with the size of the data set was the Residual vs. Predicted plots shown in the Appendix 
D for the both data set. Also, a fact worth noting is that both distributions become very 
similar with larger distributions.  
The takeaway is that the larger the data set used for the Kaplan-Meier, the better the 
parametric distributions fit the Kaplan-Meier. 
 






































The parametric analysis using the exponential and Weibull distributions for both the 








Exponential Weibull lambda Beta Theta(hr)
Limited data set 0.869 0.7492 0.0033 0.6512 416.16







CHAPTER 7  
7CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
7.1 Revisiting the research objectives and questions  
7.1.1 Revisiting the research objectives  
The foremost goal of this dissertation is to develop an approach to detect 
precursory anomalies as early as possible in order to avoid the catastrophic failure of gas 
turbines. To focus the thesis on that goal and to meet the requirement for scientific 
approach research set by the institution, two major objectives are defined: 
7.1.1.1.1 Objective 1: 
Develop a process to find precursory failure signatures as early as possible in order to 
avoid systems catastrophic failure.  
7.1.1.1.2 Objective 2:  
After an anomaly is detected, develop a strategy to prognosticate an estimation of the 
residual time to failure. 
 
The first research objective is the main driver of this research, and the ability to achieve it 
gauges the success of this work. The second objective provides the necessary information 
to make a system shut down as undisruptive as possible. 
In order to look for a way to meet the imposed objectives, a series of research questions 
are asked and using the literature review and industry practices, potential hypotheses are 
formulated. 
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7.1.2 Revisiting research question 1, 1a and hypothesis 1, 1a 
The research question 1 and its sub-question 1a are about investigating ways to meet the 
first objective of this thesis. They are recalled here with their corresponding hypotheses: 
7.1.2.1.1 Research question 1:  
How can a precursory anomaly that might lead to a gas turbine catastrophic failure be 
detected? 
Though the ability to detect an anomaly as early as possible (i.e. almost real time) is in 
itself an advancement of the current industry practice, the ability to reduce the number of 
false alarms is also desirable. Thus the research question 1a is necessary.  
7.1.2.1.2 Research Hypothesis 1:  
A multi-step process that relies on the Wavelet transforms theory can be used to detect a 
precursory anomaly that might lead to the catastrophic failure of a gas turbine 
compressor. 
7.1.2.1.3 Research question 1a: 
How can a failure precursor detection method be made robust? 
7.1.2.1.4 Hypothesis 1a:  
Combining the information from the two types of sensors could decrease the number of 
missed precursory anomalies. 
The proposed methodology presented in chapter 4 is a multi-step process that has 
successfully captured known anomalies detected by a team of gas turbine manufacturers 
in a post-failure analysis, and has also captured other less severe anomalies that they 
missed. Specifically, the proposed methodology is a six step approach: 1) raw data 
acquisition of appropriate sensors, 2) sensor normalization, 3) de-noising of each sensor 
signal, 4) multi-resolution analysis using the discrete wavelet transform, 5) sensor data 
fusion into a few uncorrelated principal components, 6) anomaly detection decision. 
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It is shown in chapter 4 that the combination of the two types of monitoring sensors 
measurement (vibration and performance) improves the capability to detect failure 
precursors. Though a study of a group of eleven failed turbines has revealed that most of 
the failure precursor anomalies have signatures in the vibration sensors measurement, 
there are few cases where specific failure signatures were detected entirely by the 
performance sensors. In the case of the latter, any process solely based on the sensor 
measurements would miss those failure signs. 
 
7.1.3 Revisiting research question 2 and hypothesis 2 
Research question 2 and sub-question 2a refer to the ability to determine the level of 
confidence of the statistical technique used to make the anomaly detection decision.  The 
two questions and hypotheses are as follows: 
7.1.3.1.1 Research question 2: 
 How can a detected precursory event be statistically validated? 
7.1.3.1.2 Research hypothesis 2: 
The X-bar control chart type of  statistical process control can be utilized to establish the 
anomaly threshold, and thus distinguish  the faulty events from the non-defective ones. 
7.1.3.1.3 Research Question 2a: 
How does the sampling interval impact on the quality of detection? 
 
7.1.3.1.4 Hypothesis 2a 
The smaller  the time step (the higher the frequency) is, the more accurate the detection 
quality will be. 
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The research question 2 and sub-question 2a are important ones in any event detection 
process because the ability to keep the number of false alerts low is the key to the 
successful implementation of any new process. Thus, to reduce the risk of the conflicting 
interpretation of many sensors signals, a process is underlined in chapter 4, to reconstruct 
a one-dimensional signal representing the overall health of the system, monitor two 
damage indicators calculated from the reconstructed signal are monitored and calculate 
the defect threshold using the x-bar chart of the statistical process control. Also, in 
chapter 4 it is explained that  the proposed methodology is designed so that  the 
calculated defect threshold depends on the risk a system analysis is willing to run (as type 
I error) of interrupting the system operation when anomalies may not be present. The 
type II error is then deduced. 
As for the impact of the sampling time, the decision is made to use the 1 minute time 
interval because it has been proven adequate. In fact, there is an important trade-off to be 
made between the accuracy and the speed of execution of the anomaly detection; the 5 
minute time interval is not accurate enough because it misses short lasting anomalies, 
while the 5 second interval is more accurate but is also more sensitive and prone to false 
alarms. 
 
7.1.4 Revisiting research question 3 and hypothesis 3 
The research questions 3 and 4 and their respective corresponding hypotheses 3 and 4 are 
intended to meet the second defined thesis objective.  
7.1.4.1.1 Research question 3:  
If a failure precursor event is validated, how can the residual time to failure be estimated? 
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7.1.4.1.2 Research hypothesis 3: 
 
Survival analysis techniques such as deterministic regression, non-parametric and 
parametric analysis of failure data can be used to build models that estimate the residual 
time to failure. 
 
The ability to predict the residual time to failure after an anomaly is detected puts more 
power in the decision markers’ hands. In fact, based on the presented methodology in 
chapter 5, and the application in chapter 6, not all the anomalies are equal. Indeed, the 
two defined health indexes (anomaly severity and anomaly duration indexes) showed that 
for the eleven units covered  under this study, the failure always happened after a fairly 
important defect intensity (either high severity or long duration).  
However, the deterministic regression techniques implemented in chapter 5 did not yield 
acceptable residual life estimations. While the Kaplan-Meier provides a true picture of 
the residual time to failure of the units studied, it is not flexible enough to provide a 
prediction for the residual time for future units with a detected anomaly, so the 
parametric analysis of exponential and Weibull distributions provides fairly decent fits. 
The quality of the prediction model using exponential and Weibull distribution as 
parametric data analysis techniques gets much higher with the larger data set. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that for a larger data set, the parametric failure data analysis can be 
used.      
7.1.5 Revisiting research question 4 and hypothesis 4 
Research question 4 and hypothesis 4 are necessary for any estimation. In fact, the value 
of any estimation lies in the confidence interval associated with it. 
7.1.5.1.1 Research question 4:  
How can the confidence level of the estimated residual time to failure be determined? 
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7.1.5.1.2 Research hypothesis 4: 
Existing mathematical techniques can be used to compute the confidence interval of the 
survival time estimation. 
 
Although the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator does not have a close form to 
compute the confidence interval, the Greenwood formula can be used to estimate the 
variance so that the confidence interval can be calculated. The parametric survival 
distributions of exponential and Weibull have readily available confidence interval 
computation forms.  
Thus, it can be stated that based on the revisions of the research questions and 
hypotheses, each stated hypothesis verified has verified. 
 
 
7.2 Summary of Findings and Research Contributions 
 
This research has produced a number of contributions to the current industry standard. 
The first contribution is the creation of a systematic methodology, following a step by 
step approach that can be applied and made easily transferable to other sensor- monitored 
systems. The second contribution is that the proposed methodology provides a way to 
combine information from different type of sensors to create a much more robust 
precursory failure events detection of systems.  
The third contribution of this dissertation is that, contrary to other early defect detection 
techniques that rely on sophisticated mathematical underlying approaches, such as the 
neural network, this proposed method uses a statistical process control that is more 
flexible, faster,  and easier to implement. Furthermore, the proposed detection scheme is 
machine specific, which addresses the issues linked to machine-machine variation.  
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The fourth contribution of this thesis is the idea that the deterministic approach is not 
adequate to model the residual time to failure, even with a large data set, because it 
typically does not have a hazard function. 
The fifth contribution of the study is that the residual time to failure prognostication can 




Despite the risks involved with the LTSA contracts, they can be an enormous 
revenue stream for OEMs. Over the years, the profit margin for the sale of new gas 
turbines has been shrinking for OEMs, though LTSA for the most part assured OEMs of 
the new sale of upgraded components to sustain degrading gas turbine performance 
throughout the duration of the LTSA. The market for LTSA can be a very lucrative one if 
the level of liquidated damages is held to a minimum.  
In this thesis, a systematic multi-step data analytics prognostic and health 
management approach is presented, which could be used to detect precursory anomalies 
that could lead to catastrophic equipment failure. This could reduce or even eliminate the 
unplanned power plant outages. The approach is divided into two parts: failure precursor 
detection and residual life estimation.  
In general power plants have two main types of monitoring sensors: the process-
related measurements and high bandwidth measurement sensors which are high 
frequency sensors. This study required a time-frequency technique that could process 
high-frequency signals. Therefore, the proposed approach started with the pre-processing 
of the raw data from the system-monitoring sensors, which ensured that the analysis 
outcome would not be skewed toward the variables with high absolute value. Then the 
discrete wavelet packet transform was used to both remove the noise from the data and to 
decompose the signal in order to extract the signal features. After that, the multi-sensor 
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time series variable was fused into a few uncorrelated principal components using the 
probabilistic principal component analysis technique. Finally, the anomaly detection 
decision was made based on the Bayesian evaluation method, applied to a precision-
related metrics, for hypothesis testing to successfully detect failure precursors. 
The proposed process has shown promising results in its application to a GE 7FA gas 
turbine compressor failure because it has captured known failure precursors.  
The proposed approach uses an elaborate statistical process control technique to 
set the defect threshold. As a result of this utilization of the statistical process control, the 
proposed methodology can be easily implemented, unlike techniques that rely on the use 
of a neural network, in which a high fidelity mathematical model is required. 
Furthermore, the process is robust with few false alarm and a much lower false-negative 
for given false-positive probability. Additionally, the use of the statistical approach 
allows the handling of practical issues such machine-to-machine variation, both in the 
design and the operation, because the abnormality threshold is machine specific. 
Importantly, the proposed methodology has the ability to not just detect an anomaly, but 
also to determine its severity through two defined anomaly indexes. Moreover, the 
statistical approach to threshold determination allows the computation of both the type I 
and the type II error associated with the detection process.  
After a failure precursor is detected, different techniques are used to model the 
residual time to failure. First, the deterministic regression, which used the response 
surface methodology and the artificial neural network, was investigated; however, that 
method did not yield an acceptable accuracy for the residual life prediction. Then, the 
non-parametric survival data analysis using the Kaplan-Meier estimator provided the 
empirical fit, and its corresponding confidence interval was determined. Also, by using 
the Kaplan-Meier to compare multiple anomalies detected on the same unit, in the cases 
in which there were multiple defects before the catastrophic failure of the unit, the 
method showed that the earlier an anomaly was detected, the more time was given back 
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to the decision makers to limit the impact of disruption associated with the unplanned 
outage of a power plant. Despite the fact that the Kaplan-Meier is not constrained by any 
predefined residual lifetime distribution, it does not provide an indication of the survival 
time of other fatally defective units not included in the data set.  Therefore, two very 
popular parametric survival analyses, the exponential and the Weibull distribution, were 
used. For a smaller data set, both the exponential and Weibull distributions provided a 
better fit to the empirical Kaplan-Meier than did the deterministic regression techniques. 
Furthermore, for a larger data set, the two parametric failure data analyses provided even 
better fits to the empirical data, thereby providing the ability to model the residual time to 
failure after a failure anomaly is detected. 
 
7.4 Recommendations for Further research  
 
Incorporation of physical aspect of failure and failure modes to data driven to 
improve the quality of PHM: 
 
Although the proposed methodology has proven promising, the assumption that the 
failures are independent and identical distribution (iid) may not be adequate. Indeed, 
there are many different failure modes within a gas turbine compressor. The 
incorporation of information from physic-based models is desirable in order  to improve 
the estimation of the residual time to failure. 
 
 
Investigate Ways to reduce the current number of required steps of the proposed 
method:  
It would be desirable to find ways to accelerate the failure precursor detection approach. 
It would be interesting to investigate, for example, how to go from the multi-resolution 
analysis to the reconstructed one-dimensional signal of overall system health without 
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losing the added capability to carry over the data uncertainty provided by the 
Probabilistic Principal Component Analysis step. One suggestion for such a study is the 
use of eigenvalues from the covariance matrix as the weight for each variable.  
  
Pattern recognition:  
It would be very interesting to expand the proposed approach to another larger data set as 
a way to perform pattern recognition. One such an application would be the early 
detection of natural disasters such as earthquakes, in which the response decision is made 
based on the recognition of a certain recognizable signature. 
 
Life Extension:  
This work could be used as a starting point for life extension strategies, in which events 
that might affect a system’s lifetime could be detected as early as possible, and action 
could be taken to reverse an undesirable course. It is worth noting that life extension is 
very crucial for critical and often expensive systems. Currently, major life extension 
research is conducted for the US Nuclear Weapon systems. 
 
Semi-Parametric approach for residual time to failure modeling 
 
Subsequent researchers could repeat the study presented in this thesis for other gas 
turbine fleets like the 9FA. One could use the semi-parametric approaches of the 
proportional hazard and the accelerated failure time model to investigate how the residual 




APPENDIX A- EXPERIMENTS 
 
 
The list of variable is the same as shown on Table 42 for each unit unless specified 
otherwise 
Table 42: Monitored Gas turbine compressor sensors 
 Variable Variables Description
X1 Overall  system health parameter 1
X2 Overall  system health parameter 1
X3 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X4 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X5 Turbine seismic vibration 3
X6 Compressor health parameter 1
X7 Compressor health parameter 2
X8 Compressor effectiveness health parameter 1
X9 operating condition (load)
X10 operation condition 1 (environment)
X11 Compressor effectiveness health parameter 2
X12 operation condition 2 (environment)
 
 
A.1-  Test unit 1 
Test unit is as used as a demonstration unit in chapter 6. 
 
A.2-  Test unit 2  
 
At the MRA step, each sensor signal is decomposed into 3-level using the DWPT 
with the Daubechies 4, that lead to 8 different wavelet components (1 approximation, and 
7 details as shown on the tree decomposition of the Figure 110: Unit 2-Tree 
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data for node: (7) or (3,0).
 
Figure 110: Unit 2-Tree decomposition of sensor X3 signal with the wavelet component at node 7 
 
The Figure 111 below shows the original de-noised signal and each of the 8 wavelet 
components (original signal in black, approximation in red, details in blue) 
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Figure 111: Unit2- DWPT 3-level MRA of sensor x3 
 
Then the energy content at each of the node at the level 3 is evaluated and grouped into 
two groups: approximation (node 7) and the details (sum of the details of node 9 through 
14) is shown in the table below:  
 
Table 43: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 2 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.963 99.962 99.982 99.999 100 100 100 99.994 100 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)
1.00E-03 3.27E-06 3.60E-03 3.70E-03 1.80E-03 4.81E-01 1.64E-04 2.74E-04 1.47E-07 6.30E-03 2.44E-01 2.99E-06
 
 
For each of the 8 sensors, the energy contained within the approximation node is over 
99.9% of the total energy of the original signal. Therefore, the approximation signal (or 
scale function) will be used as the representative of the actual signal in the subsequent 
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steps. That is, the energy content in each of the wavelet components will serve as the 
signal feature characteristic.  
 
Step 5: PPCA data fusion 
 
Then the eigenvalues and their respective contributions and the corresponding 
eigenvectors for the covariance matrix are obtained and ranked from the highest value to 
the lowest value:  
Table 44: Pareto chart of eigenvavlues contributions of UNIT2 
 
To retain at least 95% of the information contents (i.e. 95% of confidence level), only the 
first 3 eigenvalues that represent 98.269% is needed. Consequently, the eigenvectors 
corresponding to those three eigenvalues represent the principal components are chosen 








Table 45: PCA weight matrix for UNIT2 
Variables




PC3    
(3.665%)
X1 -0.00053 0.05 -0.29211
X2 0.00011 0.00008 -0.00018
X3 0.68666 -0.13455 -0.01526
X4 0.68685 -0.19962 -0.02309
X5 0.23808 0.96099 0.13268
X6 0.00228 0.01872 -0.16403
X7 -0.00275 -0.02153 0.11613
X8 0.00304 0.02187 -0.16519
X9 0 0 -0.00006
X10 -0.00473 -0.12068 0.8959
X11 -0.00031 0.01389 -0.16063
X12 -0.0009 -0.00222 0.01349  
 
The entries of the eigenvectors are called the weights that will be applied to their 
corresponding variables to obtain the principal component that is the combination of the 
8 variables. 
At this point, the PPCA procedure will be implemented. First, the major weight 
contributors are identified to get the maximum likelihood of weight that is any entry 
value of an eigenvector less than 0.1 is set to 0 (W_ML=0.1), while any value greater 
than 0.1 is kept. Consequently, for the PPCA the following principal components are 











Table 46: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT2 
Variables




PC3    
(3.665%)
X1 0 0 -0.29211
X2 0 0 0
X3 0.68666 -0.13455 0
X4 0.68685 -0.19962 0
X5 0.23808 0.96099 0.13268
X6 0 0 -0.16403
X7 0 0 0.11613
X8 0 0 -0.16519
X9 0 0 0
X10 0 -0.12068 0.8959
X11 0 0 -0.16063
X12 0 0 0  
Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  




















• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 












Figure 113: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 2 
 
 
• Residual time to failure data table 
 
Table 47: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 2 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF




• Residual time to failure extended data table 
 
 
Table 48: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 2 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1 1.036524 0.216667 332.15
 
 
A.3-  Test unit 3 
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
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Table 49: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 3 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.837 99.995 99.953 100 100 100 100 99.998 100 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)




















































































Table 51: PCA weight matrix for UNIT3 
Variables




PC3    
(4.302%)
X1 0.00292 0.04306 -0.11075
X2 -0.00061 0.00009 0.00271
X3 0.98394 0.15459 -0.06909
X4 0.09968 -0.07233 0.84134
X5 -0.1467 0.97058 0.16285
X6 -0.00316 0.03165 -0.09364
X7 -0.00405 -0.01844 0.044
X8 0.00203 0.03152 -0.07455
X9 0.00014 0.00016 0.00027
X10 0.01488 -0.15314 0.46741
X11 -0.01147 0.03482 -0.11652
X12 -0.00403 -0.00046 -0.01627  
 
• PPCA (W_ML>=0.1) 
Table 52: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT3 
Variables




PC3    
(4.302%)
X1 0 0 -0.11075
X2 0 0 0
X3 0.98394 0.15459 0
X4 0 0 0.84134
X5 -0.1467 0.97058 0.16285
X6 0 0 0
X7 0 0 0
X8 0 0 0
X9 0 0 0
X10 0 -0.15314 0.46741
X11 0 0 -0.11652
X12 0 0 0  
 




• 1-d Reconstructed signal  
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Figure 114: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 3 
 
 
• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 













Figure 115: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 3 
 




Table 53: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 3 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.282236 3.6 232.1167  
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
 
Table 54: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 3 






1 1.282236 3.6 232.1167
1.496119 2.133333 212.0167
1.246279 3.766667 208.0167












A.4-  Test unit 4  
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
 
Table 55: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 4 
 Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.92 99.93 99.86 99.999 99.99 99.999 100 99.99 99.99 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)
6.56E-04 1.55E-07 8.02E-02 6.91E-02 1.35E-01 2.52E-04 1.40E-04 2.35E-04 5.14E-05 9.30E-03 2.34E-04 5.98E-06
 
 
PPCA data fusion 
 
• Eigenvalues table: 
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• PCA: Eigenvectors 
Table 57: PCA weight matrix for UNIT4 
Variables




PC3    
(5.101%)
X1 -0.02597 -0.00802 -0.23687
X2 0.00006 -0.00007 0.00014
X3 0.18902 0.733 0.05655
X4 0.14329 0.63699 -0.10909
X5 0.96947 -0.23804 -0.05664
X6 -0.01425 0.00014 -0.15419
X7 0.00987 0.00767 0.11073
X8 -0.0085 -0.00033 -0.13352
X9 0.00013 0.00008 0.00003
X10 0.05136 0.01252 0.92201
X11 -0.0127 -0.00168 -0.14664
X12 -0.00527 0.00051 -0.01109  
 
 
• PPCA (abs(W_ML)>=0.1) 
Table 58: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT4 
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Variables




PC3    
(5.101%)
X1 0 0 -0.23687
X2 0 0 0
X3 0.18902 0.733 0
X4 0.14329 0.63699 -0.10909
X5 0.96947 -0.23804 0
X6 0 0 -0.15419
X7 0 0 0.11073
X8 0 0 -0.13352
X9 0 0 0
X10 0 0 0.92201
X11 0 0 -0.14664
X12 0 0 0  
 
 
Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  
 















• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
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Figure 117: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 4 
 
• Residual time to failure data table 
Table 59: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 4 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF




• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 60: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 4 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
3 1.359802 0.3 359.9
4 1.165099 1 339.6833





A.5-  Test unit 5 
 
Unit 5 has eleven monitored sensors. The sensor X11 (Compressor effectiveness health 
parameter 2) did not record properly.  
 
Table 61: Monitored sensors for unit 5 
Variable Variables Description
X1 Overall  system health parameter 1
X2 Overall  system health parameter 1
X3 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X4 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X5 Turbine seismic vibration 3
X6 Compressor health parameter 1
X7 Compressor health parameter 2
X8 Compressor effectiveness health parameter 1
X9 operating condition (load)
X10 operation condition 1 (environment)




Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
 
Table 62: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 5 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.976 99.984 99.491 99.417 99.131 99.979 99.982 99.982 100 99.988 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)




PPCA data fusion 
 







Table 63: Pareto chart of eigenvavlues contributions of UNIT 5 
 
 
• PCA: Eigenvectors 
Table 64: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 5 
Variables




PC3    
(3.456%)
X1 0.1897 0.34279 0.28134
X2 0.16644 0.28797 0.22198
X3 0.60303 -0.30941 -0.03406
X4 0.63552 -0.36886 0.0079
X5 0.26122 0.5137 -0.80535
X6 0.19144 0.33751 0.28019
X7 0.17847 0.29981 0.21548
X8 0.1778 0.31576 0.26381
X9 -0.00004 0.00007 -0.00046
X10 0.02073 -0.01968 -0.16502
X12 0.00086 -0.00089 -0.00246  
 






Table 65: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 5 
Variables




PC3    
(3.456%)
X1 0.1897 0.34279 0.28134
X2 0.16644 0.28797 0.22198
X3 0.60303 -0.30941 0
X4 0.63552 -0.36886 0
X5 0.26122 0.5137 -0.80535
X6 0.19144 0.33751 0.28019
X7 0.17847 0.29981 0.21548
X8 0.1778 0.31576 0.26381
X9 0 0 0
X10 0 0 -0.16502
X12 0 0 0  
 
 
Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  












Figure 118: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 5 
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• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 










Figure 119: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 5 
• Residual time to failure data table 
 
 
Table 66: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 5 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.184042 1.033333 578.2833  
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 67: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 5 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
3 1.036482 0.083333 675.4333
4 1.184042 1.033333 578.2833









A.6-  Test unit 6 
 
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
 
 
Table 68: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 6 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.096 99.2714 99.944 99.999 99.999 99.994 100 99.991 99.999 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)




PPCA data fusion 
 
• Eigenvalues table: 






























































Table 70: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 6 
Variables















X12 -0.00215 0.00225  
 
• PPCA (abs(W_ML)>=0.1) 
Table 71: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 6 
Variables






















Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  
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Figure 120: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 6 
 
 
• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 

















• Residual time to failure data table 
 
Table 72: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 6 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.062287 0.066667 458.6833  
 
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 73: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 6 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.062287 0.066667 458.6833







A.7-  Test unit 7  
 
Unit 7 has eleven monitored sensors. The sensor X11 (Compressor effectiveness health 
parameter 2) did not record properly.  
Table 74: Monitored sensors for unit 7 
Variable Variables Description
X1 Overall  system health parameter 1
X2 Overall  system health parameter 1
X3 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X4 Compressor seismic vibration 2
X5 Turbine seismic vibration 3
X6 Compressor health parameter 1
X7 Compressor health parameter 2
X8 Compressor effectiveness health parameter 1
X9 operating condition (load)
X10 operation condition 1 (environment)









Table 75: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.951 99.949 99.979 99.999 99.999 99.999 100 99.996 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)





PPCA data fusion 
 
• Eigenvalues table: 
Table 76: Pareto chart of eigenvavlues contributions of UNIT 7 
 










Table 77: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 7 
Variables




PC3    
(10.42%)
PC4    
(6.933%)
X1 0.02585 -0.11531 -0.07147 -0.21823
X2 -0.00037 0.00018 0.0004 -0.00016
X3 0.65133 0.71098 -0.12597 -0.23312
X4 0.75635 -0.59349 0.07415 0.26235
X5 0.03799 0.04331 0.95795 -0.27949
X6 0.01954 -0.07014 -0.05275 -0.12858
X7 -0.01022 0.04424 0.03495 0.10793
X8 0.00888 -0.04667 -0.04843 -0.10464
X9 -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00007 0.00002
X10 -0.03041 0.34311 0.22248 0.84368
X12 0.01037 -0.01821 0.00033 -0.01271  
• PPCA (abs(W_ML)>=0.1) 
       
Table 78: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 7 
Variables




PC3    
(10.42%)
PC4    
(6.933%)
X1 0 -0.11531 0 -0.21823
X2 0 0 0 0
X3 0.65133 0.71098 -0.12597 -0.23312
X4 0.75635 -0.59349 0 0.26235
X5 0 0 0.95795 -0.27949
X6 0 0 0 -0.12858
X7 0 0 0 0.10793
X8 0 0 0 -0.10464
X9 0 0 0 0
X10 0 0.34311 0.22248 0.84368
X12 0 0 0 0  
 
 
Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  
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Figure 122: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 7 
• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 













Figure 123: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 7 
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• Residual time to failure data table 
 
Table 79: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 7 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.551326 0.833333 35.2  
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 80: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 7 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.106504 0.166667 85.98333
1.551326 0.833333 35.2








A.8-  Test unit 8 
 
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
 
Table 81: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 8 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.953 99.974 99.966 100 100 100 100 99.998 100 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)





PPCA data fusion 
 



























































• PCA: Eigenvectors 
 
Table 83: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 8 
Variables






X1 -0.0238 0.01697 -0.00237
X2 -0.00016 -0.00011 -0.00009
X3 0.64911 0.36963 -0.66389
X4 0.58148 0.31655 0.74687
X5 -0.48381 0.87318 0.01024
X6 -0.01524 0.00621 -0.00467
X7 0.01185 -0.00543 0.01085
X8 -0.02172 0.01416 0.01098
X9 -0.00001 -0.00003 0.00011
X10 0.06941 -0.00756 0.02525
X11 -0.01085 0.00326 -0.00453
X12 0.01092 -0.01033 -0.02003  
 
 






       
Table 84: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 8 
Variables






X1 0 0 0
X2 0 0 0
X3 0.64911 0.36963 -0.66389
X4 0.58148 0.31655 0.74687
X5 -0.48381 0.87318 0
X6 0 0 0
X7 0 0 0
X8 0 0 0
X9 0 0 0
X10 0 0 0
X11 0 0 0






Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  











Figure 124: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 8 
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• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 

















• Residual time to failure data table 
 
Table 85: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 8 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.12047 0.183333 119.5167  
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 86: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 8 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.12047 0.183333 119.5167








A.9-  Test unit 9 
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
Table 87: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 9 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
100 100 99.92 99.946 99.885 100 100 100 100 99.999 100 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)








PPCA data fusion 
 
• Eigenvalues table: 
 
Table 88: Pareto chart of eigenvavlues contributions of UNIT 9 
 
 





Table 89: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 9 
Variables















X12 0.00033 0.00141  
 
• PPCA (abs(W_ML)>=0.1) 
     
 
Table 90: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 9 
Variables



















Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  
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Figure 126: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 9 
 
• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 
















Figure 127: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 9 
 
• Residual time to failure data table 
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Table 91: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 9 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.130492 0.233333 3.183333  
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 92: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 9 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.130492 0.233333 3.183333









A.10-  Test unit 10 
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
 
Table 93: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 10 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.991 99.994 99.99 99.999 100 99.999 100 99.998 99.999 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)





PPCA data fusion 
 











• PCA: Eigenvectors 
 
Table 95: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 10 
Variables






X1 0.11163 -0.0496 -0.24283
X2 0.00063 0.00001 0.00212
X3 0.53611 0.44731 -0.07759
X4 0.41406 0.5949 0.14483
X5 0.64797 -0.61745 0.44181
X6 0.09165 -0.03798 -0.18695
X7 -0.02942 0.03416 0.08944
X8 0.08733 -0.04653 -0.14856
X9 -0.00002 0.00007 0.0001
X10 -0.29391 0.23822 0.78966
X11 0.07437 -0.0258 -0.17164
X12 -0.00159 0.01089 -0.02809  
• PPCA (abs(W_ML)>=0.1) 








Table 96: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 10 
Variables






X1 0.11163 0 -0.24283
X2 0 0 0
X3 0.53611 0.44731 0
X4 0.41406 0.5949 0.14483
X5 0.64797 -0.61745 0.44181
X6 0 0 -0.18695
X7 0 0 0
X8 0 0 -0.14856
X9 0 0 0
X10 -0.29391 0.23822 0.78966
X11 0 0 -0.17164







Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  
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Figure 128: Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 10 
 
 
• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
 














Figure 129: Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 10 





 Table 97: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 10 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
2.335767 2.366667 85.18333  
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 98: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 10 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
2.335767 2.366667 85.18333
1.637981 16.38333 78.46667
1.626708 22.18333 22.16667  
 
 







A.11-  Test unit 11 
 
Multi-resolution Analysis: Energy Content of each Sensor 
 
 
Table 99: Nodes energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition of Unit 11 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Approximation         
(% of Original)
99.999 100 99.559 99.653 99.7691 99.999 100 99.999 100 99.996 99.999 100
Sum of details   
(% of Original)





PPCA data fusion 
 





























































• PCA: Eigenvectors 
Table 101: PCA weight matrix for UNIT 11 
Variables













X12 0.00079  






Table 102: PPCA Maximum likelihood weight matrix for UNIT 11 
Variables













X12 0  
 
 
Step 6: Anomaly detection decision  
 
• 1-d Reconstructed signal  












Figure 130:  Reconstructed 1-dimensional Signal for Unit 11 
 
 
• Monitoring of Damage indicator 
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Figure 131:  Monitoring of damage indicator SAD for unit 11 
 
• Residual time to failure data table.  
 
Table 103: Actual first anomaly to be used for PHM model for unit 11 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.006843 0.033333 124.4  
 
 
• Residual time to failure extended data set table 
 
Table 104: Actual extended data set representing all anomalies for PHM model for unit 11 
Anomaly ASI ADI RTTF
1.006843 0.033333 124.4




Note: Unit 11 is right-censored 
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APPENDIX B- MRA LEVEL DECISION 
 
 
The test unit 1 is used as an example to assess the effect of decomposition level 
on the multi-resolution analysis to determine the appropriate level of decomposition.  
The same de-noised signal used in Chapter 6 is used and decomposed into a two-level, 
three-level and four-level tree using the DWPT and the “Daubechies 7”. The energy 
content of the approximation is calculated on one had and the sum of the energy content 
of the details nodes is calculated on another hand. 
 












data for node: (3) or (2,0).
 
Figure 132: Level-2 tree decomposition of sensor X3 signal with the wavelet component at node 3 
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Figure 132 is the two level tree decomposition whereas Figure 133 is the multi-resolution 
analysis plot of the sensor X3 with the original de-noised signal (black), the 




































Table 105: Node energy content of each sensor at level-2 DWPT decomposition 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Aproximation 
(% of original)
100 100 99.994 99.996 99.994 100 100 100 100 99.9997 100 100
Sum of details 
(% of original)




Table 105 shows the energy content of the approximation node as well as the sum of the 












(2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3)










data for node: (7) or (3,0).
 
Figure 134: Level-3 tree decomposition of sensor X3 signal with the wavelet component at node 7 
 
 
Figure 134 is the three level tree decomposition whereas Figure 135 is the multi-
resolution analysis plot of the sensor X3 with the original de-noised signal (black), the 
approximation node signal (red) and the seven details (blue).  
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Figure 135: DWPT at level-3 MRA of sensor X3 
 
 
Table 106: Node energy content of each sensor at level-3 DWPT decomposition 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Aproximation 
(% of original)
99.9998 100 99.9835 99.9885 99.9895 99.9999 100 99.9999 100 99.9992 100 100
Sum of details 
(% of original)
2.33E-04 1.50E-06 0.0165 0.0115 0.0105 5.93E-05 2.72E-05 5.09E-05 4.86E-06 7.58E-04 3.33E-05 1.92E-06
 
 
Similarly, Table 106 shows the energy content of the approximation node as well as the 

















(2,0) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3) 
(3,0) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5) (3,6) (3,7) 
(4,0) (4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6) (4,7) (4,8) (4,9) (4,10)(4,11)(4,12)(4,13)(4,14)(4,15)










data for node: (15) or (4,0).
 
Figure 136: Level-4 tree decomposition of sensor X3 signal with the wavelet component at node 15 
 
 
The four-level tree decomposition is shown on Figure 136 and Figure 137 represents the 
multi-resolution analysis plot of the sensor X3 with the original de-noised signal (black), 
the approximation node signal (red) and the seven details (blue).  
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Table 107: Node energy content of each sensor at level-4 DWPT decomposition 
Sensor X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
Aproximation 
(% of original)
99.9996 100 99.9699 99.976 99.986 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 100 99.9984 99.9999 100
Sum of details 
(% of original)





Table 107 shows the energy content of the approximation node as well as the sum of the 
detail nodes of each of the twelve monitored sensors at four-level decomposition.  
 
B.4-  Level of decomposition decision for multi-resolution analysis  
After the decomposition of each of the twelve sensors to two-level, three-level, four-level 
and the calculation of the energy content each node, it is noticed that the approximation 
node conserves over 99.9% of the total energy of the original signal in each case. 
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However, for sensitive sensors such as vibration sensors, the higher the level of 
decomposition (finer details), the more energy is contained at the details nodes is. 
Theoretically, a sensor signal could be decomposed a level much higher, but there is a 
need for a trade-off between the amount of information gained at higher decomposition 
level and the complexity of high decomposition level.  
For example, the sensor vibration sensor X3 has the following: 
• Approximation node energy: 99.994 and detail nodes energy: 0.0045 for 
level-2 DWPT 
• Approximation node energy: 99.9835 and detail nodes energy: 0.0165 for 
level-3 DWPT 
• Approximation node energy: 99.9699 and detail nodes energy: 0.0301 for 
level-4 DWPT 
Though the level-4 yields a higher details energy content value than the level-3, which in 
turn has a higher value than level-2, as it can be inferred by comparing Figure 135 and 
Figure 137, the higher the level of decomposition, the more cumbersome the multi-
resolution analysis becomes. Moreover, based on the value of the energy content at the 
approximation node that is over 99.9% in each of the three case, it is concluded that 
level-four decomposition does not provide much more information compared to the level-
three for its associated complexity to justify its use. Consequently, the decision is made to 
use the level-three decomposition, which yields more information about the signal 




APPENDIX C- KAPLAN-MEIER TABLES 
 









3.183 0.909090909 0.739204 1
35.2 0.818181818 0.590255 1
85.183 0.818181818 0.590255 1
119.517 0.715909091 0.442171 0.9896474
124.4 0.715909091 0.442171 0.9896474
232.117 0.596590909 0.284162 0.9090197
233.067 0.477272727 0.151353 0.8031924
332.15 0.357954545 0.040514 0.675395
339.683 0.238636364 0 0.5236734
458.683 0.119318182 0 0.3376221
578.283 0 0 0.3376221  
 









1 0.909091 0.739204 1
2.783 0.818182 0.590255 1
11.05 0.727273 0.464086 0.99046
37.317 0.636364 0.352089 0.920638
48.367 0.636364 0.352089 0.920638
49.383 0.530303 0.226775 0.833831
78.467 0.530303 0.226775 0.833831
161.167 0.397727 0.077631 0.717824
201.633 0.265152 0 0.566069
318.983 0.132576 0 0.370057












C.3-  Extended tabular data  
Data point ASI ADI (hr) RTTF (hr) Censored
1 2.548228 1.183333 233.0667 0
2 2.81397 1.433333 209.85 0
3 3.029187 1.366667 161.1667 0
4 1.036524 0.216667 332.15 0
5 1.18051 0.166667 469.4833 0
6 1.132413 0.2 438.5667 0
7 1.137 0.116667 353.2667 0
8 1.183305 0.133333 284.4167 0
9 1.258377 0.366667 252.65 0
10 1.282236 3.6 232.1167 0
11 1.496119 2.133333 212.0167 0
12 1.246279 3.766667 208.0167 0
13 1.369278 2.266667 201.6333 0
14 1.252208 2.016667 182.45 0
15 1.151164 2.15 160.9333 0
16 1.208265 4.65 113.6667 0
17 1.279143 4.766667 64.81667 0
18 1.218381 2.283333 41.98333 0
19 1.140144 1.6 17.11667 0
20 1.359802 0.3 359.9 0
21 1.165099 1 339.6833 0
22 1.065159 0.6 318.9833 0
23 1.036482 0.083333 675.4333 0
24 1.184042 1.033333 578.2833 0
25 3.623064 0.716667 37.31667 0
26 1.062287 0.066667 458.6833 0
27 2.240944 1.016667 1 0
28 1.106504 0.166667 85.98333 0
29 1.551326 0.833333 35.2 0
30 1.580428 1.066667 11.05 0
31 1.12047 0.183333 119.5167 0
32 1.016824 0.05 49.38333 0
33 1.130492 0.233333 3.183333 0
34 1.18496 2.8 2.783333 0
35 2.335767 2.366667 85.18333 1
36 1.637981 16.38333 78.46667 1
37 1.626708 22.18333 22.16667 1
38 1.006843 0.033333 124.4 1
39 1.23587 0.683333 48.36667 1  
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In the “censored column, a value of “0” corresponds to an observed failure events, while 






















































0 0 0 39 1
1 1 0 39 0.9744
2.783 1 0 38 0.9487
3.183 1 0 37 0.9231
11.05 1 0 36 0.8974
17.117 1 0 35 0.8718
22.167 0 1 34 0.8718
35.2 1 0 33 0.8454
37.317 1 0 32 0.819
41.983 1 0 31 0.7925
48.367 0 1 30 0.7925
49.383 1 0 29 0.7652
64.817 1 0 28 0.7379
78.467 0 1 27 0.7379
85.183 0 1 26 0.7379
85.983 1 0 25 0.7084
113.667 1 0 24 0.6789
119.517 1 0 23 0.6493
124.4 0 1 22 0.6493
160.933 1 0 21 0.6184
161.167 1 0 20 0.5875
182.45 1 0 19 0.5566
201.633 1 0 18 0.5257
208.017 1 0 17 0.4947
209.85 1 0 16 0.4638
212.017 1 0 15 0.4329
232.117 1 0 14 0.402
233.067 1 0 13 0.371
252.65 1 0 12 0.3401
284.417 1 0 11 0.3092
318.983 1 0 10 0.2783
332.15 1 0 9 0.2474
339.683 1 0 8 0.2164
353.267 1 0 7 0.1855
359.9 1 0 6 0.1546
438.567 1 0 5 0.1237
458.683 1 0 4 0.0928
469.483 1 0 3 0.0618
578.283 1 0 2 0.0309
675.433 1 0 1 0  
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1 0.9744 0.924752 1
2.783 0.9487 0.879492 1
3.183 0.9231 0.839447 1
11.05 0.8974 0.802219 0.992653
17.117 0.8718 0.766871 0.976719
22.167 0.8718 0.766871 0.976719
35.2 0.8454 0.731571 0.959183
37.317 0.819 0.697501 0.940417
41.983 0.7925 0.664438 0.920643
48.367 0.7925 0.664438 0.920643
49.383 0.7652 0.630794 0.89963
64.817 0.7379 0.598 0.877766
78.467 0.7379 0.598 0.877766
85.183 0.7379 0.598 0.877766
85.983 0.7084 0.562608 0.854127
113.667 0.6789 0.528123 0.829581
119.517 0.6493 0.494457 0.804216
124.4 0.6493 0.494457 0.804216
160.933 0.6184 0.459497 0.777336
161.167 0.5875 0.425378 0.749613
182.45 0.5566 0.392051 0.721098
201.633 0.5257 0.359483 0.691824
208.017 0.4947 0.327651 0.661815
209.85 0.4638 0.296542 0.631082
212.017 0.4329 0.266155 0.599627
232.117 0.402 0.236496 0.567445
233.067 0.371 0.207583 0.534516
252.65 0.3401 0.179442 0.500815
284.417 0.3092 0.152116 0.4663
318.983 0.2783 0.125662 0.430913
332.15 0.2474 0.100158 0.394575
339.683 0.2164 0.075715 0.357176
353.267 0.1855 0.052488 0.318562
359.9 0.1546 0.030703 0.278505
438.567 0.1237 0.010709 0.236657
458.683 0.0928 0 0.192431
469.483 0.0618 0 0.144688
578.283 0.0309 0 0.090522
675.433 0 0 0.090522  
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APPENDIX D- RESIDUAL PLOTS FOR PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
D.1-  Residual plots for limited data set: first detected anomaly 

















Residual by Predicted for Exponential plot
 
Figure 138: Residual by Predicted for Exponential distribution assumption for limited data set 
 



















Residual by Predicted for Weibull plot
 





D.2-  Residual plots for extended data set 

















Residual by Predicted for Exponential plot
 
Figure 140: Residual by Predicted for Exponential distribution assumption for extended data set 
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Residual by Predicted for Weibull plot
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